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 With this project, I would like to reconstruct pragmatism as a valid way of 
looking at legal problems and of solving them, in particular, the current legal debate over 
race-conscious admissions policies at state universities.  Throughout this project, I will 
develop a working notion of pragmatism for twenty-first century legal theory and 
practice.  Through constant application of pragmatic ideas to the concrete issues of 
affirmative action and race-conscious admissions policies, I will show that pragmatism is 
a means to craft a more just legal system, and as a result, a more just society. 
 In this project I will use the ideas of the some of the most important classical 
pragmatists: Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and Jane Addams.  
The work of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is also important to this 
project although Holmes shunned the appellation "pragmatist."  The lives of all five 
thinkers form a web of interrelated relationships and thought.  Peirce, James, and Holmes 
developed relationships through their intellectual lives in Boston.  For a time, Dewey was 
a student at Johns Hopkins University while Peirce was a lecturer there.  James and 
Dewey were intellectual compatriots in the area of psychology and philosophy.  Dewey 
and Addams, both eventual residents of Chicago, developed a friendship and 
philosophical relationship.  Their community of thought embodies the pragmatic notion 
that discovery and learning are communal processes. 
 
 
 Pragmatism suggests that the more perspectives we gather, the closer we can 
come to a valuable truth.  The law as it stands in practice deliberately excludes a majority 
of voices from consideration.  Like the courtroom, a classroom is a focal point of 
authority; too often the voices of those who are perceived as outsiders are excluded from 
places of learning.  The most valuable contribution that pragmatism can make to both 
legal theory and pedagogy is the insistence that legal insiders and educators insure that all 
perspectives be given voice.  The Supreme Court decision Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 
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 a. Pragmatic Truth and "High Objectivity" 
The manner in which a person ascertains truth is arguably the central facet of a 
person's way of thinking about the world.  First, one must decide on what is true, and 
from there the rest follows.  René Descartes settled on one principle of truth, the cogito, 
and built his philosophy upon this notion of thinking-about-thinking.  Romanticism 
grounded truth in the individual's emotions and aesthetic experience.  Pragmatism, a 
philosophy born in late 19th century and early 20th century America, grounds truth in 
human experience.  Thus, for pragmatists, truth is contingent, perspectival, and 
mutable—though no less valid for it.  However, for those unfamiliar with the pragmatic 
theory of truth, it can seem unprincipled or infinitely subjective and relative. 
For example, in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, law professor Patricia J. 
Williams recounts the story of watching a family walk down Fifth Avenue in New York.  
She overhears the son, who is four or five years old, tell his parents that he does not like 
big dogs.  Williams writes:  
 
The mother was saying, “But why are you afraid of big dogs?”  “Because 
they’re big,” he responded with eminent good sense.  “But what’s the difference 
between a big dog and a little dog?” the father persisted.  “They’re big,” said the 
child.  “But there’s really no difference,” said the mother, pointing to a large 
slathering wolfhound with narrow eyes and the calculated amble of a gangster, 




father.  “If you look really closely you’ll see there’s no difference at all.  They’re 
all just dogs.” 
And I thought: Talk about your iron-clad canon.  Talk about a static, 
unyielding, totally uncompromising point of reference.  These people must be 
lawyers.  Where else do people learn so well the idiocies of High Objectivity? 
(Race & Rights 12) 
 
What Williams calls High Objectivity has gone by other names, some of which Williams 
provides here: “iron-clad canon;” “unyielding…point of reference.”  The parents describe 
a truth devoid of experience, a priori truth, metaphysical truth, Truth with a capital T.   
This truth lacks perspective and the knowledge of experience.  It blinds the parents to the 
bodily, substantive differences between a wolfhound and a Pekinese.  Although one 
might argue which breed is more likely to bite, the dogs are not the "same."  One is large; 
one is tiny.  Furthermore, this "truth" blinds the parents to the reality of the child, a small 
person, one whose perspective is free to be ignored or even manipulated by those in 
power.  Williams indicts the law and lawyers for clinging to beliefs even when their 
fallibility is staring them in the face—or growling at them, as the case may be.  
Williams’s example requires a priori knowledge to give way to experience and nuance––
it supports a call for pragmatism. 
With this project, I would like to reconstruct pragmatism as a valid way of 
looking at legal questions and of solving them.  In particular, I apply pragmatism to the 
current legal question of the validity of race-conscious admissions policies at public 
universities.  Throughout this project, I will develop a working notion of pragmatism for 




ideas to the concrete issues of affirmative action and race-conscious admissions policies, 
I will show that pragmatism is a means to craft a more just legal system, and as a result, a 
more just society.  Part of the work of legal pragmatism includes figuring out, via 
practical application, just what we as a society mean by words like "justice" and 
"fairness," filling these rather abstract terms with "substantive sustenance … through 
experiential inquiry" (Sullivan and Solove 704). 
Pragmatism arose as a philosophy that marries theory and practice.  One of the 
founders of pragmatism, William James, explains that thinking people seek "a philosophy 
that will not only exercise [our] powers of intellectual abstraction … but that will make 
some positive connection with this actual world of finite human lives" (Pragmatism 9).  
With these words, James takes the philosophical split of mind and body and brings the 
two parts back together.  For James, the mind, our powers of intellectual abstraction, 
should be reconnected with our bodies, the world of finite human lives.  For classical 
pragmatists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, experience was the only 
path to truth.  Pragmatism shows that High Objectivity and its a priori truth claims tend 
to fall apart when human experience is taken into consideration. 
Connecting the abstract to the finite reveals that "truth" is always partial, always 
contingent.  The pragmatic method thus creates a kind of radical uncertainty.  In what is 
now considered one of the founding texts of pragmatism, "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear" (1878), Charles Sanders Peirce sets forth the pragmatic process of truth.  He 




thought of a far higher grade than the 'distinctness' of the logicians. We have there found 
that the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is 
attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought" ("Ideas Clear" 
30). For Peirce, "thought" is reflection upon experience and empirical observation.  As he 
explains, through thinking, our beliefs may become unsettled, or irritated.  This irritation 
forces us to act: we can either suppress the irritation and cling to old beliefs, or listen to 
the irritation and examine its cause.  A good pragmatist learns to welcome the irritation of 
doubt, to question what has until that moment appeared natural.  One becomes willing to 
let go of rituals and beliefs in order to take on new ones that work better.  These new 
beliefs are then tested against experience, and the cycle of progress starts again. 
Pragmatism is a philosophy of progress and ingenuity.  Yet how does one justify 
applying pragmatism and its notions of change and progress to a legal system founded 
upon backward-looking tenets such as stare decisis ("let the decision stand")?  How do 
we bring pragmatism into alignment with judicial respect for America's two-hundred-
and-twenty-year-old Constitution?  In short, what can pragmatism do for the law?  John 
Dewey explains that the way the judiciary thinks it makes decisions and the way it 
actually does—or should—make decisions are very different.  Judges, lawyers, and even 
laypersons might think that the law is made up of processes "anterior to and independent 
of concrete subject-matters" ("Logical Method" 565).  However, Dewey explains, this is 
not how people, even people who are lawyers, actually think: "men do not begin thinking 




Method" 567).  Lawyers start with a conclusion favorable to their clients and work 
backwards, creating premises along the way ("Logical Method" 567).  Dewey 
acknowledges the importance of predictability in the law so that members of a 
community will know "the consequences which society though courts will attach to their 
transactions" ("Logical Method" 569).  But he demarcates the difference between 
"theoretical certainty and practical certainty" ("Logical Method" 569).  Theoretical 
certainty, based on fixed principles and immutable laws, is impossible for human society 
as it is constantly in flux.  Instead, Dewey proposes "that general legal rules and 
principles are working hypotheses needing to be constantly tested by the way in which 
they work out when applied to concrete situations" ("Logical Method" 571).  In other 
words, as in any other field of inquiry such as the sciences or mathematics, our beliefs 
must be tested against reality.  Even the law is not exempt from empirical data. 
As Dmitri Shalin explains, we have the greatest need for “consequence-oriented 
yet constitutionally grounded legal reasoning”––legal pragmatism––at cultural moments 
of change, “when new principles are invoked to offset old ones and fresh metaphors 
deployed to fire up moral imagination and spur legal creativity" (461).  Legal pragmatism 
is consequence-oriented, that is, grounded in substantive results; but it is also 
“constitutionally grounded,” or principled and theoretical.  Yet since human principles 
are contingent because they are grounded in human lives and history, they are shaken by 
doubt at moments of cultural crisis—and the legal creativity such crises inspire, when 




Pragmatism can help us balance the old and new in American jurisprudence 
because it looks at consequences, past and future, of judicial decisionmaking.  
Pragmatism has been accused of being unprincipled, and therefore unfit for work in 
jurisprudence, where objective principles ought to reign.  However, as Shalin writes, "as 
sense-making creatures we all take part in the production of social reality as objective and 
meaningful" (461).  Often what one considers "objective" is simply the subjective 
perspective of a powerful few given force as truth.  Within this creation of truth, of 
reality, lie serious ethical implications.  As Dewey writes, "Political facts are not outside 
human desire and judgment" (Public & Problems 6).  Rather, empirical data—scientific 
or political—is gathered and interpreted with particular ends in mind.  Usually, these are 
the ends of the white, wealthy, male, and politically powerful. 
When the parents on Fifth Avenue tried to persuade their son that the wolfhound 
and the Pekinese were the same, empirically, because they were both dogs, they tried to 
craft reality for their son based on their own beliefs.  When their beliefs collided with the 
beliefs of their son, a moment of irritation, of doubt, ensued for both sides.  Here was a 
chance for pragmatism to do its work.  The parents, the parties in power, could have 
chosen to listen to their son, to a different perspective.  Instead, they chose to ignore him.  
Not only did they ignore their son, they ignored the voice of their own experience.  Their 
beliefs collided with their own observations; the parents had to work hard to deny what 
was right before their eyes: the obvious physical differences in the sizes of the dogs.  This 




time.  On a larger scale, it led some Americans to believe for decades, for example, that 
global warming was a myth.   
Pragmatism does not require the parents to listen out to their son's point of view 
out of beneficence, but rather out of a duty to gather the perspectives and opinions of all 
people, including the small and powerless.  This is the duty of a democracy.  Dewey 
emphasizes the duty of public officials to gather the diverse opinions of the public:  
 
Unless there are methods for detecting the energies which are at work and tracing 
them through an intricate network of interactions to their consequences, what 
passes as public opinion will be 'opinion' in its derogatory sense rather than truly 
public, no matter how widespread the opinion is. … Opinion casually formed and 
formed under the direction of those who have something at stake in having a lie 
believed can be public opinion only in name. (Public & Problems 177) 
 
High Objectivity masquerading as truth is a powerful master.  It pushes willful blindness.  
Worse, though, is the brutish behavior of the parents in Williams’s story, when they try to 
impose their blindness on their son.  Even though their imposition was motivated by 
beneficence—after all, they were simply trying to assuage a child’s fears—they denied 
their son’s humanity when they refused to listen to his point of view.  The pragmatic 
method of truth requires the gathering of the perspectives of the most number of people 
in order to approach truth.  As William James writes, "when as empiricists we give up the 
doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself.  
We still pin our faith on its existence, and still believe that we gain an ever better position 




Believe" 15).  Pragmatism requires a willingness first to be irritated by doubt, then to 
choose the path of progress which may bring one face-to-face with the brutally new. 
 
b. Classical Pragmatists 
In this project I will use the ideas of the some of the most important classical 
pragmatists: Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, 
and Jane Addams.  The work of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is also 
important here although Holmes shunned the appellation "pragmatist."  The lives of all 
six thinkers form a web of interrelated relationships and thought.  Peirce, James, and 
Holmes developed relationships through their intellectual lives in Boston.  For a time, 
Dewey was a student at Johns Hopkins University while Peirce was a lecturer there.  
James and Dewey were intellectual compatriots in the areas of psychology and 
philosophy.  Dewey and Addams, both eventual residents of Chicago, developed a 
friendship and philosophical relationship.  Dewey and Mead were professors at the 
University of Chicago and close intellectual friends.  The community of thought of this 
group embodies the pragmatic notion that discovery and learning are communal 
processes. 
Cornel West calls C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) "the most profound philosophical 
thinker produced in America" (Evasion of Philosophy 43).  Peirce was a mathematician, 
statistician, and semiotician; he also coined the word "pragmatism."  He first used the 




maxim suggests that the effects of something are the only thing that matter.  He writes, in 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878):  "Consider what effects, that might conceivably 
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" ("Ideas Clear" 
36).  William James points to this essay as a founding text of pragmatic philosophy 
(Pragmatism 20).  James and Peirce were lifelong friends and together founded the 
philosophical discussion group known as the Metaphysical Club in January of 1872 
(Menand 201).  Decades later, in 1907, James helped arrange an income for the 
impoverished Peirce to support him until his death (Menand 435).   
William James (1842-1910) put pragmatism into popular consciousness.  His 
1906 Lowell Institute lectures on pragmatic philosophy were published as a book titled 
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking in 1907.  In this book the 
word "pragmatism" first appears in print—although James gives credit to Peirce for its 
coinage (Pragmatism 20).  James re-articulates Peirce's pragmatic maxim with these 
words: "There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere—
no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact 
and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, 
and somewhen" (Pragmatism 22).  In his academic career James specialized in 
psychology as well as philosophy, publishing Principles of Psychology in 1890.  He 
taught psychology and philosophy at Harvard University from 1873 until he achieved 




letters with the younger John Dewey regarding Dewey's work in psychology and 
philosophy, and came to the University of Chicago at Dewey's request to give a lecture 
there (Menand 360). 
As a member of the discussion groups of James and Peirce, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes (1841-1935) came to be associated with pragmatic thought, although he rejected 
the label "pragmatist." (Menand 432).  However, his approach to deciding legal 
decisions, articulated in his scholarly writing on the law, rings similarly to pragmatic 
philosophy.  As Menand explains, "Holmes believed that political opinion should be 
protected because that is the only way for democratic government to maintain 
legitimacy" (Menand 432).  This notion bears similarities to Dewey and Addams's ideas 
regarding the importance of perspective in social democracy.   Holmes was appointed to 
Supreme Court in 1902 by President Theodore Roosevelt.  During his life, he maintained 
correspondence with William James and saved the letters throughout his life (Menand 
436).  He also admired the philosophical work of Dewey, believing "he had found in 
Dewey a philosopher whose conception of existence seemed to match his own" (Menand 
437). 
John Dewey (1859-1952) earned his doctorate in philosophy from Johns Hopkins 
University in 1884.  Ten years later, he took a position as a professor at the University of 
Chicago.  Today, Dewey is best known today as an educator.  In January of 1896, he 
founded the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago which he used to test his 




inseparably united with doing" (Menand 322).  His pedagogical theories influenced the 
creation of progressive education in the United States.  He sets out his theories of 
education in many writings, including Democracy and Education (1916) and in a 
reflective piece on progressive schools titled Experience and Education (1938).  Dewey 
also wrote extensively on political history and theory, publishing many books and 
lectures during his ninety-three years.  He taught at the University of Michigan, the 
University of Chicago, and Columbia University.  While living in Chicago, he developed 
a close relationship with activist and pragmatist Jane Addams. 
Although George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) published no books during his 
lifetime, the variety and depth of his thought have been preserved in the many articles he 
published and the books of his essays and lectures that have appeared since his death.  
After graduating from Harvard, Mead met John Dewey while working as an instructor in 
philosophy and psychology at the University of Michigan.  In 1894, Mead came to the 
philosophy department of the University of Chicago and together with Dewey formed the 
core of the "Chicago Pragmatists."  He worked as a professor of philosophy at Chicago 
until his death.  Mead's intellectual and personal friendship with Dewey was central to his 
work as a philosopher. 
Unlike her pragmatist contemporaries, Jane Addams (1860-1935) was an activist 
first and a philosopher second.  This arguably makes her the most pragmatic of all the 
classical pragmatists, since her extensive writings are deeply rooted in her experiences as 




1889 with Ellen Gates using inheritance from her father's death (Knight 179).  Addams's 
work was firmly grounded in a belief in democracy, particularly the social democracy of 
the late 19th century: "a 'sentiment,' a feeling of equality among people from all walks of 
life" (Knight 188).  Dewey and Addams shared these social democratic sentiments as 
well as a close friendship for many years: Addams invited Dewey to join to board of 
trustees of Hull-House in 1897; Dewey and his wife named one of their children after 
Addams (Knight 240).  "The influence of the two friends on each other was profound, 
and, in many of its various parts, untraceable to one party or the other" (Knight 240).  
Dewey lectured at Hull-House; he and Addams corresponded for many years; and they 
engaged in philosophical debates of which we have too few records (Menand 310-11). 
The genealogy of American classical pragmatism involves many lives closely 
intertwined, and to attempt to talk about the work of these thinkers separately from one 
another, as I will do here, is in some ways misleading.  Louis Menand, in his historical 
account The Metaphysical Club (2001), attempts to portray how closely tied together the 
work of Peirce, James, Holmes, Dewey, and Addams actually was.  The larger scope of 
this project explores the misguided contemporary pedagogical emphasis on 
individualistic labor.  I suggest that one means toward meaningful equality under race-
conscious university admissions involves embracing notions of cooperative, rather than 
competitive, learning.  The work of the classical pragmatists demonstrates by example 
just how askew our contemporary conception of the solo thinker and creator can be.  This 




recognize how today's legal pragmatists have omitted certain classical pragmatic work 
from contemporary consideration.  I argue that these omissions are to the detriment of 
today's legal thought and suggest instead a consideration of the full possibilities of 
classical pragmatism. 
 
c. Posner, Fish, West, and Contemporary Legal Pragmatism 
A lot of work occurs under the heading of legal pragmatism today, by scholars 
such as Richard Posner, Brian Z. Tamanaha, David Luban, Stanley Fish, and Thomas C. 
Grey.  However, some of what goes for contemporary legal pragmatism ignores or 
disavows crucial aspects of classical pragmatism.  For example, the social activism and 
democratic thought of Jane Addams is all but absent in contemporary legal scholarship.  I 
suggest that a complete understanding of classical pragmatism, taking into account the 
contributions of Peirce, James, Dewey, Holmes, and Addams as a community of thinkers, 
will provide a more robust pragmatic framework for current legal work.  Such a 
framework will bear a living connection to classical pragmatism, yet will constantly 
refine itself in connection to the needs of our contemporary judicial system. 
Pragmatism has contained elements of legal philosophy since its inception.  
Classical pragmatists often used legal examples in their philosophical writings.  For 
example, in his essay "The Will to Believe" (1896), William James writes:  
 
Wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we 
can throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from 




evidence has come.  In scientific questions, this is almost always the case; and 
even in human affairs in general, the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a 
false belief to act on is better than no belief at all. Law courts, indeed, have to 
decide on the best evidence attainable for the moment, because a judge's duty is to 
make law as well as to ascertain it, and (as a learned judge once said to me) few 
cases are worth spending much time over: the great thing is to have them decided 
on any acceptable principle, and got out of the way.  But in our dealings with 
objective nature we obviously are recorders, not makers of the truth; and 
decisions for the mere sake of deciding promptly and getting on to the next 
business would be wholly out of place. ("Will to Believe" 17) 
  
After setting up the difference between urgent, practical decision-making (which requires 
decisions made without all the evidence) and objective, scientific decision-making 
(which has the luxury of waiting until all evidence is supplied), James explodes the 
binary and shows that, in the end, all decision-making is done with incomplete evidence, 
and thus, all "truth" is made by the decision-maker—or else there is no truth at all, merely 
eternal skepticism.  James's application of truth-making—as opposed to truth-finding—to 
legal theory strongly echoes the work of his friend Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.  Holmes and James were members of philosophical discussion groups in 
Boston in which pragmatic thought developed.  In a similar vein to James, Holmes writes 
that "the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is 
in every human mind.  But certainty generally is an illusion and repose is not the destiny 
of man. … You can give any conclusion logical form" ("Path of the Law" 998).  For 
Holmes, any conclusion of law can be logically justified.  We cannot count on logic for 
certainty in the law any more than we can count on the good nature of a jury.  Rather than 




reasoning, and see if the conclusions are useful: "I think that the judges themselves have 
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.  
The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal 
with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments 
inarticulate, and often unconscious" (Holmes "Path of the Law" 999).  Taken together, 
the legal writings of James, Holmes, and Dewey emphasize the importance of 
conclusions in American jurisprudence over logical method based in a priori legal 
concepts. 
One of the best-known recent scholars to claim the pragmatic mantle is Judge 
Richard A. Posner.  He writes in Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2004), regarding his 
recent legal scholarship, “I have been arguing that pragmatism is the best description of 
the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to the improvement of judicial 
performance—and thus the best normative as well as positive theory of the judicial role" 
(1).  With these words, Posner makes two suggestions.  First, he observes that the judicial 
work we do in America is best understood as pragmatic.  Second, he asserts that 
pragmatism can help us do our judicial work better.  These claims, made by such a 
powerful voice in the field of legal scholarship, seem to bode well for the future of 
pragmatism as a legal method.  But what exactly does Posner mean by "pragmatism"?  I 
suggest that he ignores or undermines crucial ideas from classical pragmatists such as 
Jane Addams and John Dewey in order to support his various claims.  Although he argues 




definitional split, between what he calls "philosophical" and "everyday" pragmatism.  He 
writes that his work "defends everyday rather than philosophical pragmatism" (4).  This 
splitting reveals that his position is fundamentally anti-theory, except in very limited 
circumstances.  He also claims that pragmatism has "no political valence," that 
progressivism does not inhere in pragmatic philosophy: that pragmatism has a form, but 
no content (44). 
Posner admits, and I agree, that "Pragmatism, notwithstanding William James’s 
effort at definition, is a devil to define" (24).  Despite these words, Posner spends the 
introductory section of this text providing what he claims are the basic tenets of what he 
calls "philosophical pragmatism."  He contrasts the philosophical version of pragmatism 
with "everyday pragmatism," which he explains in detail later.  Posner's description of 
philosophical pragmatism appears to be a fairly accurate portrayal of the basic tenets of 
classical pragmatism.  According to Posner, the "fundamental thesis of philosophical 
pragmatism" is Darwinian in nature, that is, "human beings are merely clever animals" 
(4).  Posner explains this thesis as a mending of the mind/body split: "Body is not a drag 
on mind, as Plato thought. … Body and mind coevolved" (4).  It is this mending of the 
mind/body split that provides the groundwork for Dewey's revolutionary hypothesis that 
human learning is as much about physical doing as it is about thinking.  One of Dewey's 
principles of education is the "continuity of experience."  He writes:  
 
At bottom, this principle rests upon the fact of habit, when habit is interpreted 
biologically.  The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted 




affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences.  For it is 
a somewhat different person who enters into them. (Experience & Education 35) 
 
Thus, one's physical acts, one's habits, are capable of modifying one's entire physical and 
mental being.  Dewey based his system of education on an understanding of human 
learning that considered the mind and the body inextricable from one another.  Posner 
next states, accurately, that for philosophical pragmatism, knowledge is both "local" and 
"perspectival," shaped by historical and cultural conditions (5).  Pragmatists place 
emphasis on consequences rather than metaphysical, a priori "truths."  Pragmatists 
believe in true and false, although, Posner writes (quoting James) they would be more 
likely to say "true enough" (6).   
Oddly, after all of this explanation, Posner discards "philosophical pragmatism" 
as generally useless for the law.  Law and government "should largely be cut loose from 
philosophy" (Posner 4).  "What I am calling orthodox pragmatism," he writes, "has little 
to contribute to law at the operational level.  It has become part of technical philosophy, 
in which few judges or practicing lawyers take any interest" (41).  For Posner, 
philosophical pragmatism divides into two groups, “orthodox” or academic pragmatism 
and “recusant” (literally, unorthodox) pragmatism (35).  He asserts that recusant 
pragmatists, such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, “don’t think that the 
epistemological and ethical questions that have largely defined the classical tradition and 
that many pragmatists have tried to answer are worth asking. … The questions are merely 




For Posner, philosophical pragmatism, whether orthodox or recusant, is too theoretical to 
be helpful in judicial practice: "Even recusant pragmatism has at most an atmospheric 
effect on thinking about law" (42).   
Instead, Posner focuses his attention on what he calls "everyday pragmatism," for 
this is where the real legal value of pragmatism lies.  Everyday pragmatism 
 
is the mindset denoted by the popular usage of the word ‘pragmatic,’ meaning 
practical and business-like, ‘no-nonsense,’ disdainful of abstract theory and 
intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian dreamers.  It long 
has been and remains the untheorized cultural outlook of most Americans. (50) 
 
Posner asserts that everyday pragmatism, rather than the philosophical type, should be 
used to guide adjudication and government.  Yet this binary between philosophical and 
everyday pragmatism is a false one, because all pragmatism is everyday.  In fact, Posner's 
words sound like a fairly accurate description of classical pragmatic philosophy, of the 
work of James and Dewey—with one exception.  Is Posner correct in his characterization 
of the “cultural outlook of most Americans” in that we, as a society, are contemptuous of 
“utopian dreamers”?  We seem to have great patience for idealistic talk: for abstract 
notions of equality and liberty, for I have a dream.  Contemporary pragmatist Richard 
Rorty writes, in a review of Posner’s text, “Posner is so suspicious of romance and 
idealism … that he has trouble conceding that either has played a role in our political 
history,” implying, of course, that both have played major roles indeed (101). 
Pragmatism recognizes the philosophy located in the everyday, in the pedestrian, 




academic, and that it should become more involved with everyday pursuits or it would 
risk growing irrelevant.  He writes: "Philosophy when taught inevitably magnifies the 
history of past thought, and leads professional philosophers to approach their subject-
matter through its formulation in received systems. … Direct preoccupation with 
contemporary difficulties is left to literature and politics" ("Recovery of Philosophy" 
220).  Dewey writes to his fellow philosophers that they should not ignore the needs of 
"serious-minded men not engaged in the professional business of philosophy."  These 
men want to know "what modifications and abandonments of intellectual inheritance are 
required by the newer industrial, political, and scientific movements.  They want to know 
what these newer movements mean when translated into general ideas" ("Recovery of 
Philosophy" 220).  If philosophy fails to heed the call of ordinary folks, "it is likely to get 
more and more sidetracked from the main currents of contemporary life" ("Recovery of 
Philosophy" 220).  Despite these writings of classical pragmatists which emphasize the 
importance of everyday experience, Posner insists on the importance of severing the 
everyday from classical pragmatic philosophy.  Posner writes that everyday pragmatism 
is "rooted in the usages and attitudes of a brash, fast-moving, competitive, forward-
looking, commercial, materialistic, philistine society, with its emphasis on working hard 
and getting ahead" (50).  Yet Dewey made a similar call in 1917, when he insisted that 
philosophy must be able to speak to the questions posed by industry and science. 
Posner's disagreement with philosophical pragmatism stems from his own 




"untheorized cultural outlook of most Americans," he disregards the theorization of this 
outlook, of the American ethos generally, that has been the project of many classical 
pragmatists.  For example, in her narrative writings on her experiences working with the 
poor and working classes in the city of Chicago, Jane Addams develops a flexible 
theoretical framework that helps her readers understand the relationships between the 
individual experiences she recounts and the larger project of social democracy as a 
whole.  In other words, a peek into the work of Addams reveals that pragmatism, whether 
of the everyday or philosophical type, has indeed been theorized.  Furthermore, Posner 
continues this process of theorization with his own text. 
Despite pragmatism's and Posner's own use of theory, Posner rejects theory as an 
important component of everyday pragmatism.  Instead, he writes, "Its core is merely a 
disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, 
generalities, pieties, and slogans. … Among the conceptualisms rejected are moral, legal, 
and political theory when offered to guide legal and other official decisionmaking" (3).  
Posner omits the fact that classical pragmatism advocates the interrelatedness of theory 
and practice, sometimes called the theory-practice circle.  In this conception, theory—
conjecture, speculation—and practice—experience, empirical study—have equal and 
reciprocal value.  The pragmatists of the nineteenth century did not reject theory; they 
simply brought experience into a position of equal value.  Posner’s separation of the 




According to Posner, theory is useful only to guide empirical study: “It would be 
more constructive to focus on the practical consequences of such things [e.g. 
adjudication, democracy, policies], with theorization used only to illuminate the 
consequences—which is where economic theory and empirical methods of economics 
come in" (3).  Theory is thus only valuable as a way to make investigation less 
cumbersome, that is, to shorten the pathways that experiment must travel to find its 
answers: “Pure trial and error operates too slowly to be a feasible research strategy, and 
this is where theorizing comes in.  The theories pick out the most promising paths for 
experimental inquiry.  But this means that theorizing is the beginning of inquiry, not its 
end" (32).  What Posner misunderstands is that from its inception, pragmatism sought to 
unite theory with experience, because each is just as important as the other in guiding us 
to knowledge. Theory and practice are resting posts on the path to pragmatic truth.  
Contemporary pragmatists Roskelly and Ronald explain the classical pragmatic 
relationship between theory and practice in lucid terms: 
 
Because it is concerned with consequence, use, and human action, the heart of 
pragmatism rests in experience, testable conclusions, and verifiable data.  It is 
therefore scientific, or technical, in its approach to the possibility of knowledge 
and truth.  The strong emphasis on experience as opposed to a priori assumptions 
led to an interactive, symbiotic relationship between theory and practice and, just 
as important, an altered vision of the role of the observer, who participated in 
making meaning through experience and observation. ("Untested Feasibility" 
618) 
 
The symbiosis of theory and practice does not allow for a discarding of theory altogether.  




philosophy grounded in a priori assumptions when they insisted on the importance of 
experience.  But Posner has allowed the pendulum to swing too far the other way, 
removing all theoretical insight from pragmatism; removing, as he would say, all 
philosophy.  In their review of Posner’s book, legal scholars Sullivan and Solove write:  
 
At the heart of Posner’s pragmatism is a particular understanding of the 
relationship between theory and practice.  For Posner, theory has little to offer 
practice, and he has engaged in an ongoing quest to attack academic theorists. … 
According to Posner, academics are insulated from the ‘real’ world and tend to 
become easily infatuated with empty abstractions such as justice, fairness, and 
equality. (697) 
 
Posner may not like theory and those who engage in theoretical thought.  However, 
complete understanding and application of the tenets of pragmatism requires respect for 
and use of both theory and experience.  For, it is only through theory and reflection that 
we are able to learn from our experiences and make use of new experiential knowledge.  
Peirce calls this moment of learning the "irritation of doubt"; Jane Addams calls it 
"perplexity."  Dewey calls change that occurs upon the irritation or perplexity 
"readjustment."  Wherever one turns in classical pragmatism, the process of reflection 
upon one's experiences, of theorizing from what one has lived, is central to the pragmatic 
method. 
Posner's discarding of the theory-practice circle unfortunately allows him to be 
blinded to the political ramifications inherent in pragmatism.  His opinion about the 
relationship between pragmatism and politics is fairly straightforward: “[T]he suggestion 




Pragmatism has no political valence" (44).  Posner argues that the fact that so many 
pragmatic philosophers are social liberals or progressives is merely accidental: 
“Philosophical pragmatists tend … to believe that somehow their philosophy really can 
clear the decks for liberal social policies, though this is largely an accident of the fact that 
John Dewey was a prominent liberal" (12).  Indeed, Posner goes to great lengths to draw 
connections between pragmatism and National Socialism to make his point that no ethical 
or moral content attaches to pragmatism, noting "the powerful vein of hard-hearted 
pragmatic thinking in German jurisprudence during the Weimar and Hitler eras" (44).  In 
the end, for Posner, pragmatism "has no moral compass" (55).  Pragmatism has only a 
structural relationship to the law; "as for law’s content,” Posner writes, “pragmatism is 
and was silent" (44).  Rorty agrees with Posner on this point, writing, "Posner, a 
philosophy buff who cheerfully calls himself a ‘moral relativist,’ is happy to endorse 
Dewey’s anti-foundationlist and contextualist views about knowledge, rationality, and 
morality.  But he thinks, rightly, that ‘pragmatism has no political valence,’ and that 
Dewey’s social hopes have nothing in particular to do with these views." (100).  The 
binary separation of structure from content that Posner employs to make this argument is 
misleading and harmful to our understanding of not only the law, but of everything.  The 
originary content/form division is the mind/body split, one that dates to Plato, if not 
before.  Here, Posner’s pragmatism slips back into metaphysics.   
Cornel West, a contemporary pragmatic philosopher overlooked by Posner in his 




relevancy of American pragmatism in his book on pragmatic philosophy, The American 
Evasion of Philosophy (1989).  He writes: 
 
The distinctive appeal of American pragmatism in our postmodern moment is its 
unashamedly moral emphasis and its unequivocally ameliorative impulse.  In this 
world-weary period of pervasive cynicisms, nihilisms, terrorisms and possible 
extermination, there is a longing for norms and values that can make a difference, 
a yearning for principled resistance and struggle that can change our desperate 
plight. (Evasion of Philosophy 4) 
 
West claims pragmatism supports a “moral emphasis” and an “ameliorative impulse.”  
He believes that pragmatism is the social philosophy that can “change our desperate 
plight” in our nihilistic world by providing “values that can make a difference.”  
Throughout his writings and his political work, West applies his pragmatic philosophy to 
concrete social problems, arguing for a moral and ethical social progress.  Roskelly and 
Ronald write, 
 
The central proposition of North American pragmatism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries is an insistence on precisely this relationship between belief 
and action, knowing and its consequences.  West describes the pragmatists' 
provocative agenda as a "deep intellectual vocation" that "impels the major 
American pragmatists to be organic intellectuals; that is, participants in the life of 
the mind who revel in ideas and relate ideas to action." ("Untested Feasibility" 
616) (citing West Evasion of Philosophy 6) 
 
The organic relationship between theory and practice gives pragmatism its content. 
Philosophers cannot to bury their heads in the sand; they must take the perspectives of all 




tenets are part of the structure and content of pragmatism, which are, like experience and 
belief, inextricable. 
Contemporary legal philosopher Stanley Fish agrees with Posner regarding 
pragmatism's philosophical void, writing: 
 
If pragmatism points out that its rivals cannot deliver what they promise—once-
and-for-all answers to always relevant questions—pragmatism should itself know 
enough not to promise anything, or even to recommend anything.  If pragmatism 
is true, it has nothing to say to us; no politics follow from it or is blocked by it; no 
morality attaches to it or is enjoined by it. (Trouble with Principle 295) 
 
For Fish, there are no lofty ideals without culture, language, and society to give them 
meaning—highly contingent and disputed meaning.  Without principles, according to 
Fish, we are left with rhetoric—principles of argumentation first compiled in an 
organized fashion by Aristotle and added to ever since, tools we can use as needed (à la 
the Sophists) to win the arguments we find most valuable.  Of course, how we determine 
which arguments are most valuable is the big question.  Although there are no universal, 
a priori truths, Fish suggests that one's smaller “interpretive communities” help one make 
meaning of the world.  These communities provide definitions for politically powerful 
words such as “equality,” “justice,” “good,” and “evil" (Fish Trouble with Principle 295).  
Because, according to Fish, pragmatism explodes the notion of universal principles in 





Fish writes that even though one may not believe in ultimate truths, but rather in 
inquiry, as a pragmatist does—even though one may revise one's knowledge through 
experience—these are simply beliefs.  They remain isolated from one's actual behavior.  
A person still can act like a jerk, metaphysically speaking.  Fish writes:  
 
[Y]our philosophical views are independent of your views (and therefore of your 
practices in any realm of life other than the very special and rarified realm of 
doing philosophy.  If you believe that your convictions have their source not in 
ultimate truths or foundations but in contingent traditions of inquiry and are 
therefore revisable, that belief, in and of itself, will not render you disposed to 
revise your convictions or turn you into a person who enters into situations 
provisionally and with epistemic modesty. (Trouble with Principle 300) 
 
Thus, for Fish, because one's philosophical views are stuck in the part of you that is 
philosophical, they have no bearing on how you act in the world.  He writes, “You can 
give all the standard answers to all the pragmatist questions and still be an authoritarian 
in the classroom, a decided conservative in cultural matters, or inclined to the absolutes 
of theology" (Trouble with Principle 300).  But in this Fish expounds a very unpragmatic 
philosophy, for the essence of pragmatism is bringing the everyday into philosophy and 
philosophy into the everyday.  Pragmatism has at least one, very important principle, that 
even Fish agrees on: the theory-practice circle.  Fish calls it having one's “convictions” 
rooted in “contingent traditions of inquiry" (Trouble with Principle 300). The results are 
the same: if one is a pragmatist, and practices philosophical pragmatism, then one's 
philosophy cannot be partitioned off from the rest of one's life, or from one's behavior, 




is no “doing philosophy” in pragmatism that is separate from everything else that one 
does.  One's philosophy is integral to one's experience, and vice-versa. 
Fundamental to classical pragmatism is the recognition that each person has a 
unique perspective on the world.  This tenet began as a scientific principle, when 
pragmatism insisted on subjectivity of the observer in scientific practice, a revolution in 
scientific method at the time.  In this manner, pragmatism presumed there would be 
human error.  To compensate for error, a scientist can gather a high number of 
observations, or perspectives, and take an average thereof in order to gain an accurate 
measurement. (Menand 177).   In social terms, in a democracy, gathering the most 
perspectives from the most diverse number of people allows for the closest 
approximation of social "truth."  Posner is helpful when he recognizes the perspective 
inherent in the judicial process, writing, "Pragmatism applied to law at most takes away 
from judges the claim to be engaged in a neutral scientific activity of matching facts to 
law rather than in a basically political activity of formulating and applying public policy 
called law" (46).  Here Posner denaturalizes—de-neutral-izes—the work that judges do.  
He writes, though, that this is the "most" that pragmatism can do for law.  He fails to take 
the next step, and suggest how pragmatism can help the law act in a more ethical, 
democratic manner toward its citizens.  In her writings, Jane Addams insists on gathering 
the perspectives of the downtrodden when powerful people come to help.  She writes, for 
example, regarding educating "special" children: "In discussing the problem of the 




who is somewhat mentally deficient, and of the child who is what we now call 
incorrigible and delinquent" ("Special Child" 224).  Addams's choice of phrase, "of 
course," highlights the fact that most educators and policy makers at the time of this 
speech in 1908, and even through today, do not consider the points of view of children 
with special needs important to policy decisions regarding the education of these 
children.  Addams's work constantly highlights the importance of taking account of 
perspective for gaining a correct understanding of the world. 
Susan Haack, a contemporary scholar of pragmatism, has written much about the 
debates within pragmatic thought today.  She suggests an approach for dealing with the 
question of pragmatist “authenticity”:  
 
It is easy to get hung up on the question of which variants qualify as authentic 
pragmatism; but probably it is better––potentially more fruitful, and appropriately 
forward-looking––to ask, rather, what we can borrow from the riches of classical 
pragmatism, and what we can salvage from the intellectual shipwreck of the new. 
(34) 
 
In a similar mode to that suggested by Haack, I suggest that contemporary legal 
pragmatism consider the fullness of classical pragmatism, especially the work of Jane 
Addams which has thus far been neglected, in shaping the ways that pragmatism can help 







d. Chapters Overview 
The general focus of this project is the reconstruction of classical pragmatism as a 
useful way to solve legal problems.  In order to illustrate the validity of classical 
pragmatic thought, I study the issues that have arisen during the long-standing debate 
surrounding race-conscious college admissions.  Included in this study are readings of the 
recent Supreme Court decisions Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger 
(2003), cases which recently reconsidered, reshaped, and upheld affirmative action in 
higher education.   
Chapter One, "Peirce, Formal Equality, and the Philosophies of Affirmative 
Action" introduces founding pragmatic concepts and applies them to some of the 
fundamental issues of the debate over race-conscious college admissions policies.  Using 
pragmatism, I question the notion of "formal equality," the value of elite colleges and 
universities to our democracy, and whether supposedly objective standards of 
consideration are preferable or indeed even possible.  Chapter Two, "James, Mead, 
Individualism, and the Myth of Color-Blindness," examines the anti-affirmative action 
movement's call for individualism and color-blindness. 
In Chapter Three, "Addams, Holmes, and Contemporary Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence," I provide a pragmatic reading of recent Supreme Court cases dealing with 
race-conscious university admissions in a framework crafted from the jurisprudence of 
Justice Holmes and the social activism of Jane Addams.  In this chapter, I show that 




Bollinger (2003), it did so in terms that reveal a loyalty to elitist values, not a 
commitment to democratic representation in higher education—despite the Court's talk of 
"diversity."  Chapter Four, "Dewey, Pragmatic Pedagogy, and Meaningful Diversity," 
combines readings of pragmatism and the affirmative action cases and looks for various 
ways that the call for "diversity" in Grutter might be made meaningful through 
pedagogical practices.  Using the pragmatic educational methods of John Dewey, this 
chapter provides readings of contemporary pragmatists and pedagogical theorists, 
mapping ways that educators can make the promise of diversity provided to us by 
continued race-conscious college admissions a meaningful reality. 
Pragmatism suggests that the more perspectives we gather, the closer we can 
come to a valuable, viable truth.  The law as it stands in practice deliberately excludes a 
majority of voices from consideration.  Like the courtroom, a classroom is a focal point 
of authority; too often the voices of those who are perceived as outsiders are excluded 
from places of learning.  The most valuable contribution that pragmatism can make to 
both legal theory and pedagogy is the insistence that legal and educational insiders ensure 
that all perspectives be given voice.  Grutter promises "diversity," but it is up to each of 









PEIRCE, FORMAL EQUALITY,  
AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
When discussion of affirmative action is couched in terms of legal "facts" or 
political "truths," the underlying philosophical presumptions of the debate are lost in the 
shuffle.  Although I support affirmative action, many contemporary liberal defenders of 
race-conscious college admissions and hiring programs have bought into the same 
philosophies as those that zealously criticize these same programs.  For example, both 
critics and liberal supports of affirmative action agree that students admitted into college 
must "merit" such admissions, in that their college admission test scores and grade point 
averages must meet some pre-set standards of merit.  Both sides presume the infallibility 
and objectivity of these standards of merit.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in its recent opinion 
upholding affirmative action, Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), held that affirmative action 
"permits consideration of race as a 'plus' factor in any given case while still ensuring that 
each candidate 'competes with all other qualified applicants,'" (Grutter 335).  In other 
words, all applicants must be "qualified" as some baseline measure, before race can be 
considered a "plus."  Here, the Court which upheld affirmative action does so using the 
same terms of argument employed by their opponents—those of merit, qualifications, and 




minefield of "objectivity" and "merit."  They have no way to account for human 
fallibility, history, or experience. 
The debate needs to be reframed.  Liberal ideology cannot support affirmative 
action as it stands now, for it is too invested in "formal equality" and the concepts which 
are its fruit.  The work of Charles Sanders Peirce, a pragmatic philosopher who 
recognized "that in a universe in which events are uncertain and perception is fallible, 
knowing cannot be a matter of an individual mind 'mirroring' reality. … knowledge must 
therefore be social"—teaches that concepts such as equality and "objective merit" must 
be examined closely (Menand 200). Truth becomes a probability and a process, rather 
than a telos.  Because perfect truth and knowledge are not possible, the method of study 
becomes far more important.  Through these methods, humans make truths. 
The work of C. S. Peirce is best understood in the context of the study of 
probabilities and statistics that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  The "law of errors," the statistical method which produces the bell-shaped 
curve that most are familiar with today, emerged around 1800 (Menand 177).  Menand 
explains the law with this example from astronomy: 
 
If a team of astronomers wishes to chart the position of a star, and its 
members make a series of individual observations of that star, the results they get 
will almost always vary.  The same problem arises when a single astronomer 
makes multiple observations of the same star.  In fact, when we measure anything 
repeatedly with exactitude, we generally get discrepancies in the results.  In the 
case of astronomy, the discrepancies can have many causes … But these causes 
are largely undetectable (otherwise we could correct for them).  So when we don't 
know what is producing the discrepancies, how do we know which result is the 




The basis of the law of errors in astronomy was the discovery that multiple 
observations of a star also tend to conform to a bell-shaped curve—as does nay 
group of measurements of a fixed object. … although the differences in the results 
are produced by chance (since none of the errors is deliberate), they nevertheless 
distribute themselves more or less symmetrically around a mean, and this mean 
can be taken as the likeliest position of the star.  The reasoning is that if there is 
no single hidden variable, no unknown cause responsible for the discrepancies, a 
measurement is just as likely to be too great as it is to be too small. (179-80) 
   
Scientists discovered that a measurement will grow more accurate—more true—with an 
increase in the number of observations.  Thus, truth-making becomes a process: the 
process of gathering more and more observations of the same object until  "the chances of 
being wrong become infinitesimal" (182).  At that point, "we have arrived, if not at 
complete certainty, at virtual certainty" (182).  Virtual certainty is provisional certainty, 
provisional truth, a truth that is human-made.  In pragmatic philosophy, this is the closest 
humans can come to truth. 
French scientist Pierre-Simon Laplace made the law of errors famous.  C. S. 
Peirce's father and mentor, Benjamin Peirce, was a Harvard professor of mathematics; he 
studied under Nathaniel Bowditch, the man who translated Laplace's five-volume Traité 
de méchanique céleste (1798-1825), or Treatise on Celestial Mechanics, into English.  
Laplace and his followers in the study of statistics made their field hugely popular 
because they translated the method of study of astronomy and other scientific phenomena 
into the study of social phenomena (Menand 184).  Because human behavior proved to be 
statistically predictable, probability theory supported a new type of human determinism 




theorists shifted blame for society's ills from the individual wrong-doer to society at large 
(Menand 188).  Probability theorists argued "that it is society, and not the individual, that 
is responsible for vice" (Menand 192).  This determinism in turn was used to 
philosophically support laissez-faire politics and individualism: "nearly all the 
nineteenth-century champions of statistics were laissez-faire liberals" (Menand 194).  
Menand explains: 
 
What statistics seemed to show, in short, was that the market was not … an 
invitation to anarchy.  Markets operate just the way nature does: left to 
themselves, they can be counted on to produce the optimum outcome over the 
long run.  The individual pursuit of self-interest conduces to aggregate efficiency.  
Of course, like all appeals to natural laws as a justification for human 
arrangements, the "discovery" of the laws reflected the arrangements to be 
justified. (195) 
 
Peirce disagreed theories of economic individualism, determinism, and self-interest, yet 
he was also a highly trained statistician.  This paradox underlies all of his philosophical 
writings.  Menand explains:  "He believed that the universe is charged with 
indeterminacy; like his father, though, he also believed that the universe makes sense, and 
he devoted his life to devising a cosmology that would show how both of those things—
the indeterminacy and the intelligibility—could be the case" (195).  The bringing together 
of these two ways of thinking underlies pragmatic thought generally, and it can be 
restated this way: a search for a usable truth knowing that all truths change. 
C. S. Peirce was a mathematical prodigy, and statistics and probabilities were his 




logic, semiology, mathematics, astronomy, physics, psychology, and philosophy 
(Menand 199).  His philosophical work in what came to be known as "pragmatism" 
began in the discussion group in Boston that he helped start in January of 1872, called the 
Metaphysical Club.  William James credits Peirce with coining the new philosophical 
term.  West explains the "three fundamental claims in Peirce's pragmatism": 
 
first, that the most reasonable way of arriving at warranted and valid beliefs is by 
means of scientific method; second, that scientific method is a self-correcting 
social and communal process promoted by smoothly functioning habits, i.e., 
beliefs, upset by uncertain expectations, i.e., doubts, and whose sole end is the 
"settlement of opinion"; and third, that this scientific quest for truth is inextricably 
linked, though in no ways reducible, to the ultimate good of furthering "the 
development of concrete reasonableness," i.e. evolutionary love. (Evasion of 
Philosophy 43) 
 
West has laid out the paradox of Peirce's thought and the solution that Peirce worked 
toward.  As a scientist, Peirce believed in the scientific method as the process that would 
lead humans closest to truth.  Yet, rather than supporting turn-of-the-century 
individualism, Peirce considered human inquiry a social process, one based in a 
community of observers.  In order for the scientific process to function properly, the 
highest number of scientific observations must be gathered, the most number of 
perspectives possible.  Thus, the communal aspect of science does not derive necessarily 
from a good will towards others, but rather from a belief that the truth process can only 
work if people work together.  The perspectives are governed by method: only viable 
perspectives will gather because the scientific method governs the truth-finding.  One of 




habit that the presence of other people and new experiences provides. Peirce calls this 
disruption the "irritation of doubt" ("Ideas Clear" 30).  In his philosophical articles, Peirce 
explains just how irritation upsets habit, and then leads people to new belief—when "we 
find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which 
occasioned our hesitation" ("Ideas Clear" 31).  Such irritation is central to the scientific 
method; it leads scientists and other truth-seekers to set aside prior paradigms in favor of 
new ways of thinking. 
In his writings, Peirce speaks of scientific truth-finding processes in everyday 
terms; "he demystifies the scientific method into a human affair" (West Evasion of 
Philosophy 43).  Two early articles published by Peirce set forth the fundamental 
concepts of pragmatism although he does not use the word itself: "The Fixation of Belief" 
(1877) and "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878).  The concepts Peirce develops in 
these articles are ones that he first worked with in a paper that he first presented to the 
Metaphysical Club in 1872 (Menand 272).  In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce asserts 
that a person existing in the world with other people, especially if one lives or works in a 
diverse community, will encounter those whose differences challenge one's previously-
held beliefs.  Peirce writes, "Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily 
influences each other's opinions" ("Fixation of Belief" 16).  For Peirce, this communal 
influence is not a bad thing—rather, it leads members of a community or a society closer 
to truth.  He suggests that "a new method of settling opinions must be adopted," and a 




in different lights" ("Fixation of Belief" 19).  However, mere contemplation is not enough 
for Peirce, rather "a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by 
nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our 
thinking has no effect" ("Fixation of Belief" 20-21).   Peirce means, of course, science, 
and the scientific method.  He recognizes, though, that the ways the physical world 
affects each person "are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the 
method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same." 
("Fixation of Belief" 21).  He outlines the method he envisions: "The force of habit will 
sometimes cause a man to hold on to old beliefs, after he is in a condition to see that they 
have no sound basis.  But reflection upon the state of the case will overcome these habits, 
and he ought to allow reflection its full weight" ("Fixation of Belief" 24).  For Peirce, this 
is the pragmatic method of truth: habit upholds old beliefs, but they eventually yield to 
experience—scientific testing—coupled with reflection, if people seek the path of true 
belief. 
Affirmative action challenges many previously held beliefs: about what it means 
to live in a "free" country, what it means to be "equal," about what it means to be 
"qualified."  If one lifts the layers of popular speech about affirmative action one sees 
how much Americans take for granted in this debate.  One popular argument asserts that 
university admissions and workplace decisions should be based strictly on merit, not on 
qualities like race or gender.  Underlying this argument is a presumption that there are 




or hiring.   Another presumption asserts that it is just and fair for there to be such a 
limited supply of positions in elite universities leading to elite, creative, well-paying jobs 
in the future.  Because elite positions are in such short supply, the stakes of the 
affirmative action debate are high.  Members of our society are fighting over how we 
give out the few, very valuable positions in our society.  The naturalness of the society's 
stratification that yields such an imbalance of valuable positions is never questioned.  
Instead, opponents of affirmative action insist on adherence to notions of "formal 
equality," an unpragmatic frame of argument that ignores all existing social structures, all 
history, all context and experience. 
 
  a. Pragmatism and Formal Equality.   
Stanley Fish, in a recent edition of his weekly online column for the New York 
Times, analyzes recent developments in affirmative action law using the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant.  In the column, "Revisiting Affirmative Action, with Help from Kant" 
(2007), Fish writes: 
 
It is because Kant insists on distinguishing what works (at least in the short run) 
and what is right that he would, I believe, be against affirmative action. He would 
have said, as many opponents of affirmative action do say, that it is wrong to 
respond to past acts of discrimination by discriminating in the present, even if 
your intentions are good. If discrimination—the unequal treatment of inherently 
free and equal citizens—is to be condemned when the motives behind it (to 
preserve power or maintain a way of life) are suspect, it is also to be condemned 
when the motives behind it (to redress an historical injustice or have the student 
body reflect the diversity of America) are benign. Otherwise the calculation of 
happiness (at least by someone’s lights) will have taken precedence over the 





Fish quotes pragmatist William James with the phrase "what works" (Pragmatism 36).  
He contrasts Kant's philosophy of high principles—"what is right"—with a pragmatic 
way of considering a problem as imbedded in history and culture.  The "what is right" 
way of thinking ignores context and pays attention only to the "discrimination" yielded 
by affirmative action.  The "what works" way of thinking insists on paying attention to 
context, to history, and to "motives."  However, in this passage, Fish has touched on one 
aspect of the debate over affirmative action that has proven sticky for proponents of race-
consciousness in college admissions or hiring: too many people perceive affirmative 
action to be "the unequal treatment of inherently free and equal citizens."  Fish takes it for 
granted that this is the definition of discrimination, and that affirmative action is 
discrimination—he just does not see anything wrong with discrimination if it is justified.   
Fish does not suggest that affirmative action is anything but discrimination or that 
discrimination in this context is anything but the unequal treatment of inherently equal 
citizens.  With these words, Fish nods at a different, highly principled notion—that of 
"formal equality."  Formal equality is "equality" stripped of context, history, and culture.  
It can be defined as treating like individuals alike, their likeness being judged by some 
"objective" standard.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides this definition: 
 
When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, 
they must be treated equally with regard to this respect. This is the generally 
accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle formulated in reference to Plato: 
'treat like cases as like.' … Of course the crucial question is which respects are 






In other words, when considering the usage of formal equality, one must ask, which 
standards are to be considered the controlling standards?  How does one decide which 
qualities constitute good qualities?  The closer one examines formal equality, the more 
the objective slips into the subjective. 
An opposing notion to formal equality is "substantive equality."  Using the 
context of sex discrimination, legal scholars Bartlett and Harris explain that substantive 
equality 
 
looks to a rule's results or effects. Formal rule equality often does not produce equal 
results because of significant differences in the characteristics and circumstances of 
women and men. Advocates of substantive equality demand that rules take account 
of these differences to avoid gender-related outcomes that are considered unfair. 
Determining what differences should be taken into account and in what ways—in 
short, what is fair—is not always an easy matter. Thus, substantive equality is not 
one theory, but several theories, reflecting multiple types and sources of difference 
and a number of alternative or overlapping substantive ideals. (261) 
 
One theory of substantive equality seeks to remedy past discrimination against a 
disfavored group using remedial measures such as affirmative action (Bartlett and Harris 
261).  In short, substantive equality defines equality by taking into account historical 
circumstances and currently cultural contexts.  Rather than suggesting that "all men are 
created equal" as an abstract claim, substantive equality insists that the claim be 
supported by evidence.  This tension between the abstract definition of equality and the 




C. S. Peirce recognizes humankind's tendency to provide abstract definitions or 
explanations of everyday occurrences.  In describing Leibniz's philosophical work, Peirce 
writes, "on observing that the method of Descartes labored under the difficulty that we 
may seem to ourselves to have clear apprehensions of ideas which in truth are very hazy, 
no better remedy occurred to him [Leibniz] than to require an abstract definition of every 
important term."  ("Ideas Clear" 28).  Peirce examines a recent book on mechanics, 
wondering that  
 
it is stated that we understand precisely the effect of force, but what force itself is 
we do not understand!  This is simply self-contradiction.  The idea which the 
word force excites in our minds has no other function than to affect our actions, 
and these actions can have no reference to force otherwise than through its effects. 
("Ideas Clear" 41)   
 
For Peirce, our understanding of force is the consequence of our understanding of the 
effect of force, because force is its effect.  The drive for an abstract definition is human 
fancy.  Broadly put, Peirce suggests that  
 
I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our 
minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things.  Our idea 
of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any 
other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the 
thought for a part of the thought itself. ("Ideas Clear" 36) 
 
Peirce is driving toward a method of thinking and investigating which will guide 
humankind toward "true belief" ("Ideas Clear" 43).  Focusing on abstract terminology 




for Peirce's method.  He writes, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing 
definitions" ("Ideas Clear" 28). 
Pragmatism requires us to ask whether there can be "equality" devoid of 
experience and detached from the everyday shuffle.  Can equality be "formal"?  Can it 
exist "in principle"?  Using the guidelines from Peirce, it would seem that notions of 
some sort of a priori formal equality might be interesting to toss around in philosophical 
discussion, but since citizens of the United States do not experience equality in a formal 
way, it is nearly useless to try to define it or use such a notion to shape policy.  Rather, in 
order to come to a true understanding of what equality is now, examination is required.  
Turning a blind eye to disparate outcomes of jurisprudential rules or legislation because 
principle dictates such ignorance yields exactly that—ignorance—of contemporary 
context and of reality.  Ignoring the disparate distribution of people of color in higher 
education or political office or corporate America yields only ignorance.  Talk of formal 
equality is a smokescreen. 
Law professor Patricia J. Williams writes, in the context of choosing between two 
otherwise “equally qualified” job candidates:  
 
Rarely are two people absolutely equally qualified … so the judgment of equality 
is usually pretty subjective to begin with … and usually overlooks or fills in a lot 
of information that may in fact distinguish the candidates significantly (is it the 
same to be number one in a small class as in a huge class; is the grading done by 
some absolute standard, or on a strictly enforced bell curve; …).  All  such 
differentiations are matters of subjective preference, since all such “equality” is 
nothing more than assumption, the subjective willingness not to look past a 
certain point, or to accept the judgments of others (the admissions director of 






According to Williams, formal equality is a myth because it chooses to ignore important 
facts, important context clues that affect how one person’s numbers appear next to 
another person’s numbers. When opponents of affirmative action say that hiring or 
college admissions should be based strictly on merit because people in our democracy 
should be treated equally, pragmatism forces the discussion back to the place where merit 
is created and asks all of the important questions about context: who decides what merit 
is, what counts, and why.  Williams takes her critique a step further: “Even if we were 
talking about an assembly line, where the standard [of merit] were some monotonous 
minimal rather than a rarefied maximum, my critique holds that certain human 
characteristics are being dishonored as irrelevant—such as creativity, humor, and 
amiability” (Race & Rights 100).  Do we as a society take for granted the qualities that 
we look for in candidates for jobs or places in university programs, without questioning 
how these qualities end up shaping professions, end up shaping society itself?  Have our 
definitions of quality lost connection with our experience? 
The constant interplay between theory and experience is fundamental to a 
pragmatic thought.  "Experience," for Peirce, is grounded in methodical scientific study.  
For Addams, it is grounded the lives of the working classes of Chicago that she knew so 
intimately and wrote about prolifically.  For pragmatic legal scholar Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
building upon the work of John Dewey and William James, theory has an inextricable 




truth and knowledge upon this relationship.  Meaning, language, truth, and knowledge are 
always grounded in and derived from our meaningfully informed activities in the world" 
(58) (emphasis added).  Thus, what we do is just as important as what we know, in fact, 
what we do in this sense becomes what we know.  Furthermore, pragmatic thought calls 
the entire notion of objectivity into question because it recognizes the importance of 
perspective. Tamanaha writes:  
 
while the pragmatists recognize that there is no unmediated access to the world, 
and they accept that in a certain sense the world is constituted through our ideas 
and beliefs, that it is carved up and available to us only through the prism of our 
perspective-based interests and concerns, they continue to insist that there is a 
world out there which has its own facticity, albeit one we can never have access to 
in any raw form. (60) 
 
In other words, although pragmatists insist that a reality exists, humans do not have 
unadulterated access to it, because perceptions, experiences, and beliefs shape one's 
existence in the world.  Each person views the world with an individual's eyes.  This 
should not be mistaken as a call for individualism.  On the contrary, for pragmatists, 
meaning is made by communities.  Tamanaha continues, on the pragmatist "coherence 
theory" of knowledge: 
 
According to the coherence theory, beliefs are true based upon their relationship 
with other beliefs, or, more broadly stated, based upon consistency with the entire 
complex of beliefs.  This second element indicates that a key aspect of the inquiry 
is that it takes place within a community of investigators (identified in the 
broadest possible terms, over the long run) which indicates that for the knowledge 






The consequence of this pragmatic notion of perspective is that one must question 
whether there can be anything like formal equality at all. 
 
b. The "Myth of Merit" 
The primary popular argument against affirmative action suggests that hiring and 
college admissions decisions should be based strictly on "merit," rather than on race or 
gender.  Some states have taken this argument and turned it into law, passing ballot 
referendums outlawing affirmative action in public hiring, contracts, and education.  For 
example, in November of 1996, California's Proposition 209 passed on a state ballot 
referendum with a 54% of the vote.  It amends the state Constitution and reads, in part, 
“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual 
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of 
public employment, public education, or public contracting" (California).  The 
proposition was initiated by Ward Connerly, at the time a Regent of the University of 
California.  Connerly, a conservative activist, is an outspoken opponent of affirmative 
action.  Since the passage of Proposition 209, he has led similar campaigns in other 
states, most recently in Michigan. 
In January of 2007, the New York Times published an article on the “new face” of 
the University of California at Berkeley, a campus that the author, Timothy Egan, 
describes as "overwhelmingly Asian" (24).  The piece, titled "Little Asia on the Hill," 




California system in the ten years since the passage of Proposition 209.  Ultimately, it 
appears that Egan wishes to question whether a "pure meritocracy" is more ethical than 
college admissions based on "racial preferences" (27).  He writes: 
 
If Berkeley is now a pure meritocracy, what does that say about the future of great 
American universities in the post-affirmative action age?  Are we headed toward a 
day when all elite colleges will look something like Berkeley: relatively wealthy 
whites (about 60 percent of white freshmen’s families make $100,000 or more) 
and a large Asian plurality and everyone else underrepresented?  Is that the 
inevitable result of color-blind admissions? (27) 
 
Egan wants to know whether it is ethical for state schools––which claim to serve the 
entire population of a state––to educate only a racially select group.  He notes that blacks 
and Latinos are all but absent from Berkeley’s campus, and the campuses of other elite 
University of California schools. 
Egan's phrase "overwhelmingly Asian" has a decidedly doomsday tone.  It is also 
inaccurate.  At the time of this article, Berkeley’s campus was 41% percent Asian. Thus, 
although Asians are a plurality, they are not a (overwhelming) majority. This statistic 
includes people of south Asian descent as well––those from India, for example—yet the 
students pictured in the photographs and featured in the story are all of east Asian 
descent.  The subheadline of the article reads: "With a mandate that says merit trumps all, 
Berkeley finds itself looking across the Pacific for its identity.  Is this the new face of 
higher education?" (24).  This statement reveals the striking xenophobic tone of the 
article as a whole.  The phrase "finds itself" sets up Berkeley, and the state of California 




though the voters of California did not choose to eradicate affirmative action at the ballot 
box.  Furthermore, the very framing of this statement in the form of a question creates an 
ominous rhetorical tone (is this the new face…?).  Finally, Egan writes that Berkeley is 
"looking across the Pacific."  In this he is simply incorrect.  Berkeley, a state school, is 
educating state citizens; the students at Berkeley may be of Asian descent, but they are 
Californians and Americans—not interlopers from across an ocean. 
There is a subtext to this article that is representative of the affirmative action 
debate on a grander scale.  Although it is hard to ignore the xenophobic tone of the 
article, Egan also makes many presumptions about affirmative action: that we as a society 
agree on a meaning of "equality"; that there is such a thing as admission based purely on 
merit ("pure meritocracy").  Egan does present one opposing viewpoint which claims "the 
idea of pure meritocracy is bunk," because access to excellent high school education is so 
unevenly distributed along lines of class and race (27). 
One popular anti-affirmative action argument claims that some sort of objective 
standard of merit, not race (or gender or class), should determine whether a person or 
group receives a desired position.  This argument applies across the board: to spots in 
university classes, government jobs, and government contracts.  Stanley Fish outlines the 
merit argument against affirmative action: "It goes like this: people should get jobs and 
places in college because they merit them, and neither race nor gender could be a 
component of merit" (Trouble with Principle 30).  Fish explains how merit, although it 




trick here is to define merit narrowly—with test scores or examination results—and then 
stigmatize any other consideration as unwarranted preference or bad social engineering.  
But merit is just a word for whatever qualifications are deemed desirable for the 
performance of a particular task, and there is nothing fixed about those qualifications" 
(Trouble with Principle 30).  Fish denies the possibility of objective standards of merit.  
Because they are created by people, standards cannot be objective, but rather represent 
whatever people subjectively want.  In the end, "Merit is not one thing but many things, 
and even when it becomes a disputed thing, the dispute is between different versions of 
merit and not between merit and something base and indefensible" (Trouble with 
Principle 30). 
Unfortunately, as a society we are so accustomed to thinking in terms of objective 
merit that it has become habit.  Shelby Steele, a conservative scholar on race and a fellow 
at Stanford's Hoover Institution, is a firm believer in objective standards.  In The Content 
of our Character (1990) he makes the classic merit-based argument against affirmative 
action.  He does so, though, under the guise of sympathy for the depressed social position 
black people.  He claims that many black students are accepted into American colleges 
and universities because of “the lowering of normal standards to increase black 
representation" (Content of our Character 117).  By “normal standards” he seems to refer 
to standardized test scores and grade point averages, the supposedly objective, 
standardized, numerical measures of achievement that colleges and universities favor, as 




tries to function like a social program.  Rather than ask it to ensure equal opportunity we 
have demanded that it create parity between the races.  But preferential treatment does 
not teach skills, or educate, or instill motivation" (Content of our Character 121).  In 
other words, Steele believes that black people, as a group, need skills, education, and 
motivation, in order to merit positions in universities that are currently handed out under 
a system of racial preferences.  At the moment, according to Steele, those positions are 
undeserved by black people as a group.  Affirmative action "only passes out entitlement 
by color" (Content of our Character 121). 
Steele's argument seems to presume that skills, education, and motivation can be 
gained outside of colleges and universities, since Steele acknowledges that black people 
will be excluded from universities without affirmative action.  This fact is also 
acknowledged by the defendant in Grutter.  The witnesses for the defendant, the 
University of Michigan Law School, testified that for the class of 2000, had there not 
been a race-conscious admissions policy, underrepresented minorities would have made 
up 4% of the class rather than the 14.5% that actually attended that year (Grutter 320).  
Steele seems to presume that once black students learn skills and gain motivation, 
their enrollment will increase in higher education.  But how long will this take?  In 
California, the consequence of ten years without affirmative action in the state university 
system, as Egan explains, is that black students are virtually non-existent at Berkeley and 
other U.C. schools.  According to Egan's article, black students make up the following 




Irvine 2%, San Diego 1%.  California's state population is 7% black.  Yet Steele seems to 
think that affirmative action is standing in for the basic education that black students need 
to succeed.  So where are the programs in California to teach black students these skills 
to help them meet the neutral standards that are keeping them out of state universities?  
Could it be that affirmative action was not the real culprit, but rather an educational 
system that is not invested in the success of black students?  California has had ten years 
to educate its students of color.  Those students that were in second grade when 
Proposition 209 passed would be going to college.  That is plenty of time to learn skills 
and motivation, but it has not happened, as the numbers at the top schools show.   
The anti-affirmative action argument Steele presents suggests that test scores, 
grade point averages, and other measurements of "objective" merit can reveal whether a 
student has adequate skills, education, and motivation to succeed in college.  But inherent 
in his words are so many variables that go unquestioned.  How are colleges reading the 
results of standardized tests?  How are they valuing grade point averages?  Are there 
other qualities that would predict student performance that are being ignored?  As Fish 
explains, some schools have chosen to redefine what merit means:  
 
Some medical schools now decline to certify aspiring doctors who have proven 
themselves technically but lack the skills that enable them to relate to patients.  
These schools are not abandoning merit but fashioning an alternative conception 
of it rooted in an alternative notion of what the job requires.  (Trouble with 





The merit argument presumes that there is such a thing as objective merit at all; that there 
are such things as skills, education, and motivation required for higher education that 
policy makers can point to and measure.  Patricia J. Williams writes that "standards are 
nothing more than structured preferences" (Race & Rights 103).  In the end, they are 
simply the preferences that come to look normal and cease to be questioned. 
In her discussion of affirmative action, political scientist Iris Marion Young 
explains the "myth of merit" this way: 
 
A widely held principle of justice in our society is that positions and rewards 
should be distributed according to individual merit.  The merit principle holds that 
positions should be awarded to the most qualified individuals, that is, to those 




This principle of merit seems so commonsensical as to be beyond question: the best 
person should get the job.  However, as Young points out, "Use of a principle of merit to 
allocate scarce and desirable positions in a job hierarchy, and in the educational 
institutions that train people for those jobs, is just only if several conditions are met" 
(201). The first of these conditions is that "qualifications must be defined in terms of 
technical skills and competence, independent of and neutral with respect to values and 
culture" (201).  Young defines technical competence as "competence at producing 
specified results" (201).  In other words, only if a group can be certain that the 
requirements for a job or a college spot are free of cultural norms can it be certain that the 




The problem with using objective standards, according to Young, is that 
everything humans define derives from values and culture.  In pragmatist terms, the word 
for "culture" is "experience."  For example, Menand explains that when John Dewey 
published Experience and Nature in 1925, "Dewey used the term 'experience' in that 
book exactly as [Oliver Wendell] Holmes had used it forty years earlier in the famous 
opening paragraph of The Common Law—as a name for culture" (437).  In "How to 
Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce provides an example of the function of experience in 
pragmatist philosophy.  He writes, "There is absolutely no difference between a hard 
thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test" ("Ideas Clear" 36).  He 
describes a situation in which "a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion 
of soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally burned up" ("Ideas Clear" 36).  
He asks, rhetorically, "what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly 
soft until they are touched" ("Ideas Clear" 37).  Peirce is pushing towards a conclusion 
that questions the very existence of a priori knowledge without testing in experience:  
"This leads us to remark that the question of what would occur under circumstances 
which do not actually arise is not a question of fact, but only of the most perspicuous 
arrangement of them" ("Ideas Clear" 37).  The diamond in the cotton cushion teaches us 
about the importance of context: how objects derive their meanings by what lies around 
them.  For Peirce, this scientific context could be called experience; in human terms, it 
can be called culture.  We can only learn about the diamond by bringing it into contact 




diamond is contextual.  We do not have knowledge of the diamond disengaged from 
comparisons to the hardness or softness of other materials.  There is no "objective," 
decontextualized standard of hardness.  An object can only be "as hard as" something 
else, a measurement that is imbedded in context. 
Merit does not exist in a cotton cushion, but rather derives from standards written 
in a highly contextual environment.  Merit does not exist a priori.  Hiring managers or 
college admissions counselors can only set standards based on prior systems of 
measurement; they can only require that new applicants be "as good as" someone else—a 
highly contextual, subjective standard.  The standard by which others are measured is not 
any eternal standard of the good, it is merely another human circumstance.  Thus, it is 
impossible to design job qualifications or merit standards for a university that are culture- 
or value-free.  According to Young, when this is the case, the resulting standards must be 
unjust: "If merit criteria do not distinguish between technical skills and normative or 
cultural attributes there is no way to separate being a 'good' worker of a certain sort from 
being the sort kind (sic) of person—with the right background, way of life, and so on" 
(201).  In the end, Young explains, "The idea of merit criteria that are objective and 
unbiased with respect to personal attributes is a version of the ideal of impartiality, and is 
just as impossible."  The root of the problem, as Young points out, is that these merit 
criteria are used to legitimate unjust hierarchies, in jobs and schooling, hierarchies that 




Before the United States used a hierarchy of merit, it used a hierarchy of race.  
White people were considered to be valuable members of American society than black 
people.  This system does not hold any more, at least not in a de jure fashion, so we have 
a new system, the merit system.  Except the merit system is not exactly new; it is still 
highly entangled with the prior racial caste system.  When college admissions directors 
and hiring managers look to their standards, their highly contextualized, culturally-
grounded standards, they are enacting standards that are a carryover from the prior 
system.  The model student did not suddenly change when Harvard College was racially 
desegregated or when women were admitted.  One day black students were admitted, yes, 
but the standards existed prior to their admission.  These standards were crafted by white 
men for white men who bore their own system of values.  In this way, the hierarchy of 
merit has stepped into the shoes of the hierarchy of race.  Young explains the relationship 
between merit and hierarchies in America: "[The merit] principle is central to 
legitimating a hierarchical division of labor in a liberal democratic society which assumes 
the equal moral and political worth of all persons. … The unjust hierarchy of caste is to 
be replaced by a 'natural' hierarchy of intellect and skill" (200). The problem in practice is 
the unjust hierarchy that the myth of merit supports. 
The myth of merit has justified hierarchies in the United States workforce and 
educational systems for decades.  It has yielded, for example, a small minority of elite 
universities which receive astronomical financial resources and a majority of 




justified by the objective standards of students' grades and scores and the performances of 
professors.  Without examining the standards of merit by which we justify our 
hierarchical system of education (and the workforce it supplies), we merely replicate the 
hierarchies with each new generation of students and workers.  Democracy demands the 
experiences and voices of all citizens be given equal value in our educational system.  If a 
portion of the population remains unrepresented in our public schools, then their 
experiences remain unrepresented as well.  If a population's cultural history is elided and 
suppressed, rather than embraced and studied, then their experiences are elided and 
suppressed. 
The problem with Young's critique, as insightful as it may be, is that she fails to 
provide much of a solution at the end of her deconstruction of the current standard of 
merit in our society.  If what we do now is not fair, what would be a fair way to award 
spaces in colleges and universities?  Young takes her critique a step further, and suggests 
dismantling the system of elite universities and vocations altogether, as these structures 
support unjust class hierarchies.   
Like truth, merit can be defined provisionally using pragmatism.  In order to 
continue to function, universities will need to continue to make admissions decisions, and 
they will need standards in order to cull applicants.  If pragmatism debunks objective 
merit, and subjective merit is unworkable by definition, perhaps there can be a third way.  
Merit can be filled with provisional value—with provisional truth.  Pragmatism teaches 




methodical and sound study and openness to perspectives, can lead us on the path to a 
contingent vision of merit.  For example, it is no secret that the most accurate predictor of 
a student's performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is the income of the 
student's parents. "According to the College Board, which administers the SAT, test 
scores improve with family income" (Gelpi).  Yet, Berkeley still relies heavily on test 
scores in admissions.  Egan notes that most white students come from wealthy families; 
yet he is incorrect that the admissions policy is based purely on merit: experience shows 
that it favors those who are wealthy.  Furthermore, in our society, in which people of 
color are disproportionately poor, the test favors those who are white.  By granting power 
to a test such as the SAT which displays a bias so obvious that its own administrators 
announce it to the world, universities do not use experience to supply a useful meaning to 
"merit."   
 
c. The Elite Pie.   
Cornel West, in his popular book Race Matters (1993), describes the history of 
affirmative action this way: 
 
This historic role of American progressives is to promote redistributive measures 
that enhance the standard of living and quality of life for the have-nots and have-
too-littles.  Affirmative action was one such redistributive measure that surfaced 







With these words, West identifies the stakes of the affirmative action debate in a way 
most Americans would recognize: there are some people in U.S. society who possess 
more wealth and power than others, and those in favor of affirmative action see this 
unequal distribution of wealth and power as unjust.  Thus, affirmative action seeks to 
redistribute access to education and jobs to align with progressive ideals of justice.  Since 
there are only a very limited amount of highly desired items––positions in elite college 
classes, valuable jobs, government contracts––such redistribution necessarily takes away 
from some people in order to give to others.  Simply put, the pie of elite jobs, contracts, 
and college spots is small, everyone wants a piece of this pie, and affirmative action 
makes powerful people angry because it interferes with the portion they are accustomed 
to receiving.  Of course, the status quo makes other people angry too, but those people 
are poor, disenfranchised, and underrepresented. 
For West, affirmative action is about distribution, about money, about class.  He 
writes, "If I had been old enough to join the fight for racial equality in the courts, the 
legislatures, and the boardrooms in the 1960s …, I would have favored—as I do now—a 
class-based affirmative action in principle" (Race Matters 95).  West claims that the 
redistribution accomplished by affirmative action is contrary to traditional capitalist aims: 
"Every redistributive measure is a compromise with and concession from the caretakers 
of American prosperity—that is, big business and big government" (Race Matters 94).  
Thus, for West, there is a conflict between unfettered capitalism, represented by "big 




capitalist wealth-sharing.  However, West's language of redistribution is misleading.  
Affirmative action is not a socialist, nor even progressive, program.  It was originally 
designed to work within a capitalist system.  It aims to create representative social 
stratification within racial groups.  Affirmative action does not work to break down social 
stratification.  The way it works now, affirmative action remains a program designed to 
maintain hierarchies of poverty and wealth.  In this sense, it is not a true "redistributive 
measure." 
West's arguments in favor of affirmative action, although they claim to be 
progressive, are in fact firmly lodged in liberal capitalist principles.  His cultural critique 
does not include the larger social structures within which affirmative action has been 
limited.  For example, West writes that he only favors race-based (and gender-based) 
affirmative action because he sees such measures as practical, whereas class-based 
affirmative action would be too difficult to implement.  In some ways, his language is 
recognizably pragmatic, for he is looking for a policy that works:  
 
[I]n the heat of battle in American politics, a redistributive measure in principle 
with no power and pressure behind it means no redistributive measure at all.  The 
prevailing discriminatory practices during the sixties, whose targets were working 
people, women, and people of color, were atrocious.  Thus, an enforceable race-
based—and later gender-based—affirmative action policy was the best possible 
compromise and concession. (Race Matters 95) 
 
 
Race-based affirmative action is a system that works, a stand-in for a class-based system 
which would be too difficult to enforce, according to West.  Choosing an enforceable 




that is perfect in theory––one based on class––but unenforceable.  For West, race and 
gender are imperfect stand-ins for class in an affirmative action system.  He accepts the 
stand-ins, because the system is workable.  But it is unclear, according to West, why a 
race-based system is imperfect.  West says he prefers a class-based system, but does not 
specify why, simply saying he favors it "in principle," nor does he explain why it would 
be difficult to enforce.  Yet, at the same time, West writes that the discrimination against 
people of color and against women has been “atrocious.”  It would seem that this 
atrocious discrimination justifies affirmation action based on race and gender.  People of 
color have been and continue to be discriminated against because of their skin color, 
whether or not they are poor.  The internal conflict in West’s critique arises because West 
has bought into the prevailing justification of affirmative action: that it exists to 
redistribute resources, to divvy up the elite pie, that is, to distribute spots in elite colleges 
that will then yield spots in elite professions; to distribute elite government contracts and 
jobs.  Affirmative action, as it stands now in public discourse, leaves hierarchical wealth 
structures unquestioned and undisturbed.  The goal of affirmative action is to make these 
wealth structures representative of the racial makeup of the general population, not to 
redistribute wealth. 
Young provides an insightful critique of affirmative action that questions what 
she calls the "distributive paradigm" (198).  She writes, "While distributive issues are 
important concerns of social justice, an approach that focuses solely on distribution tends 




distributions" (198). She cites affirmative action advocate Richard Wasserstrom as a 
"representative of those who conceptualize affirmative action as an issue of distributive 
justice": 
 
There is, at present, a maldistribution of power and authority along racial and 
sexual lines that is part of the social structure. … To the degree that the present 
distribution of services and goods is unfair to members of these groups 
[nonwhites and women], the distributional change is justifiable simply because it 
is now a more just distribution. (Wasserstrom) 
 
 
Young acknowledges that affirmative action does have some success in redistributing 
"desirable positions" referred to by Wasserstrom to people of color and women, people 
"who otherwise probably would not get them" (199). 
Young and Wasserstrom agree that principles of formal equality should be 
"violated in order to produce more just patterns in the distributions of positions," that is, 
in order to create substantive equality (Young 199).  But preferential treatment does not 
solve the real problem identified by Young: "the basic structure of group privilege and 
oppression in the United States."  She elaborates: 
 
Since these programs [affirmative action programs] require that racially or 
sexually preferred candidates be qualified, and indeed often highly qualified, they 
do nothing directly to increase opportunities for Blacks, Latinos, or women whose 
social environment and lack of resources make getting qualified nearly impossible 
for them. (199) 
 
 
Young asserts here that affirmative action programs do not help those who need the most 




opportunity.  "Qualified" is a subjective standard set by people entrenched in positions of 
power, and the only way to become qualified is to pass through the gateways that these 
people guard with standards and qualifications—a catch-22 that reveals the 
interconnectedness of the problem of the "pure meritocracy" in a world of elite 
hierarchies. 
In order to be effective, the philosophy of affirmative action must be a three-part 
process.  First, it must provide opportunities to people who are denied access to social, 
political, and financial power: a redistributive measure.  As the California experiment has 
shown, waiting around for change to happen has not worked.  Steele may criticize 
affirmative action for acting as a "social program," but he has not adequately explained 
why it is not needed, particularly in light of the evidence to the contrary.  Secondly, the 
philosophy of affirmative action must examine standards and qualifications that claim to 
be objective in light of the cultural context from which they arise.  This pragmatic 
examination of standards will reveal whether they have discriminatory consequences, 
such as the examination of the SATs that revealed the test's privileging of its wealthy 
takers.  Finally, the philosophy of affirmative action must question hierarchical social 
institutions and structures that prevent the democratic participation of each individual in 
U.S. society.  The goal of this philosophy and its attendant social labor is not some 
abstract notion of justice, a Kantian principle lodged in the ether.  Rather, it is possible to 
see, through careful observation, with an open mind, the ways in which in our society 




project, then, is for racial difference not to disappear, but rather to no longer be the cause 
of hurt.  Being black should not suggested that one tends to receive a sub-par public 
education and being Asian should not mean that one tends to be targeted with 









JAMES, MEAD, INDIVIDUALISM,  
AND THE MYTH OF COLOR-BLINDNESS 
 
a. James and the Force of the Individual 
Cornel West, in his book on pragmatism, describes William James this way:  
 
In short, he is an authentic American intellectual frontiersman, not so much 
staking land in a wilderness but rather, like Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn, 
expanding the moral possibilities of individuals on a raft that floats near land and 
society yet never really banks for long.  In an important sense, experience is a 
river—a set of actions and reactions connected with ethical purpose.  Yet, in 
contrast to Emerson, James is not a detached contemplative man of the spirit, but 
rather an attached restless patrician of the street. (Evasion of Philosophy 55) 
 
As West describes, James was interested in the hustle and bustle of humanity; his work 
takes Peirce's scientific method and pragmatism and "extends them to our personal and 
moral lives" (Evasion of Philosophy 55).  As opposed to the model provided by Emerson, 
that of an isolated thinker, James's pragmatism took for granted that humans are social 
creatures.  In this way, James reveals a similarity to Peirce, who believed scientific 
discovery was a communal process. 
Although there are differences between the work of Peirce and James, the 
similarities are far more significant: "Both shun the Cartesian problematic; both turn 
away from foundations, certainties, and bases and toward effects, consequences, and 




philosophy" (Evasion of Philosophy 56).  As scientists—James was a psychologist—both 
thinkers "were preoccupied … with method, with how experience is embodied, might be 
accounted for and used toward the end of understanding" (Roskelly and Ronald Reason 
to Believe 86).  Ultimately, as pragmatists, both Peirce and James "wished to find a way 
to mediate between experience and belief. … They were also deeply invested in 
reconciling belief and doubt" (Reason to Believe 86).   
Prior to William James, pragmatism was a topic of discussion among a small 
group of thinkers in Boston.  After he spoke on it at the University of California at 
Berkeley in 1898 and published his book Pragmatism in 1907, the term and its attendant 
ideas lodged themselves in America's popular consciousness.  James brought pragmatism 
out of Peirce's laboratory and into the street.  Although Peirce was hardly grateful—
Peirce distinguished his own line of thinking by changing the name to "pragmaticism"—
James's work bears great force in the larger community of American thought. 
Mediating dualities was a special hobby of James: he favored the "juxtaposition 
of exorbitant polar positions" (West Evasion of Philosophy 57).  James enjoyed 
identifying a middle ground between extremes.  For example, his project in Pragmatism 
was to find a third way between what he called "rationalism" and "empiricism."  Another 
such conflict that arises in James's work is between the individual and the community.  
West critiques an apparent tendency of James to focus on the force of the individual: 
"James's emphasis on heroism is his way of revising Emerson's notion of power.  Like 




anthropocentric than Emerson; man truly is the measure of all things for him" (Evasion of 
Philosophy 58).  West observes that, because of his focus on the strength and 
accomplishments of individuals, James is not a proponent of social change like his fellow 
pragmatists such as Dewey and Addams:  
 
For James, the moral development of human personalities is related to but far 
from determined by social circumstances.  Like Emerson, he is prohibited by his 
individualism from taking seriously fundamental social change; instead, he opts 
for a gradualism supported by moral critique. (Evasion of Philosophy 60) 
 
West attributes James's outlook to his social circumstances:  
 
James's position is symptomatic of his class background, family upbringing, and 
personal temperament.  The crises he encountered were personal and existential, 
not political or economic. … James was preoccupied with the state of his and 
others' souls, not the social conditions of their lives. (Evasion of Philosophy 60) 
 
West describes James as a wealthy son detached from the hustle and bustle of social 
reality, aloof from the streets and from a wealth of diverse experiences that could 
challenge habit and lead to pragmatic knowledge.  In some ways, West's words at this 
moment contradict his earlier description of James as Huck Finn riding the river of 
experience.  West's problem of interpretation arises perhaps because James's language in 
his writings is sometimes ambivalent, treading both sides of an argument, when he takes 
on his role of mediator of binaries. 
In his writings on individuals and communities, James straddles the line between 




insists on the importance of both in the creation of social change.   In "Great Men and 
Their Environment" (1880), James writes:  
 
Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct 
factors,––the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological 
and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in 
his hands; and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or 
rejecting both him and his gifts.  Both factors are essential to change.  The 
community stagnates without the impulse of the individual.  The impulse dies 
away without the sympathy of the community. ("Great Men" 182) 
 
Although, as West asserts, James lays great store by the power of the individual to create 
social change, the main emphasis of this passage, and of the essay as a whole, is on 
"interaction" between two separate yet equally important forces: the individual and the 
community.  The individual and community are as inextricable in James's philosophy as 
belief is from experience.  The social shapes the individual, but the individual in turn 
shapes society.  Thus, the relationship between the individual and community is 
reciprocal. 
 
b. Mead, the Social Group, and Affirmative Action 
Menand writes that George Herbert Mead was "Dewey's best friend at Michigan, 
whom [Dewey] later brought to Chicago, … a former student of William James's, and 
one of the founders of social psychology, a field premised on the idea that selfhood is a 
function of one's relations with others" (304, ).  This notion of the reciprocity of the self 




current legal arguments between the call for individual consideration which been raised 
against those who work for civil rights for people of color as a group ("Self and Social 
Control" 190, ).  For, in the end, one is always an individual and a member of a group—
or groups—at the same time.  Does the idea of reciprocity between individual and social 
group provide any answers for the current debate over race-conscious admissions policies 
to colleges? 
In the debate over affirmative action, the conflict often arises over individual 
remedies versus remedies for groups or communities of people.  Opponents of 
affirmative action charge that the broad-based remedy of "racial preferences" is "group-
think," which is, as Stanley Fish explains, "contrary to the American tradition of 
regarding persons as individuals" (Trouble with Principle 31).  Fish continues: 
 
The "group perspective" is rejected both as a way of assigning responsibility (it is 
individuals who discriminate, not society or patterns of history) and as a way of 
identifying the victimized (it is individuals, not groups, who are harmed).  But this 
insistence on what the Adarand decision calls an "individualized showing" of 
harm does not correspond to the manner in which the harms were inflicted and 
experienced.  Blacks were not historically discriminated against one by one but as 
a group, by persons who had the entire African-American population, not 
particular members of it, in mind.  And those who experienced discrimination did 
not do so as the result of being individual targeted (although that of course 
happened more than occasionally) but as the result of living in a society whose 
general and impersonal structures worked ceaselessly to their disadvantage. 
(Trouble with Principle 31) 
 
In other words, to forbid plaintiffs seeking judicial remedies for racism from using 
evidence of racism against groups makes no sense because the nature of racial 




a plaintiff to only show acts by individuals against the plaintiff as an individual 
misunderstands, perhaps deliberately, the very nature of racism. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, requires just this individual showing.  The 
decision Adarand v. Pena (1995), referenced by Fish in the above passage, examined a 
challenge to a provision of the Small Business Act which states it is "the policy of the 
United States that … small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals, … shall have the maximum practicable 
opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal Agency" 
("SBA" 8(d)(1)).   Under the SBA, if a business is able to show social and economic 
disadvantage, then it qualifies for special consideration for government contracts.  
However, under certain provisions, the SBA allows a presumption of social disadvantage 
if a business owner is a member of an ethnic group as provided in the statute.  
Additionally, the showing of economic disadvantage is less rigorous for members of 
these groups.  In Adarand, the lower court upheld the SBA provisions, applying a 
Supreme Court decision, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC (1990), which gives greater latitude 
to "benign" discrimination intended to remedy racism.  Justice O'Connor, writing for the 
slim Adarand majority, did not produce much of an opinion regarding the underlying 
conflict in Adarand: she simply vacated the lower court's opinion and sent it back to the 
lower court for reconsideration.  The major change in law occurred because the Supreme 






The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all derive from the 
basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
protect persons, not groups.  It follows from that principle that all governmental 
action based on race—a group classification long recognized as "in most 
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,"… should be subjected to 
detailed judicial inquiry and ensure the personal right to equal protection of the 
laws has not been infringed. (Adarand 227) 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court has eliminated the possibility of benign discrimination in 
government contracts and hiring, choosing instead to subject all race-conscious programs 
to the same level of judicial suspicion, no matter what the motives or consequences of the 
program may be.   
Philosophically, the Court is able to treat all race-conscious programs the same 
way because it deliberately excludes social context from its consideration.  Programs 
designed to remedy discrimination and programs designed to exclude or injure a 
disfavored group look the same in the eyes of the Court when history and context are 
erased.  Removing context includes removing an individual plaintiff's group membership.  
However, in reality, a black person comes before the law not as an individual, but rather 
as a person positioned in the context of structural and governmental discrimination 
against black people both historically and currently.  In this way, all individuals come 
before the law bearing their group identities with them.  This powerful context does not 
necessarily fully limit our agency as individual persons, however, it is important to 




that we as a society are not always aware of.  By gaining awareness of these pressures, 
individuals and a society can work to change them. 
Shelby Steele, a vocal opponent of affirmative action, attacks race-conscious 
programs by attacking group consciousness in favor of the "individual."  Group-based 
solutions such as affirmative action, for Steele, not only do not work, but are in the end 
hurtful because they deny a person's ability to be an individual.  In his book The Content 
of Our Character (1990), Steele claims that the benefits of affirmative action programs 
for the poorest and most oppressed members of society are shaky at best: “Racial 
representation is not the same as racial development, yet affirmative action fosters a 
confusion of these very different needs.  Representation can be manufactured; 
development is always hard-earned" (Content of our Character 116).  Here, Steele 
accurately describes affirmative action's current goal of gaining racial representation 
within America's existing class structure.  But he also quite flippantly denies the 
possibility that opportunities provided by race-conscious programs provide just the 
development he seeks.  Furthermore, rather than providing alternatives or modifications 
to race-conscious programs, Steele attributes a multitude of negative ramifications to 
affirmative action and suggests scrapping it.  For example, according to Steele, 
affirmative action creates "demoralization" and "enlargement of self-doubt" in its 
beneficiaries (Content of our Character 116).  It also "undermines their ability to 
perform" (Content of our Character 117-18).  Astonishingly, Steele does not hold racist 




Instead, Steele justifies racism and the racial glass ceiling in the workplace by blaming 
affirmative action: “Affirmative action makes a glass ceiling virtually necessary as a 
protection against the corruptions of preferential treatment" (Content of our Character 
120-21).  His words beg the question: what was the explanation for the glass ceiling that 
existed before there was affirmative action? 
In his book, Steele does not provide much support for these tenuous arguments 
against affirmative action.  Stanley Fish easily debunks the suggestion that affirmative 
action lowers self-esteem of its beneficiaries.  The argument 
 
has little statistical support and is dubious psychology.  Some beneficiaries of 
affirmative action will question their achievements; others will be quite secure in 
them; and many more will manage to have low self-esteem no matter what their 
history.  Affirmative action is a weak predictor of low self-esteem, and even if 
there were a strong correlation, you might prefer the low self-esteem that comes 
along with wondering if your success is really earned to the low self-esteem that 
comes with never having been in a position to succeed in the first place. (Trouble 
with Principle 32-33) 
 
For black students arriving on campuses of predominantly white universities, the 
challenges to self-esteem are plenty.  Low self-esteem can arise from the history and 
tradition of exclusion of black students and other students of color from the culture and 
community of the university.  Low self-esteem might also arise from white students 
accusing black students of gaining admission merely because of affirmative action, 
whether or not such accusations are true.  Low self-esteem can arise because black 
students and other students of color are often treated as outsiders on white campuses, 




In an article for Harper’s Magazine, “The Age of White Guilt and the 
Disappearance of the Black Individual” (2002), Steele provides a more complex 
explanation for the arguments he puts forward in his book.  Steele focuses on a conflict 
between individual and group identities, describing what he calls the “protest-group 
identity” that black people have embraced since the civil-rights era ("Age of White Guilt" 
35).  The foundation of Steele's argument suggests that by focusing on their victim status 
as a group, black people are locked in a self-imposed cycle of underachievement.  Black 
individuals, specifically intellectuals, who may otherwise achieve true greatness are 
unable to do so because of loyalty to their oppressed racial group.  Such intellectuals may 
have the "moral glamour" of being related to "an oppressed group's liberation struggle" 
("Age of White Guilt" 37).  But "one ceases to be a mere individual with a mere point of 
view and becomes, in effect, the embodiment of a moral imperative" ("Age of White 
Guilt" 37).  However, Steele explains, "This is rarely done consciously, as a Faustian 
bargain in which the intellectual knowingly sells his individual soul to the group.  Rather 
the group identity is already a protest-focused identity, and the intellectual simply goes 
along with it" ("Age of White Guilt" 37).  What is worse, according to Steele, due to this 
protest-focused identity that black people have adopted, the group "mistrusts 
individualism because free individuals might jeopardize the group's effort to activate this 
liability"—that is, "white liability" for racism in America ("Age of White Guilt" 35).   
Steele uses many powerful words in these passages, words that reveal the key to 




particular, by "free individuals"?  Is it true, as he claims, that "There are, in fact, no races 
that need help; only individuals, citizens" ("Age of White Guilt" 42)?  Is there such a 
thing as a "self-made individual" ("Age of White Guilt" 42)?  Steele's fundamental view 
on individuality underlies his argument and should be studied closely, for it is a common 
argument for those who are opposed to affirmative action. 
At the beginning of the article, Steele tells the story of his coming-to-
consciousness as a child: 
 
One day back in the late fifties, when I was ten or eleven years old, there was a 
moment when I experienced myself as an individual—as a separate 
consciousness—for the first time. …  
 I was struck by a thought that seemed beyond me.  I have tried for years to 
remember it, but all my effort only pushes it further away.  I do remember that it 
came to me with the completeness of an aphorism, as if the subconscious had 
already done the labor of crafting it into a fine phrase.  What scared me a little at 
the time was its implication of a separate self with independent thoughts—a 
distinct self that might distill experience into all sorts of ideas for which I would 
then be responsible.  That feeling of responsibility was my first real experience of 
myself as an individual. ("Age of White Guilt" 33) 
 
Two elements of this passage are particularly striking, especially in light of the article as 
a whole.  First, Steele's coming-to-consciousness is spurred not by an external 
experience, a collision with the world outside of himself, but rather by a "thought" that 
springs forth unbidden from his own mind.  In many ways, Steele's moment is a 
restatement of Cartesian cogito: by thinking, the child Steele realized he was a being.  




setting up the rest of the article which is an indictment of the black community for its 
shirking of responsibility for its faults. 
 What is most interesting about this narrative from the perspective of pragmatism 
is that the spur of internal thought, apparently welling from an individual self and not 
from interaction with any outside forces, creates the young Steele's coming-to-
consciousness.  Classical pragmatists, for whom the study of human psychology was a 
wellspring for philosophical ideas, recognized the social nature of human identity 
formation.  For example, in "The Social Self" (1913), George Herbert Mead studies the 
creation in every person of a "subject" consciousness and an "object" consciousness.  
Mead calls these two consciousnesses the "I" and the "me": "the self can not appear in 
consciousness as an 'I,' that it is always an object, i.e., a 'me'" ("Social Self" 374).  These 
two consciousnesses interact: "If the 'I' speaks, the 'me' hears" ("Social Self" 375).  
Fundamental to the creation of these two separate consciousnesses, what we today might 
call the creation of self-consciousness, is the creation of a social self.  The "me," the 
object-self, is also the self that other people see and act upon, it is "the object of the social 
conduct of others" ("Social Self" 375).  On the other hand, "The 'I' of introspection is the 
self which enters into social relations with other selves" ("Social Self" 375).  Mead 
writes:  
 
[I]t is only as the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he 
acts towards others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, 
and only as he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is 
affected by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct. 





In other words, in order for self-consciousness to begin, a person must recognize that she 
herself is a person in the world like all other people in the world; she must step back and 
consider her self the way she considers others.  This process is fundamentally social, as 
the underlying process of considering oneself is modeled after the consideration of other 
people.  Thus, introspection, for Mead, is a function of humanity's social nature, despite 
that introspection has to do with a person communicating with and examining one's own 
being.  Mead explains further:  
 
The self which consciously stands over against other selves thus becomes an 
object, an other to himself, through the very fact that he hears himself talk, and 
replies.  The mechanism of introspection is therefore given in the social attitude 
which man necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism of thought, in 
so far as thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner 
conversation. ("Social Self" 377) 
 
Even though introspection involves the self examining itself as an object, the process is, 
in the end, social, in its function and purpose. 
In Steele's coming-to-consciousness narrative, he writes that, as a ten or eleven-
year-old, "I experienced myself as an individual—as a separate consciousness—for the 
first time," equating being an "individual" with possessing self-consciousness ("Age of 
White Guilt" 33).  In his work, Mead describes in particular a child's experience with 
self-consciousness: 
 
Thus, the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his 




developed into the abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains 
dramatic, and the self which is a fusion of the remembered actor and this 
accompanying chorus is somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social.  
Later, the inner stage changes into the forum and workshop of thought. ("Social 
Self" 377-78). 
 
In other words, the child that lacks self-consciousness per se can only step outside of 
itself and view its actions from the perspective of an absent, imagined parent-character.  
It is the moment of transition from this dramatic stage into the "workshop of thought" 
that Steele recounts in his narrative.  But instead of describing a social experience of 
identity formation, in his narrative Steele emphasizes the power of an individual, 
Cartesian thinker: "I was struck by a thought that seemed beyond me. … it came to me 
with the completeness of an aphorism" ("Age of White Guilt" 33).  For Steele, the self-
consciousness process is not social, but rather individualistic, both in process and in 
purpose.  Now that he is self-conscious, Steele would be "someone who would have to 
navigate a separate and unpredictable consciousness through a world I already knew to be 
often unfair and always tense" ("Age of White Guilt" 33).  This navigation would be done 
as an individual, not a member of a social group. 
For Steele and his argument, it is very important that his childhood coming-to-
consciousness be rooted in his individual mind of a Cartesian-like thinker, not in his 
social group.  Steele launches from his narrative of self-consciousness into a discussion 
of the 1950's perspective on African American assimilation and individuality: "The idea 
of the individual resonated with Negro freedom—a freedom not for the group but for the 




was no embrace of a Negro identity, because that would have weakened the argument for 
our humanity" ("Age of White Guilt" 34).  Steele's nostalgia for the days prior to the 
advent of identity politics is palpable, but it is not realistic.  Identity politics, that is, 
claiming political and legal rights for a group of people based on similar qualities they 
share, grew as a strategy to work within America's equal protection system of 
jurisprudence.  Steele's argument is also wrong-headed, because he imagines that identity 
is formed purely from within an individual or social group.  In reality, identity is formed 
through a combination of forces, arising from within and without an individual or group 
of individuals. With this language, Steele works to draw a bright line between 
"individuals" and "group," as though these two things can exist separately, as though 
"individuals" do not always "make up the group."   
Pragmatism emphasizes just the sort of reciprocity between individuals and 
groups, the self and the social. In "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control" (1925), 
Mead writes of the comprehensive intersection between individual and group behavior: 
"In the complex life of the group, the acts of the individuals are completed only through 
the acts of other individuals" ("Self and Social Control" 186).  Although each individual 
might have a singular role to play, it is only when all of these individual roles are brought 
together into a group that these roles take on meaning.  For Mead, and James and other 
pragmatists, the group and the individual are reciprocal forces, each equally important to 




An important component of Steele's coming-to-consciousness narrative is the 
awakening of his sense of responsibility.  Throughout the rest of the article, Steele argues 
that black people in America have shirked responsibility for the improvement of their 
race, writing that, after the end of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, 
 
We allowed ourselves to see a greater power in America’s liability for our 
oppression than we saw in ourselves.  Thus we were faithless with ourselves just 
when we had given ourselves reason to have such faith [at the end of the Civil 
Rights Movement].  We couldn't have made a worse mistake.  We have not been 
the same since. ("Age of White Guilt" 35) 
 
 
Steele's language simplifies a great shift in political feeling from the 1960s through the 
1980s through today.  Steele seems to claim that the Civil Rights Movement lost steam 
because black people became "faithless" in themselves.  This may be partially true.  But it 
is also certainly true that America's majoritarian sympathies shifted as well.  The change 
observed by Steele is actually a result interaction between a small group—African 
Americans—and the larger group of which it is a member, that is, society of the United 
States.  Towards the end of the 1960s, majority public perception shifted to a place that 
believed that the "race problem" was solved.  American society was no longer 
sympathetic to continued change.  The judicial branch grew more conservative through 
appointments of justices unwilling to work beneficial social change through the 
Constitution.  It was the interaction between these concrete social forces and smaller, 
recorded and unrecorded events in black communities that created the reality Steele 




Steele's use of the term "liability" invokes the language of legal action.  But Steele 
does not encourage such legal action as a way to solve perceived problems in the black 
community in America, for legal action would require looking outside the black 
community for a source, or cause, of problems that the black community suffers.  Steele 
writes: 
 
To go after America’s liability we had to locate real transformative power outside 
ourselves.  Worse, we had to see our fate as contingent on America’s paying off 
that liability.  We have been a contingent people ever since, arguing our weakness 
and white racism in order to ignite the engine of white liability.   
 
 
Steele reveals a logical slippage at this point by relying upon a binary to make his point.  
He suggests that in order to hold America at large accountable for the wrongs done to 
African Americans as a group, both historically and currently, black people have had to 
"argue their weakness."  But this argument does not hold.  Just because one wishes to 
hold another accountable for a wrong does not mean that one reveals "weakness" in order 
to make that claim.  One can be a victim of rape or mugging, and hold another 
accountable for the crime, without being "weak." 
Steele insists on the power of the individual, contending that any claims that black 
people may make as a group are dirty identity politics: "The greatest problem in coming 
from an oppressed group is the power the oppressor has over your group.  The second 
greatest problem is the power your group has over you" ("Age of White Guilt" 36).  
Steele suggests that black America must turn toward its own resources to solve black 




at large.  This is an isolationist rejection of community, of diverse social forces coming 
together into a living unit.  Steele suggests that black people have been focusing on their 
victimhood in the face of white racism, rather than on their own communities as a source 
of strength.  This may be true in some instances, and community building is an important 
project for all groups in America.  But Steele does not consider that both strategies are 
possible at the same time: reclaiming what America at large has taken and continues to 
take through structurally racist programs or nepotism, along with working from within to 
build community strength.  Steele also bemoans the loss of individuality as a result of 
black identity politics.  The particulars of his argument suggest that "blacks fell into a 
group identity that has absolutely no other purpose than to collect the fruits of white 
guilt" ("Age of White Guilt" 40).  Steele does not suggest that the group identity might 
work as a procedure to gain needed rights under legal action.  For Steele, "to be black in 
the age of white guilt is to be a victim who is very rarely victimized by racism" ("Age of 
White Guilt" 40).  In other words, for Steele, legal action is no longer necessary since 
racism is virtually non-existent now.  Worst of all, though, for Steele, "the fervor of this 
symbiosis with white guilt has all but killed off the idea of the individual as a source of 
strength in black life.  All is group and unity" ("Age of White Guilt" 40). 
Pragmatism can help Steele better understand the relationship between individuals 
and communities.  His work relies upon two main arguments: first, that black Americans 
should reject America's aid and solve their problems; and second, that black Americans 




to the periphery.  As Mead's work in the area of social psychology shows, there is no 
individual identity this is not at the same time a social identity. Steele's arguments are not 
only wrongheaded but impossible, for a powerful symbiosis that defines the relationship 
between individuals and communities, and small communities within large communities.  
William James writes, in "The Will to Believe" (1896): 
 
A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each 
member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will 
simultaneously do theirs.  Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-
operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure 
consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately 
concerned.  A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an 
athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing 
achieved, but nothing is even attempted. ("Will to Believe" 21) 
 
In other words, although a group is made up of "many independent persons," strong faith 
in the community forms a tight bond that enables great achievement.  The activities of 
individual persons and the community bond are required for success; they are symbiotic. 
Applying this idea to Steele's complaint reveals how his suggestions—the 
rejection of the larger American community by black communities and the rejection of 
black identity by individual black people—strips away a vital component of this 
symbiosis of power and change.  Rather, by locating black America firmly within 
America at large, the transformative power and responsibility to help communities of 
black Americans would be placed within everyone’s hands, in the hands of black and 
white people together, as a larger community.  Steele writes, in an ominous tone, that 




been a contingent people ever since" ("Age of White Guilt" 35).   With these words he 
makes grave error.  For, as James's words explain, all people are contingent: no person or 
group exists alone, outside of context, culture, and community.  From community, 
individuals derive power and strength; from individuals, communities derive their power 
and creativity.   
Mead writes in his essay "A Contrast of Individualist and Social Theories of the 
Self" (1927):  
 
The difference between the social and the individual theories of the development 
of mind, self, and the social process of experience or behavior is analogous to the 
difference between the evolutionary and the contract theories of the state as held 
in the past by both rationalists and empiricists.  The latter theory takes individuals 
and their individual experiences––individual minds and selves––as logically prior 
to the social process in which they are involved, and explains the existence of that 
social process in terms of them; whereas the former takes the social process of 
experiences or behavior as logically prior to the individuals and their individual 
experiencing which are involved in it, and explains their existence in terms of that 
social process. ("Theories of the Self" 296) 
 
Here, Mead outlines two ways of thinking about the self in a community.  In the 
"individual" or "contract" theory he refers to, a self exists as complete prior to its 
entrance into social engagements, or "processes."  The social theory which Mead 
advocates suggests that individuals do not exist before joining a social organization.  One 
never starts from a point of origin—individuals are always already starting in certain 
conditions of social life. There is no master position from which one can speak about the 




Pragmatism explodes the binary of individual versus group set up by thinkers 
such as Steele and helps us see how communities are made up of individuals, and 
individuals are inescapably, and to their benefit, part of communities.  When Steele 
writes, "One's group identity is always a mask––a mask replete with a  politics," he seems 
to argue that a group identity is less authentic than an individual identity.  Steele suggests 
that group identities oppress while "individualism is freedom" ("Age of White Guilt" 36).  
With these words he presumes that identity is ever purely individual, without group 
connections or markers.  Yet, as Mead explains, the society we are thrown into marks us, 
as do the social processes that shape our identities.  It is not simply one's personal 
decision to act as an individual rather than as part of a group. 
Steele presumes that it is possible for one to present oneself to the world without a 
"mask," that one possesses a true face that one can show.  Presumably, for Steele, this 
would be one's "individual" face.  For Steele, the problem arises when this individual face 
is hidden behind the "group" face, a false face.  But can an individual ever present a true 
face to the world, a face without a persona?  And even if one did, would each person one 
encountered see the same face?  The world "is carved up and available to us only through 
the prism of our perspective-based interests and concerns" (Tamanaha 60).  Pragmatism 
suggests that because perspective shows humans the world, even if an individual could 
put on a true face, each person one encountered would see it differently, from a different, 
individual perspective.  Interactions with other people are a dynamic interplay of shifting 




interactions with the world more genuine.  Even if one insists that one is an individual, 
not a member of a race, of the group called "black people," certain members of American 
society––both black and white––will never see a black person as anything other than a 
person marked by a group identity.  When Steele writes that a group mask is "replete with 
a politics," he implies that the mask of an individual would be apolitical ("Age of White 
Guilt" 36).  Steele is searching for a neutral position that does not exist. 
Human interdependency is central to much of pragmatic thinking.  James's 
pragmatic precursor Peirce explained that by working and thinking in a community, 
humans create knowledge.  John Dewey, James's pragmatic descendent, puts even greater 
emphasis on the power of community in shaping human thinking and behavior. Drawing 
from Dewey's Democracy and Education (1916), contemporary pragmatic scholar 
Charlene Haddock Seigfried writes, "Dewey calls the illusion that one can think and act 
alone a form of insanity that is responsible for much of the avoidable suffering in the 
world" ("Dilemma" 33).  Thus, for Dewey, working in groups forces humans to consider 
others.  It makes humanity more empathetic, and at the same time, stronger for it.  At the 
bottom of Steele's call for individualism is a desire for strength and agency in a society 
that has, since its inception, denied power and agency to black people in some of the most 
brutal and inhumane ways in the history of humanity.  But to claim that black people are 
not part of American society denies them membership in a powerful community.  To 
claim that black people should somehow—as though it were possible—deny their 




Steele's own membership in the group.  The pragmatic thought of James shows that the 
greatest social power lies in claiming the strength of individuals along with the strength 
of community, and recognizing the interrelationship between them. 
 
c. Color-Blindness or Race-Consciousness? 
Steele's call for "individualism" can be read as a call for color-blindness: for 
Steele, people should be seen as individuals, not as members of a racial group, indeed, as 
not bearing any racial markings at all.  Color-blindness is a social and legal approach to 
racial politics, rather than a practical one, that negates the importance of race.  The topic 
of color-blindness in contemporary popular discussion grows confusing because people 
are actually talking about two different ideas. Color-blindness can operate on the level of 
current policy formation; it is "positive" color-blindness.  Here, proponents of color-
blindness argue that new social policies should be written in a colorblind manner because 
it is more fair to all racial groups.  Under this argument, affirmative action, due to its 
focus on race, is unfair.  The second way of considering color-blindness is more 
philosophical and "normative": it operates on the level of societal transformation.  
Because a black person cannot simply choose to be not-black in the eyes of American 
society, in order for there to be color-blindness, American society must first cease seeing 
color.  Of course, how society reaches this point is also a point of contention. 
Positive color-blindness is part of Steele's cure for the black underclass.  It is a 




changed significantly since the end of the civil rights movement.  In a column for the Los 
Angeles Times, he announces the "death of white supremacy" ("Racism").  Because white 
supremacy is dead, white racism has lost its teeth.  Focus on white racism by black 
Americans, according to Steele, only serves to mask the real problems faced by black 
society: "underdevelopment and broken families" ("Racism").  These are problems that 
can only be fixed by "black effort," not by "white goodwill" ("Racism").  Part of his 
solution is legally enforced color-blindness in the public sphere:  "Today we live in 
terrible ignorance that will no doubt last until we take race out of every aspect of public 
life—until we learn, as we did with religion, to separate it from the state" ("Racism").  
Steele justifies his call for color-blindness this way: "This does not mean that racist 
behavior today is somehow benign.  It means that today racism swims upstream in an 
atmosphere of ferocious intolerance.  Moreover, today's racism is no longer in concert 
with an overt and systematic subjugation of blacks.  While racism continues to exist, it no 
longer stunts the lives of blacks" ("Racism").  This enforcement of color-blindness 
includes the eradication of affirmative action.  He considers the movement to end 
affirmative action as a movement towards "fairness": "Was the recent defeat of 
affirmative action at the polls in Michigan an example of racism or of an insistence on 
fairness?" ("Racism"). 
Steele's use of the word "fairness" to describe the destruction of social policy 
aimed to ease oppression is merely one example of the rhetorical dismantling of 




and at the polls.  In the debate over affirmative action, the argument is often made—by 
conservatives and many so-called liberals—that we should stop making preferences 
based on race and instead become a colorblind society, in the interest of fairness and 
equality.  The way to become a (normative) colorblind society, in this line of argument, is 
to first become a positive colorblind society.  One is presumed to directly lead to the 
other.   
In public rhetoric, affirmative action is cast as "unfair" to white people by its 
detractors.  Affirmative action is also attacked by being renamed: the phrase "racial 
preferences" is often used synonymously with "affirmative action."  For example, Egan, 
in his article on Berkeley, uses the two phrases interchangeably (27).  "Racial 
preferences" is a phrase that seems to bear dirty connotations.  For those who do not 
support affirmative action implicitly, but consider it a necessary evil, "racial preferences" 
lays those evils on the table: race, and "unequal" treatment.  The Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative Committee, sponsors of the 2006 "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative" (MCRI), 
claims that the MCRI is "a proposal to amend the state constitution to ban affirmative 
action programs that give preferential treatment to groups or individuals based on their 
race, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin for public employment, education or 
contracting purposes" (MCRI). "Affirmative action" is a phrase with positive 
connotations.  "Racial preferences" implies unequal treatment, based on race, which 
sounds downright unconstitutional, even un-American.  Critics wisely attacked the 




"racial preferences" to carry the negative rhetorical weight.  Even Cornel West, a 
supporter of affirmative action, considers it a necessary evil, a "concession."  He would 
prefer instead a class-based system of affirmative action.  He writes, "an enforceable 
race-based—and later gender-based—affirmative action policy was the best possible 
compromise and concession" (Race Matters 95). 
Critics of affirmative action also use the rhetoric of color-blindness to add 
legitimacy to their own movements.  Opponents of affirmative action, such as Ward 
Connerly, the most vocal sponsor of the MCRI and similar proposals in California 
(Proposition 209) and other states, abscond with the language of civil rights and equality 
in order to make affirmative action and race-consciousness seem wrong (ACRI).  Use of 
the phrase "Civil Rights" to name the proposals in California and Michigan which 
dismantled affirmative action demonstrates the slick rhetorical maneuvering on the part 
of Connerly.  Steele can call the dismantling of affirmative action "fairness" because, 
from the perspective of conservative American society for whom he is speaking, and 
even to many centrists and so-called liberals, affirmative action now appears unfair.  It 
appears unfair because reality has been changed from one in which race-consciousness 
for the purpose of remedying discrimination was a social good to one in which any race-
consciousness—rather than color-blindness—is the equivalence of racism or worse, 
"reverse-discrimination" against white people. 
Steele insists that white supremacy is dead.  He writes that his children "have 




Connerly, and others of their opinion, America should stop focusing on race and get rid 
of racial preferences.  America is a melting pot, after all.  We are a nation of individuals 
who can pull themselves up by their bootstraps—and Steele and Connerly point to 
themselves as examples.  In this line of thought, racial group-think is only holding people 
of color back.  Black race-consciousness is simply racism in reverse.  This is the mythos 
that Connerly and Steele are selling.  But their theory does not hold when tested against 
experience. 
In many ways, the call for color-blindness is a call to erase significant aspects of a 
person's identity, those aspects represented by the signifier "race."  Race may mean 
different things to all people in America, but it nonetheless means something to all.  It is 
an aspect, a quality, that shapes who we are and become.  The social ethics that are 
central to the pragmatism of John Dewey and Jane Addams asserts that we are social 
creatures, products of our cultural settings.  Dewey, in his 1888 essay "The Ethics of 
Democracy," warns against considering people as abstractions, removed from their 
environments: 
 
If [the student of society] will beware of such abstractions, he will remember that 
men cannot be reduced for political purposes, any more than for any other, to bare 
figure ones, marks to be placed in rows set over against one another.  A man when 
he comes to vote does not put off from him, like a suit of old clothes, his 
character, his wealth, his social influence, his devotion to political interest, and 
become a naked unit. ("Ethics of Dem." 189) 
 
In other words, citizens of a democracy cannot shed their history, their culture, or their 




decisions.  Dewey would consider the call for color-blindness in policy moot and 
wrongheaded, for it is impossible to extract individuals from their cultural milieu.  
America may some day become a culture that no longer sees race, but we are not that 
culture now.  It does not make sense to legislate as though we were. 
A sleight-of-hand occurs through the popular and political discourse of color-
blindness.  Black people are told, by people like Steele, that if they would stop focusing 
on race, then race would stop holding them back.  But, as Dewey writes, we are social 
creatures, defined socially as part of an organism: we are "men only when in intrinsic 
relations to other men;" we are not "isolated non-social atoms" ("Ethics of Dem." 186).  
Yet the policy of color-blindness presumes that social influences do not matter, 
specifically when those influences are attached to race.  Race is a social construction that 
has fluctuated over centuries to serve the interests of those in power, whether those 
interests were slavery, white supremacy, or laissez-faire capitalism.  But race has also 
come to socially define African-Americans in their communities in the United States as 
cultures with languages, religions, arts, literatures, and music, all of which a policy of 
color-blindness must erase in order to work.  Race is not just skin color, it is also culture 
and community knowledge. 
Pragmatism shows us that the many broad arguments of the anti-affirmative 
action movement only hold when extracted from context and history.  One argument 
claims that affirmative action amounts to reverse discrimination and thus should be 




consciousness is regressive, no different from white supremacy, all Americans should 
aim for a colorblind society.  I argue that when returned to their place within culture, as 
pragmatism demands, these arguments cannot stand.  For in the end, a call for color-
blindness in policy decisions can be seen as a call for the erasure of history and context. 
Proponents of affirmative action and the race-consciousness it requires in order to 
operate have been charged with "reverse discrimination."  Stanley Fish quickly 
dispatches this accusation, making a point that is particularly pertinent to a pragmatic 
reading of the affirmative action debate.  He debunks the charge that affirmative action is 
merely reverse discrimination, that "racial classifications are odious and inherently 
suspect" (Trouble with Principle 27).  According to Fish, opponents of affirmative action 
charge that "If race-consciousness is a component of a policy, it is the same as any other 
policy rooted in race-consciousness—Ku Klux Klanners the same as admissions officers 
at the University of California" (Trouble with Principle 27). In other words, to the anti-
affirmative action movement, race-consciousness with the purpose of alleviating racial 
oppression is exactly the same as race-consciousness with the purpose of perpetuating 
racism.  What causes such blindness to purpose?  The trouble, according to Fish, is with 
"principle."  He writes:  
 
The objection to this line of reasoning is not that it evacuates history—
although it surely does that—but that it evacuates morality, by first taking away 
the usual measures by which we label one act abhorrent and another praiseworthy 
and then substituting for these measures a mechanical test like the question "Does 




This is the trouble with principles determined to be neutral: they operate 
by sacrificing everything people care about to their own purity. (Fish Trouble 
with Principle 27-8) 
 
The problem, according to Fish's critique, is first that a universal condemnation of race-
consciousness fails to take into account context, specifically, historical context of race in 
America.  But dehistoricizing is a lesser crime in Fish's eyes.  Amorality—that we are no 
longer able to tell the difference between acts done for the good of others and acts done 
to hurt others—is the greater problem.  The charge of reverse discrimination misses the 
point, perhaps deliberately, that affirmative action can be seen as a morally good act, an 
ameliorative act with a specific goal: the goal of contingent justice. 
Later in The Trouble with Principle Fish provides a polemic on pragmatism's 
failures, such that he can hardly be called a pragmatist. He writes, for example, "If 
pragmatism points out that its rivals cannot deliver what they promise—once-and-for-all 
answers to always relevant questions—pragmatism should itself know enough not to 
promise anything, or even to recommend anything" (Trouble with Principle 295).  Yet, 
Fish's words on morality strongly echo pragmatist sentiments. Pragmatism's idea of the 
morally good can be stated simply: it is mutable, and it is social.  John Dewey and James 
Haydon Tufts trace a genealogy of morality in their jointly written Ethics (c. 1932).  
Seigfried summarizes Dewey and Tufts's observations on the mutable nature of the good: 
"Dewey and Tufts emphasize the historically developmental character of morality and 
say that the nature of the good cannot be determined for all time but must be done over 




("Introduction" xvii).  In pragmatic terms, humanity's conception of the morally good is 
either revised or reinforced every time it is tested against experience.  As Seigfried 
explains, "Every situation has unique features, and our moral life is dynamic.  Unless we 
are willing to challenge our beliefs and test their adequacy against the actual outcomes 
acting on them, including their tangible effects on others and on bettering specific, 
harmful situations, morality will hinder rather than help in solving present social ills" 
("Introduction" xvii).  In pragmatic terms, a fixed morality is hardly morality at all, 
because morality cannot hold on to immutable principles in the face of human suffering.  
Rather, it must shift to accommodate experience, and thereby help alleviate suffering.  
This is Fish's point when he writes that charges of reverse discrimination evacuate the 
moral purpose of affirmative action.  Only by ignoring experience—knowledge gained 
through practice—history, and context can all types of racial discrimination be 
considered, in principle, to have the same pernicious effect on society. 
But isn't Steele's argument that the time for affirmative action has come and gone?  
What about his claim that most black people rarely suffer racism?  The foundation for his 
argument is that white supremacy is "dead."  But one need only compare two recent 
natural disasters and our nation's response to them—Hurricane Katrina and the tornados 
in Kansas—to see how much more simply humanity our country grants to white people 
than to black people.  Granted, the scale of the disaster in Kansas in the spring of 2007 
was barely comparable to that of Katrina and the damage it wreaked on New Orleans and 




Instead, the United States government dispatched mercenaries from Blackwater USA and 
paid them $350 per day to lay down martial law with assault rifles . Rebuilding efforts 
have been tainted by portrayals of black citizens of Louisiana as animalistic, lazy, dirty, 
and stupid—the same caricatures that have haunted black Americans since the beginning 
of America.  The white victims of the Kansas tornados did not also suffer from 
misrepresentation in the media and gross mishandling by the government.  Experiences 
such as these show that white supremacy is not dead. 
Not only is morality revisable for pragmatists like Dewey and Addams, it is also 
fundamentally social, for it is shaped by contact with other people through a diversity of 
experiences that are deliberately sought.  Addams writes, in Democracy and Social 
Ethics, "We realize, too, that social perspective and sanity of judgment come only from 
contact with social experience; that such contact is the surest corrective of opinions 
concerning the social order, and concerning efforts, however humble, for its 
improvement" (Social Ethics 7). Addams recognized that people of different economic 
backgrounds, national origins, and ethnic groups experience life in America far 
differently than she did, as an upper-class, white, educated woman.  Therefore, she 
believed it was her duty, and the duty of all members of a democracy, to deliberately seek 
unfamiliar experiences.  For Addams, "we are under a moral obligation in choosing our 
experiences, since the result of those experiences must ultimately determine our 
understanding of life" (Social Ethics 8).  The challenge is that most people find new 




within this very discomfort, according to Addams, that human understanding can grow.  
This pragmatic notion of discomfort or irritation arises in the writings of many thinkers.  
For Peirce, this discomfort is "doubt," which initiates inquiry and leads inquirers closer to 
knowledge of reality.   
Addams writes that in order to understand one another, we must "see the size of 
one another's burdens" (Social Ethics 7).   What happens if humans do not choose diverse 
experiences, but instead remain within their narrow groups?  Addams writes: "We know 
instinctively that if we grow contemptuous of our fellows, and consciously limit our 
intercourse to certain kinds of people whom we have previously decided to respect, we 
not only tremendously circumscribe our range of life, but limit the scope of our ethics" 
(Social Ethics 8).  For, human ethics and morality are not formed prior to engagement 
with others, but rather through engagement with others.  If one's human interactions are 
limited, one's ethical understanding of the world is limited as well.   
The demand for color-blindness in current policy can be understood as an attempt 
to circumscribe and suppress racial and ethnic differences.  Color-blindness is a way for 
white people to interact with black people without having to engage culturally, without 
having to recognize difference, without having to recognize the size of a black person's 
burdens, whatever that person's burdens might be.  The pragmatic response to the racial 
elision of color-blindness is the call for race-consciousness.  When race-consciousness 
governs interactions between racially different individuals, cultural differences cease to 




Whiteness can be examined as well, as a cultural construction that provides privilege in 
our society.  History, context, and experience become central sources for knowledge 
about human interaction and social amelioration.   
In his landmark article "Race-Consciousness" (1990), critical race theorist Gary 
Peller defines race-consciousness as "thinking that race should make a difference in 
social relations."  In his article, Peller traces the history of color-blindness and what he 
calls "the repudiation of race-consciousness" in current political practice (127).  He 
associates color-blindness with the adoption of the strategy of racial integration by the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s.  Peller writes: "My argument, in summary form, is 
that the boundaries of today's dominant rhetoric about race were set in the late sixties and 
early seventies, in the context of an intense cultural clash between black nationalists on 
one side, and integrationists (white and black) on the other" (127).  The problem with the 
contemporary integrationist point of view, according to Peller, is that it sees all race-
consciousness as racial prejudice.  Peller writes:  
 
In the integrationist perspective, racism is rooted in consciousness, in the 
cognitive process that attributes social significance to the arbitrary fact of skin 
color.  The mental side of racism is accordingly represented either as "prejudice," 
the prejudging of a person according to mythological stereotypes, or as "bias," the 
process of being influenced by subjective factors.  The key image here is of 
irrationalism: the problem with prejudice is that it obscures the work of reason by 
clouding perception with beliefs rooted in superstition. (129) 
 
For integrationists, race should make no difference; race, because it is a cultural 




Peller's work, when coupled with the pragmatic philosophy of Addams, makes 
clear the failures of integration when coupled with a policy of positive color-blindness.  
From the perspective of Addams's pragmatism, integration itself seems to be an ideal 
experiment in gaining the diversity of experience that would guide us to a more ethical 
social democracy.  But integration cannot work with positive color-blindness as its 
bedfellow.  Color-blindness ensures that we do not see each other as socially imbedded.  
Take school integration, for example: students from diverse backgrounds are put together 
in classrooms, but then are systematically told that they are all the same—or they should 
be.  Students are not encouraged to engage with each others' differences.  Furthermore, in 
the case of integration in the 1960s and 1970s, as Peller points out, "same" meant "white 
bourgeois," a "neutral" standard that was hardly neutral (129). 
Legal scholar Rhonda V. Magee Andrews has written on the second type of color-
blindness, normative color-blindness.  In true pragmatic fashion, she explodes dualisms 
and embraces paradoxes in her search for social amelioration.  In her article "The Third 
Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race-Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-
Slavery America" (2003), she writes:  
 
Drawing on the most compelling insights of colorblind and race conscious 
approaches leads me to a paradoxical approach which simultaneously focuses on 
both the centrality of race and race-mediated oppression in shaping the world we 
know and the paramount importance of our essential commonality as human 
beings. If race and racial bias remain salient in American law and politics, and 
there is no question that they do, we have a duty under the Constitution to take 
aggressive steps to minimize their harmful effects on people's lives. If, however, 




race, we must minimize our reliance on the concept of race in ordering our 
sociopolitical lives. (Andrews 487) 
 
Andrews rejects the contemporary policy of color-blindness, because "traditional 
proponents of the colorblind perspective … have utterly failed to incorporate what we 
have learned about the implications of racialization and race-based oppression—its 
continuing threat to universal human dignity for all, and its ability to coexist with the 
color-blind approach" (559).  Yet she embraces the possibility of a future society in 
which race is no longer a salient characteristic in social structuring.  She is willing to 
trespass on the both sides of the color-blindness debate in order to imagine dynamic 
solutions to current problems of racism and racial oppression.  She chooses a method that 
"emphasizes our commonality but takes into consideration the role of race in our lives" 
(559).   
She brings together the strengths of normative color-blindness and race-
consciousness in crafting her model.  She provides an alternative to race-consciousness 
and color-blindness, utilizing a new non-dualistic term, "humanity consciousness" 
(Andrews 489).  Although she argues that "race should be rejected as the primary basis 
for ordering our socio-political thought and action," she also recognizes that racial 
injustice will persist during this "period of transition" America will find itself in.  In 
response, Andrews writes, "I propose a dual race-and-humanity conscious approach that 
would permit the use of race to remedy the effects of minority oppression and white 




humanity-conscious approach" (489).  She insists upon working through the law, 
rejecting a cynical outlook about the American legal system held by some of her 
compatriots.  She observes that some legal theorists  
 
conclude that American law will never do more than maintain, by clever devices, 
the systemic white-over-black privilege that whites have come to expect.  Perhaps 
they are right.  Nevertheless, like many critical race theorists, I have refrained 
from giving up altogether on the principles that provide the only basis for the kind 
of human communication and negotiation by which real change ultimately can be 
made. (557) 
 
Andrews has not given up hope in the American legal process, the "principles" she refers 
to here.   
Although pragmatism sees the law less as principles and more as a set of useful 
tools, Andrews's words strongly echo the words of Addams, in which Addams professes 
an unstoppable faith in the transformative power of democracy and the processes of the 
American political system.  Despite the human suffering Addams found around her in 
Chicago during her years at Hull-House, she never gave up the belief that "the cure for 
the ills of Democracy is more Democracy" (Social Ethics 9).  Addams's faith is not in 
immutable political concepts, but rather in day-to-day political struggles that, in the end, 
create and recreate our democratic process.  Similarly, Andrews writes, "Appeals to 
abstract principles generally serve better as masks for the socio-political power struggles 
which explain legal results," arguing instead that "constitutional law, like all law, must be 
viewed as a social product" (557).  Because they can imagine possibilities inherent in 














ADDAMS, HOLMES, AND CONTEMPORARY  
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
a. Holmes, Pragmatism, and Reading the Law 
An original member of the Metaphysical Club, Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes's philosophical conversations and letters with Charles Sanders Peirce, 
William James, and John Dewey helped shape pragmatic thought in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  Holmes did not call himself a pragmatist; Menand explains 
that Holmes "associated the term with a desire to smuggle religion back into modern 
thought under a pseudo-scientific cover" (432).  Yet, Holmes's "belief that life is an 
experiment, and that since we can never be certain we must tolerate dissent, is consistent 
with everything James, Peirce, and Dewey wrote.  What Holmes did not share with those 
thinkers was their optimism.  He did not believe that the experimental spirit will 
necessarily lead us, ultimately, down the right path" (Menand 432-33).  This lack of 
belief in the transformative possibilities of experience and social democracy separates 
Holmes from his pragmatist contemporaries such as Addams and Dewey.  However, as a 
legal scholar, Holmes provides insight into the relationship between "experiment," as 
Menand terms it, and the law.  In this chapter I would like to draw on Holmes's ideas 
about the relationship between "experiment" and the law and combine these ideas with a 




legal theory to examine the theory of affirmative action jurisprudence and the most recent 
Supreme Court cases treating affirmative action, Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) and Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003). 
Holmes opens his magisterial text The Common Law (1881) with this language: 
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" ("Common Law" 1).  
What does Holmes mean by "experience?"  He means, as Menand explains, "culture" 
(Menand 437).  Although in today's usage, the word culture has taken on a variety of 
meanings, often conflicting, for Holmes, "culture" referred to "[t]he felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed" ("Common Law" 1).  When Holmes writes that the "life of the law" has not 
been logic, he does not mean to say that the law is illogical.  Rather, Holmes is 
emphasizing the interwoven relationship of the law in human society.  Syllogism and 
other logical tools are empty, useless tools without human culture to act with and 
through.  To help make his point, Holmes draws a line between form and substance of the 
law: "The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it 
goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the 
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past" 
("Common Law" 1-2).  Thus, for Holmes, substance, or content, of law is driven by what 




derive from our legal past are embodied in the form and structures of the law, in our legal 
processes.  The law, for Holmes, is a fusion of past and present, of form and substance—
of theory and experience.  He might not have called himself a pragmatist, but he often 
thought like one.  Like Dewey and James, he rejected a priori notions of truth and instead 
shaped his judicial decisions around experience. 
Even among the early pragmatists, there grew deep philosophical splits.  One such 
split falls along the development of social democracy, as compared to more traditional 
liberal ideas of democracy.  In her treatise Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), when 
Addams declares that "the cure for the ills of Democracy is more democracy" (Social 
Ethics 12), Dewey responds with this statement: "The old saying that the cure for the ills 
of Democracy is more democracy is not apt if it means that the evils may be remedied by 
introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which already exists" (Public & 
Problems 144).  As Seigfried explains, if "democracy" is understood by its traditional 
liberal definition, more democracy will only be "having more of what ails such a political 
order" ("Socializing Democracy" 209).  Seigfried explains that liberal democracy refers 
to "a process by which individuals seek to satisfy their own needs in complete disregard 
of those others who are expected to protect their own interests or fall by the wayside" 
("Socializing Democracy" 209).  In its characterization in the field of political science, a 
liberal understanding then of democracy encourages individuals to act in a self-interested 
manner; it is opposed to intervention that prevents the individual from pursuing self-




politics, a distinction can be drawn between liberal, laissez-faire democracy and the 
social democracy advocated by Dewey and Addams. 
The roots of liberal democratic theory are deep, but it has strong support in the 
industrial and capitalist growth of the late nineteenth century: in, for example, the liberal 
social theorist Herbert Spencer's reading of evolutionary theory.  Spencer believed 
evolution indicated that "survival of the fittest," a phrase he coined, leads to social 
progress (Menand 143).  Spencer took his premises from Darwin's research but applied 
them to human social behavior in a positivist manner.  Like many in the 19th century, 
Holmes subscribed to Spencer's social Darwinism and he supported Eugenics for this 
reason, believing that the most fit of the species were most capable of making 
contributions for the betterment of society.  In the case Buck v. Bell (1927), he wrote the 
opinion approving compulsory sterilization by the state of Virginia.  The victims of the 
sterilization were a mother and daughter, described in the facts in this manner: "Carrie 
Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above 
mentioned in due form.  She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same 
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child" (Buck 205).  Based on 
these facts, Holmes found that the interests of the state outweighed the interests of Carrie 
Buck and her daughter, and granted permission to force them to be sterilized: 
 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who 
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  The principle that sustains 
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 





Holmes's words reveal his lack of interest in the sacrifice of individuals for what he 
perceived to be the greater good of society.  In this moment, Holmes's words reveals the 
strong relationship between utilitarian social theory and "survival of the fittest" social 
Darwinism.  Holmes's opinion in Buck had far-reaching consequences, rendering forced 
sterilization active policy around the country for decades.   
Menand provides useful insight into Holmes's legal theory.  Menand writes:  
 
The key to Holmes's civil liberties opinions is the key to all his jurisprudence: it is 
that he thought only in terms of aggregate social forces; he had no concern for the 
individual.  The spectacle of individuals falling victim to dominant political or 
economic tendencies, when those tendencies had been instantiated in duly enacted 
laws, gave him a kind of chilly satisfaction. (65-66).   
 
The key word in this passage is "spectacle."  It emphasizes the position of Holmes as 
spectator, removed from the effects his decisions might have upon individuals in society.    
Holmes's disregard for the fate of individuals stands in stark contrast to the philosophy of 
Jane Addams, John Dewey, and other pragmatists, who insist that individuals and their 
opinions are essential to a valid democracy, because the greater the experience we have 
to use the truer or more real our conclusions will be (Dewey Public & Problems 177).  
Addams in particular dedicated her life to helping individuals resist victimization by the 
political and economic forces which threatened to crush them.  She often wrote about the 
life stories of individuals, and through these narratives derived her theory.  In crafting a 




provides a necessary antidote to the disregard of the individual prevalent in the legal 
writings of Holmes. 
Holmes's jurisprudence makes it possible for contemporary self-styled 
pragmatists such as Richard Posner and Richard Rorty to makes claims about the moral 
emptiness of pragmatism—even though Holmes rejected the pragmatist label.  The Law 
and Economics school of legal analysis, of which Judge Posner is a leader, is strongly 
rooted in the theoretical work of Holmes.  Holmes advocated a working knowledge of 
statistics and economics by lawyers and legal scholars, rejecting the role played by 
"history" in legal thought in his day: 
 
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of 
dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our 
energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring 
them.  A step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an 
understanding of economics. … In the present state of political economy, indeed, 
we come again upon history on a larger scale, but there we are called on to 
consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the 
cost. ("Path of the Law" 1005) 
 
Although he emphasizes consequences, a pragmatic maxim, Holmes's words can be read 
to oversimplify this maxim into cost-benefit, means-end analysis.  These are the ideas 
that are linked to contemporary legal pragmatism.  It appears that contemporary legal 
pragmatism has been reduced to utilitarianism.   
What Holmes lacked, and what Posner lacks, are two necessary components of 
pragmatic method: diversity of perspective and empathy.  Holmes was willing to reject 




his analysis is strictly rooted in the perspective of a Supreme Court Justice claiming to 
know what is best for society.  Essentially, Holmes claims to act in a neutral manner.   
Holmes saw nothing wrong with this objectivism, and neither does Posner.  This is the 
problem with Posner's neo-pragmatism; this is why Holmes is not a pragmatist.  
Pragmatism insists on multiple perspectives, believing that every member of society has a 
perspective and that every person's perspective is should be heard.  The more variety of 
experience that we bring to bear on an issue of social importance, the more accurately we 
can act upon that issue, the more "true" our understanding of that issue will be.  Holmes's 
and Posner's objectivism collides with pragmatic perspectivism, which requires that the 
observer recognize his position as observer, and all of the privileges that inhere in that 
position.  It is doubtful that Holmes recognized his perspective as a perspective at all. 
Pragmatism, through its constant questioning of so-called objectivity, allows us to 
see that all too often the people sacrificed for the greater good are those deemed by the 
wealthy and powerful to be unimportant.  Society ends up sacrificing poor people, ethnic 
and racial outsiders, women, and other marginalized people, because it assumes their 
experience does not matter, or because it assumes that they do not know as much as 
powerful people, or because they do not represent the greatest number of people.  For 
example, although in the Buck case Holmes claims to be considering what is best for 
society, his reasoning ends up erasing the individuality of the persons whose physical 
integrity is at stake.  He protects society at the expense of a family of women.  Yet, for 




order to establish a principle that the greater good would be served by forced sterilization. 
Holmes's upper-class, powerful, white, male perspective omits consideration of the 
perspectives of racial, ethnic, gender, and economic outsiders. 
This mode of decisionmaking distinguishes Holmes's work from pragmatism, at 
least theoretically. Pragmatism deliberately searches for the perspectives of outsiders––
the non-lawyers, the defendants, the "imbeciles"––as central to its method of truth.  This 
deliberate search for diversity of perspective is essential to the theory of social 
democracy which drives much of the work of John Dewey and Jane Addams.  Dewey 
writes, "Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life.  It is the idea of community life itself.  It is an ideal in the only  
intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of some thing which 
exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected" (Public & Problems 148).  
Addams, a social activist, lived her philosophy.  She founded and directed a settlement 
house in one of the poorest slums of Chicago, and her experiences with outsiders such as 
immigrants, prostitutes, and laborers informed all of her pragmatist beliefs.  Because of 
Addams's focus on the experiences of outsiders, her writings provide an essential and 








b. Jane Addams, Perplexity, and Perspective 
According to the ethical pragmatism of Jane Addams, all people have a duty to 
search for a diversity of experiences. Addams writes, "We are learning that a standard of 
social ethics is not attained by traveling a sequestered byway, but by mixing on the 
thronged and common road…" (Social Ethics 7).  These experiences ensure that we keep 
in mind the perspectives of others and prevent us from slipping into solipsism. The duty 
is heightened for those who have power over the lives of others, people like judges and 
politicians, or the presidents of corporations who control the lives of their workers.  
Addams derived and modified her theories through her career at the Hull-House 
Settlement in Chicago, where she worked with immigrant and working class families to 
improve living conditions for all.  For example, in her essay "Charitable Effort," Addams 
examines the relationships between wealthy charity visitors and the working class 
families they visit.  As Addams recounts, when charity visitors encountered the real lives 
of working class families, received doctrines tended to be called into question.  Charity 
visitors were often taught that families which needed charity were lazy.  But upon 
meeting the families, visitors realized the families were instead hard workers exploited by 
industry and poor labor conditions.  Visitors then found themselves perplexed by this 
conflict between beliefs and experiences.  Recognizing that many visitors were unsure 
how to act, Addams wrote to help guide people through these moments of perplexity. 
Similar to Peirce's "irritation of doubt," Addams's notion of "perplexity" is key to 




Social Ethics 26). Although perplexity arises from the "absolute crashing of two ethical 
standards," the root of perplexity, in Addams's view, is democracy itself.  "The young 
charity visitor who goes from a family living upon a most precarious industrial level to 
her own home in a prosperous part of the city, if she is sensitive at all, is never free from 
perplexities which our growing democracy forces upon her" (Addams Social Ethics 13, 
31).  For the charity workers in Addams's stories, perplexity forces a choice.  As 
Seigfried explains, "The perplexity cannot be resolved without developing a new 
understanding of the situation and calling into question received values" (Seigfried 
"Introduction" xxiii).  Thus, we can either welcome this new understanding, or at 
minimum allow it space, adjusting our awareness of the world to align with it, or we can 
refuse to change and suppress the perplexity.   
Toward the end of the essay, Addams poses two important questions: "Of what 
use is all this striving and perplexity?  Has the experience any value?" (Social Ethics 31).  
The answer, for Addams, is undoubtedly yes, but only if we apply what we have learned 
through experience.  Too often, according to Addams, "We distrust the human impulse as 
well as the teachings of our own experience, and in their stead substitute dogmatic rules 
for conduct" (Social Ethics 32-33).  In other words, many times we suppress what we 
learn and let the rules given to us by others tell us what we should do or believe, even if 
those rules are contradicted by what we have learned on our own.  Our experiences 
cannot help us if "[w]e forget that the accumulation of knowledge and the holding of 




to life itself" (Addams Social Ethics 33).  Through the endless cycle of experiences and 
examination of those experiences, we can revise the received doctrines that do not hold 
true, and develop new theories to help us move forward into the future.  The present can 
help discern what is useful in the past in order to craft our future. 
It is here that the ideas of Addams and Holmes can begin a productive dialogue.  
Although they disagree on the progressive possibilities of pragmatism, Holmes has much 
to say on the use of history in the present interpretation of laws, laws that have 
fundamental power over our future.  He writes, "It is revolting to have no better reason 
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past" ("Path of the Law" 1001).  Like 
Addams, Holmes rejects hanging onto received doctrine when present experience reveals 
it to be useless or dead wrong.  Addams's work adds to Holmes's, in that it insists on a 
duty to add diversity to our experiences in order to consider the perspectives of others.  It 
is important to note that this duty is not based on an abstract morality or a feeling of 
beneficence toward those whose perspectives one seeks; rather, it is scientific, pragmatic.  
Hearkening back to Peirce and the law of errors, one must gather perspectives on the path 
to truth.   Taken together, Holmes and Addams's ideas help formulate a method for 
examining legal cases, a pragmatic strategy that insists we use the past only when it is 
useful in terms of present legal problems and that take into account the perspectives and 





c. Pragmatic Ethics and Legal Outsiders 
Jane Addams articulates a necessity to embrace the perspectives of all people in 
order to have a more ethical democracy.  A similar necessity arises in the limited realm of 
the legal system: the perspectives of all people must be welcomed in order to ensure the 
legal system treats all people fairly.  Too often, only the voices of legal insiders are 
heard—the voices of judges and lawyers, as well as the voices of the wealthy and 
powerful who can afford superior legal representation.  Philosophy and legal scholar 
Costas Douzinas outlines an ethical duty for contemporary Anglo-American legal 
practice.  Douzinas observes, "Law appears at its most imperialistic at the precise 
moment when it starts losing its specificity" (Douzinas 202).  In other words, when the 
law ceases to be anchored in the lived experience of the people whose lives it controls, it 
slips from being a democratic system of justice into tyranny.  The pragmatic ethic I put 
forward here aims to re-anchor the law in the lives of legal outsiders. 
Although the legal system currently claims to treat all comers equally, as 
Douzinas explains, this "equality before the law is only formal; it necessarily ignores the 
specific history, motive, and need that the litigant brings to the law" (Douzinas 213).  
Instead of treating a legal outsider as an individual, the law translates her into a faceless, 
inhuman form that the legal system can grasp.  Thus, "legal freedom is . . . the freedom to 
be what the law has ordained" (Douzinas 213).  In Buck v. Bell, Carrie Buck ceased to be 




might desire to forcibly sterilize.  Holmes and the rest of the Supreme Court erased her 
history, her identity, in order to make their judgment.  "Legal freedom" can indeed be 
tyranny.  Pragmatism, as defined by and practiced by Addams, demonstrates how the 
experiences of legal outsiders provide necessary "irritation" and "perplexity" for the law.  
Legal insiders—lawyers, judges—are the mediators of this perplexity.  Insiders can 
ensure that the law listens to the experiences of outsiders, allows their words to enter into 
the law, and thereby to change the law.  The law has traditionally been a transitive force 
in that it acts upon something, applying formal, fixed principles upon faceless outsiders 
that come before it.  Through dialogue, lawyers and judges have the opportunity to 
mediate the reductive, self-centered system of the law in order to preserve the 
perspectives of legal outsiders. 
A companion to perplexity in Addams's work is the work of "investigation."  Like 
perplexity, investigation is a commonplace word that takes on significant meaning in 
Addams's pragmatic philosophy.  Through investigation, Addams brings into 
consideration the experiences of outsiders.  In Twenty Years at Hull-House, she writes of 
the early days of the Hull-House settlement, explaining the centrality of investigation to 
her work.  One characteristic of settlements in general, she writes, is "insisting that each 
new undertaking should be preceded by carefully ascertained facts" (Hull-House 77).  
These facts, for Addams, are gathered by "investigation" (Hull-House 77).  Investigation 
is not lone contemplation by a thinker removed from human experience; rather, it is 




example, when Hull-House desired to start a public kitchen, an "investigation of the 
sweatshops had disclosed the fact, that sewing women during the busy season paid little 
attention to the feeding of their families" (Addams Hull-House 77).  Further, one of the 
Hull-House residents "made an investigation, at the instance of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, into the food values of the dietaries of various immigrants, 
and this was followed by an investigation made by another resident, for the United States 
Department of Labor, into the foods of the Italian colony" (Addams Hull-House 77-78).  
Addams uses the word "investigation" three times in a half of a page: it is her mantra, 
central to her pragmatic vision.  Without investigation, one cannot hear the perspectives 
of others; without these perspectives, for Addams, there can be no democracy. 
What the Hull-House workers learned through their investigations surprised them: 
the neighborhood residents weren't interested in the dietetically sound yet unpalatable 
food from the kitchen.  However, at the same time, Hull-House was beginning to provide 
social gathering space for neighborhood residents.  This gathering space was hugely 
popular.  Addams writes, "The experience of the coffee-house taught us not to hold on to 
preconceived ideas of what the neighborhood ought to have, but to keep ourselves in 
readiness to modify and adapt our undertakings as we discovered those things which the 
neighborhood was ready to accept" (Hull-House 79).  Thus, it is not enough to simply 
conduct investigations and listen to the perspectives of others; one must allow these 
perspectives to arouse perplexity, and then allow perplexity to modify behavior.  The 




because they were perplexed that underfed workers didn't want their food.  After 
investigating further and listening to the needs of the neighborhood, they discovered that 
what the people would use was a meeting space, and provided that instead. 
We can learn important lessons by drawing parallels from the work of Addams.  
Does the law listen to the perspectives of those most affected by its rulings?  I would 
argue, in the realm of affirmative action jurisprudence, the voices of those most affected, 
students from underrepresented minorities, are rarely heard.  The law fails to seek out 
their voices, instead listening to university administrators—defendants in most recent 
affirmative action suits—and white plaintiffs supported by our white upper- and middle-
class whose voices have the most power in our society, even though they are no longer a 
majority.  The true outsiders have gone missing. 
 
d. Perspective and the "Liberal Defense" of Affirmative Action 
There are some legal scholars who are working to bring the perspectives of 
outsiders into affirmative action jurisprudence.  These scholars recognize that the cases 
challenging affirmative action such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
(1978) and the recent University of Michigan cases Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Gratz 
v. Bollinger (2003) present the perspective of white students who claim to be wronged by 
the "racial discrimination" inherent in affirmative action programs.  They suggest, and I 
agree, that these white students are insiders in affirmative action litigation, as they share 




meant to remedy.  In order to have true, democratic debate about affirmative action, we 
need to conduct pragmatic investigation and bring the perspectives of all people to bear 
on these issues.  Thus far, the cases before the Supreme Court have utterly failed in this 
respect. 
Before Grutter and Gratz, colleges and universities justified affirmative action 
policies in admissions by pointing to Justice Powell's majority opinion in the Bakke case.  
In Bakke, a white male who had been denied admission twice to the medical school at the 
University of California at Davis, sued the University of California for violating the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Bakke 269-70).  The Equal Protection Clause reads, "no state shall … deny 
any person with its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  It was enacted in 1868 
as part of the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, which abolished slavery; the 
Fourteenth, which dealt with equal protection, due process, and citizenship; and the 
Fifteenth, which provided for universal male suffrage.  Unfortunately, in the Civil  Rights 
Cases (1883), a group of similar cases considered together, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Congress lacked the power to outlaw racial discrimination by private actors.  This 
case set the foundation for decades of Jim Crow segregation throughout the United 
States.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to bring life back into the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Using the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution as a 
groundwork, in order to bypass the holding of the Civil Rights Cases, the Civil Rights 




employment, education, public accommodations (owned by private companies), etc.  
Title VI, which students have used to sue universities in affirmative actions cases, 
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" 
(USA). 
Plaintiff Allan Bakke complained that the special admissions program at the 
Davis medical school impermissibly excluded him on the basis of his race.  Davis 
admissions office reserved 16 seats out of a class of 100 for minority students.  In his 
opinion for the majority, Justice Powell asserted that first of all, any racial and ethnic 
classification is inherently suspect, without regard to whether the group discriminated 
against is a "discrete and insular minority" (Bakke 290).  In other words, it doesn't matter 
whether the racial classification is made to help a historically disfavored minority; any 
racial classification will receive special review by the courts.   Powell then held that 
Davis's special admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it used 
a quota or fixed numerical set-aside on the basis of race.  This process was deemed 
impermissible because it discriminated against white applicants: "In summary, it is 
evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial 
classification never before countenanced by this Court.  It tells applicants who are not 
Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the 




California and other colleges and universities may use race as one of many factors in 
admissions in order to achieve the state's interest in a diverse educational environment. 
After providing his opinion for the majority, Powell wrote a famous "Appendix" 
to his opinion (Bakke 321).  In the Appendix, Powell addresses the topic of diversity and 
how universities might achieve it without violating the Constitution.  Although this dicta 
is not controlling, it was quoted often during the quarter century between Bakke and 
Grutter.  Powell points to the admissions process at Harvard College as a model for 
achieving racial and ethnic diversity in higher education: 
 
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational process 
has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions.  Fifteen or twenty years ago, 
however, diversity meant students from California, New York, and 
Massachusetts; city dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and football 
players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics 
and politicians.  The result was that very few ethnic or racial minorities attended 
Harvard College.  In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of 
diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic 
groups.  Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but 
also blacks and Chicanos and other minority students.  Contemporary conditions 
in the United States mean that if Harvard College is to continue to offer a first-
rate education to its students, minority representation in the undergraduate body 
cannot be ignored by the Committee on Admissions. (Bakke 322-23) 
 
Universities modeled their affirmative action programs using Powell's diversity 
justification for decades afterwards.  These diversity-minded programs remained 
significantly unchallenged until the Grutter and Gratz cases in Michigan, heard by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 2003.  Bakke allowed affirmative action to survive, but not the 




what has changed is perspective—the court has shifted its point of view from that of the 
victims of structural white supremacy to that of those who benefit from it.  From the 
perspective of the victims of white supremacy, affirmative action should remedy past and 
present racial oppression.  When that perspective is shifted to the perspective of those 
who benefit from white supremacy, the only argument left in favor of affirmative action 
is the diversity argument, which essentially says that the presence of black students and 
other students of color will enhance the education of a predominantly white class of 
students. 
Legal scholar William J. Rich has written on the importance of considering 
perspective in considering affirmative action cases.  He explains that in the years since 
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court in particular and 
the federal judiciary as a whole has shifted its perspective.  In Brown, the courts took into 
account the experiences of the victims of discrimination, a point of view that Rich calls 
the "antisubordination principle" (Rich 323).  Under the antisubordination principle, the 
courts find an "affirmative duty to eliminate segregation."  From this posture, "The 
dominant majority violated the Equal Protection Clause when it forced the minority into a 
position that all perceived as subordinate" (Rich 323).  Rich contrasts the 
antisubordination principle with the posture that has come to dominate affirmative action 
jurisprudence: the "color-blind principle."  As he explains, the difference between these 
principles "can be understood in terms of the perspectives of the class of victims of 




affirmative action from the perspective of the victims, they ceased to see any judicial 
obligation to remedy domination by our white majority and historically white 
supremacist institutions.  Instead, the judicial imperative has shifted toward color-
blindness, a remedy chosen and approved by the white majority. 
Legal scholar and critical race theorist Charles R. Lawrence criticizes mainstream 
liberal theory for denying the perspective of the oppressed in the affirmative action 
debate.  He writes, regarding the use of the notion of equal protection: "Critics of liberal 
theory, including critical race theorists, have offered another way to think about 
promoting equality and human dignity, one that reflects the perspective of the 
subordinated.  Consider the constitutional and moral command of equal protection as one 
requiring the elimination of racism rather than mandating equal treatment as an individual 
right" (Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 950-51).  Like Rich, Lawrence calls this way 
of thinking about equality "antisubordination" theory.  He writes, "Such a substantive 
approach assumes that ridding society of racial subordination is indispensable and a 
prerequisite to individual dignity and equality" ("Two Views of the River" 951).  For 
Lawrence, perspective is an important component of antisubordination theory.   
Lawrence examines contemporary debates over affirmative actions identifying 
what he calls the "liberal defense," which is based in the state's interest in maintaining 
diversity in education, compared with the a defense of affirmative action grounded in 
antisubordination theory and racial justice ("Two Views of the River" 931, 32).  He 




diversity argument to defend affirmative action at elite universities and law schools 
without questioning the ways that traditional admissions criteria continue to perpetuate 
race and class privilege" ("Two Views of the River" 931).  The liberal defense of 
affirmative action, the defense that Powell provided in his Appendix to Bakke, suggests 
that the quality of education at colleges and universities is enhanced by a diverse student 
body. There is significant empirical data to support this claim.  But the problem is, 
according to Lawrence, is the liberal defense of affirmative action maintains existing 
structures of oppression:  
 
The case for diversity is a case for the integration of a privileged class.  Because 
the liberal defense of affirmative action accepts the reproduction of elites as the 
primary purpose of selective colleges and universities, it neither questions the 
validity of standard admissions criteria used at these institutions, nor examines the 
ways that these criteria reinforce the effects of societal segregation and racism. 
(Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 941).   
 
In short, the liberal defense is a top-down defense, a defense from the perspective of 
elites.  It is the defense given by the gatekeepers of top universities and accepted by the 
insiders of the legal system.  As Lawrence explains, liberals are attracted to the diversity 
defense because it is the "argument for racial integration that least threatens their own 
privilege" (Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 941).  The diversity defense doesn't 
require insiders in the academy or the legal system to seek out the perspective of 
outsiders. 
Lawrence recognizes the problem of perspective inherent in the liberal defense of 




different perspective, in order to bring the experiences of outsiders into the narrative of 
affirmative action.  In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 209 which banned 
affirmative action in all public institutions, including the University of California system.  
In 1999, a Mexican-American, an African-American, and a Filipina-American filed a 
class-action suit against the Regents of the University of California and against the 
University of California at Berkeley.  They were all top students in their high schools and 
all had been denied admission to Berkeley.  Lawrence explains that  
 
The current Berkeley admissions process creates a preference for white 
folks in two very concrete ways: First, it gives bonus points to high school 
students who are enrolled in advanced placement courses; and second, it relies in 
a determinative and exclusionary way on insignificant differences in standardized 
test scores.  
Advanced placement courses are not available in every California high 
school. According to the lawyers representing the Rios plaintiffs, "As many as 
twenty-five percent of California's high schools offer no AP courses whatsoever. 
Yet some high schools - four percent - offered twenty-one or more AP courses. 
Thus, where a student attends high school plays a very large part in his or her 
chances of admission to Berkeley."  In fact, over fifty percent of Berkeley 
students come from only five percent of California's high schools. (Lawrence 
"Two Views of the River" 943-44) 
 
Lawrence's study of this law suit is significant because it turns the typical affirmative 
action challenge on its head.  He deliberately takes the perspective of students who were 
the former the beneficiaries of affirmative action and explains why the stripping away of 
affirmative action violates their equal protection rights.  Essentially, the standards of 
merit that are accepted by the liberal defense are revealed to be discriminatory.  




classes and SAT scores and hold the University responsible for perpetuating the 
discriminatory practices and conditions of the larger society via the use of such criteria.  
…[t]he suit exposes and demands an end to systemic, institutional racial preferences" 
(Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 946).  The plaintiffs in the Rios class action suit 
expose our "neutral" college admissions standards for what they are: part of a social 
structure built upon racial oppression (Rios).  Unlike the liberal defense, "The Rios suit 
speaks from the vantage point of the subordinated" (Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 
951).  We need more investigation such as this in order to bring a full chorus of voices 
into the debate over affirmative action.   
 
e. Grutter, Gratz, and Pragmatism 
The recent coupled opinions of Grutter and Gratz come firmly from the 
perspectives of upper- and middle-class, of white people, and of legal insiders.  Although 
in the end the Supreme Court upholds affirmative action with Grutter, it is clear that the 
Justices find race conscious programs a necessary evil, not something to be embraced.  
"Diversity" is the primary defense of affirmative action in Grutter.  The Court does not 
find race conscious programs necessary for remedying past discrimination.  Past 
discrimination is never considered at all.  In fact, it is arguable that any such "backward-
looking" arguments have been stripped forever from affirmative action jurisprudence.  
Ironically, though, O'Connor's opinion in Grutter has been called "pragmatic" both by 




with it (as an insult).  I suggest here that the opinion is not pragmatic at all, for it is 
written from the vantage point of white, powerful, legal insiders and fails to take into 
consideration the perspectives of those who affirmative action is designed to help.  
Without the perspectives of all people, the Grutter opinion ends up being tyrannical, as I 
will demonstrate.   
The Supreme Court considered Gratz and Grutter together as a pair.  In Gratz, 
white applicants to the undergraduate program at the University of Michigan asserted that 
the admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In the undergraduate 
admissions program, applicants were awarded a certain number of points for certain 
qualities.  If they reached one hundred points, they were generally admitted.  Membership 
in an underrepresented minority group was given a flat point-value of twenty.  Plaintiffs 
alleged that this allotment all but guaranteed admittance those black people, Latinos, and 
Native Americans, and the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the point system looked 
too much like a quota for their comfort.  The clincher for the Court was that the system 
failed to provide "individualized consideration" of each applicant (Gratz 269).  Justice 
William Rehnquist writes, for the majority, "Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 
emphasized the importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, 
assessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that 
individual's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education" (Gratz 271).  




Arts] policy does not provide such individualized consideration" (Gratz 272).  Because 
race becomes a decisive factor for underrepresented minority applicants, the policy is 
held unconstitutional.   
In contrast to the Gratz opinion, Grutter upheld affirmative action under certain 
circumstances.  Like the plaintiffs in Gratz, the white plaintiffs claimed here the 
admissions program of the University of Michigan law school violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  However, this time the Court found that the consideration given to race was not 
decisive, and that each application was considered individually. Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor writes for the majority, clarifying the importance of considering each 
application individually: 
 
When using race as a 'plus' factor in university admissions, a university's 
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.  The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions 
program is paramount. (Grutter 337) 
 
In applying this standard to the Michigan Law School's admission policy, she writes, 
"Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute 
to a diverse educational environment" (Grutter 337).  She discusses at length the 
necessity of a diverse student body in higher education in particular.  First, she writes that 




schools, when they state that "diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits" (Grutter 
328).  Diversity "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial 
stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of different races" (Grutter 
330).  O'Connor asserts that business leaders are better prepared if they have come from a 
diverse educational environment, as are military officers (Grutter 330-31).  She concludes 
that "the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm 
nonminority applicants" (Grutter 341). 
At the end of Grutter, the Court's opinion takes a strange turn.  These are the 
words I would like to examine most closely, for they reveal the most about the Court's 
position on affirmative action in particular and racial equality in general.  After 
pronouncing the holding, O'Connor writes, "We are mindful, however, that '[a] core 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race'" (Grutter 341) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti 1984).  There are 
two unstated premises behind this "purpose."  First, this purpose is the interpretation that 
the Court has given to the Fourteenth Amendment, and not one that is necessary or 
natural.  Second, with these words O'Connor presupposes that affirmative action qualifies 
as "discrimination based on race," a premise that the Rios plaintiffs challenge with their 
lawsuit.  These words reveal what is fundamentally wrong with the liberal defense of race 
conscious admission policies: it presumes that these policies are wrong at their core, that 
they are discriminatory, a necessary evil.  Thus, the liberal defense finds itself on the side 




O'Connor writes, is that affirmative action is a "deviation from the norm of equal 
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups" (Grutter 342).  In order to justify the evil of race 
discrimination in college admissions, a rhetorical position that O'Connor put herself in 
with her own arguments, she writes: 
 
Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.  This 
requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, 
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the 
interest demands.  Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences 
would offend this fundamental equal protection principle. (Grutter 342) 
 
In response to this "principle" of equal protection the Court suggests "sunset provisions," 
time limits on race-conscious admissions policies.  This legislative move is highly 
unusual for judicial decisions. Then, the Court goes even further and puts a specific time 
limit on their own opinion: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today" (Grutter 
343).  In other words, although the state's interest in diversity will remain viable 
indefinitely, the Court believes that in a quarter century diversity will just happen on its 
own. 
But this is the problem with diversity: people do not tend to seek out the company 
of people unlike themselves, others whose opinions, beliefs, and ways will disrupt 
preconceived notions of how the world is supposed to be.  Diversity provokes doubt and 
perplexity, and perplexity isn't fun.  Addams recognized this; she writes: "We can recall 




conviction that they are different from other men and women, … Such people refuse to 
be bound by any relation save the personally luxurious ones of love and admiration, or 
the identity of political opinion, or religious creed" (Social Ethics 8-9).  Addams imposed 
an affirmative duty on all people to seek out diverse experiences, to investigate, to gather 
perspectives, to welcome perplexity, because "diversified human experience and resultant 
sympathy … are the foundations and guarantee of Democracy" (Social Ethics 7).  
O'Connor and the Court recognized the value of diversity to a viable democracy when 
they justified diversity as a rationale for race-conscious admissions programs.  But they 
conceded to the enemies of race-conscious programs that affirmative action is a 
"deviation from the norm," rather than a necessary condition of democratic education and 
democratic society.  The next chapter will explore how a slight shift in thinking and a 
more dramatic change in pedagogical practices can transform our current system of 







DEWEY, PRAGMATIC PEDAGOGY, AND MEANINGFUL DIVERSITY 
 
Grutter v. Bollinger provides two exhortations to colleges and universities 
interested in using race-conscious admissions processes.  First, the application process 
must provide individual consideration of each applicant, including a "holistic" weighing 
of each person's potential contributions to a class of students (Grutter 337).  Second, the 
only acceptable justification for race-conscious admissions are the benefits of a diverse 
educational environment (Grutter 330-31).  So, schools that use race-conscious 
admissions have a duty to ensure that the learning environments they foster are indeed 
diverse.  These two concepts—individual consideration and diversity—are also central 
concepts for pragmatic educational methods, from John Dewey's work through the 
present day.  In this section, I will explore the relationship between pragmatism, 
pedagogy, and affirmative action, in hopes of finding the answers to some questions that 
proceed from the holding of Grutter. What does it mean to teach with, through, around, 
or—in the case of California or Michigan—without affirmative action? What does it 
mean to consider our students as individuals? What does "diversity" mean, and what duty 
does it impose on teachers and schools? 
These questions emphasize the importance of considering affirmative action in the 
context of teaching.  Too often it seems that the debate swirls into the stratosphere and 




gets to learn, and what and how they learn.  Pragmatism insists that inquiry remain firmly 
planted on the ground; the affirmative action debate must remain grounded in the lives of 
students and teachers who live the consequences of the political wrangling every day. 
 
a. The Individual in Education 
In his introduction to John Dewey's Democracy and Education, twentieth-century 
pragmatic philosopher Sidney Hook emphasizes the importance for Dewey of 
considering all facets of a person's identity.  He writes, "[T]he motivation for Dewey's 
concern with the social coefficients of 'equal opportunity' flows from his appreciation of 
the unique value of the individual" (Hook xxii).  Dewey focuses much of his educational 
philosophy on "individual experience," always concerned that we not "judge people only 
by whether they are men or women, black or white, Jew or Gentile, American or foreign 
and thereby overlook the specificity, the individuality, and the uniqueness of the person" 
(Hook xxii, xxiii).  In his writings on education, Dewey recognizes the grave importance 
of "breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men 
from perceiving the full import of their activity" (Dewey Democracy & Education 93).  
What would Dewey have thought of the requirement of Grutter of holistic consideration 
of university applications?  It appears that Dewey's insistence that we not judge people 
only by their race or class or nationality or gender aligns with the Grutter instructions.  
However, although their words sound similar, the purpose of Dewey's writings is to 




instructions of the Grutter decision on holistic consideration of applications does not 
come from a liberatory position, but rather from one that seeks to set hurdles in the path 
of eliminating the oppression of disfavored minority groups.   
Grutter is not a decision about disfavored minorities; in fact, disfavored 
minorities hardly appear in the opinion at all.  The plaintiffs in Grutter, like those of 
Bakke and Gratz, were white students who claimed to be harmed by the admissions 
policies of public universities.  When the Supreme Court held the policies in Bakke and 
Gratz to be unconstitutional, they agreed that the rights of the plaintiffs were infringed 
upon by the policies.  In other words, the Court held that white students were unfairly 
hurt by race-conscious admissions policies.  In Gratz and Bakke, the Court did not 
address the perspectives of the black, Latino or Native American students who are hurt 
by racism.  Their point of view was omitted from the "facts" section of the opinions.  The 
opposing party in the case was not the group of exploited and oppressed minority 
students in America who do or may benefit from affirmative action.  Instead, the 
Universities of California (Bakke) and Michigan (Gratz) stood opposite the white 
plaintiffs and argued their interests in having diverse student bodies for the sake of 
improving the education of all of its students.  The white plaintiffs called themselves 
"victims of affirmative action" (CIR).  The defendants were large, state institutions, 
historically all-white, run predominantly by white people.  Eight of the nine justices 
which heard the 2003 cases were white; all of the Bakke justices were white.  I do not 




Justice Clarence Thomas's stance with that of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg in order to 
lose that simplistic viewpoint.  However, in the Grutter case, it is arguable that 
significant parties to the litigation are missing: students of color whose race hurts their 
chances of admission to college when affirmative action is stripped away from the 
admissions process.   
In Grutter, the perspectives of parties to the litigation were omitted.  The 
pragmatic method of truth tells us that without the perspectives of all parties involved, we 
cannot approach an accurate consideration of a conflict.  When O'Connor writes that each 
applicant to the Michigan Law School must be considered in a holistic manner, she is 
contrasting the Law School's policy with the undergraduate policy of Gratz, in which 
being a disfavored minority (black, Latino, or Native American) earned a candidate a 
certain number of "points," and drastically boosted chances of admission.  The Michigan 
undergraduate policy under examination in Gratz admitted "virtually every minimally 
qualified underrepresented minority applicant" (Gratz 272).  It was held to violate the 
rights of white applicants because "the University's use of race in its current freshman 
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling 
interest in diversity" (Gratz 275).  The interests of disfavored minority students were 
never considered by the Gratz or Grutter decisions.  The directions the Court provides in 
Grutter to provide individual consideration of law student applications is not designed to 
protect disfavored minorities from exclusion based on their race, but rather to protect 




light, Grutter flips the pragmatic educational philosophy of John Dewey on its head.  
Dewey's admonishments about consideration of race and gender tell us we must consider 
people as individuals as well members of groups such as black people or women.  Thus, 
he does not advocate color-blindness, but rather race- and gender-consciousness 
combined with appreciation of each person's individual qualities.  He fears that if we do 
not give members of disfavored groups individual consideration, then the powerful 
members of society will reject these people outright simply because they are members of 
oppressed minority groups.  On the contrary, in the Grutter decision, the Supreme Court 
fears that schools will accept—not reject—students simply because they are members of 
oppressed minorities.  Dewey held legitimate fears that American society would mistreat 
minorities.  The Grutter Court fears we are treating them too well. 
The only conclusion to draw from the Grutter decision, especially when viewed 
in light of Dewey's work, is that our judiciary has slipped too far from the lives of real 
people.  The Court has failed to consider the interests of a significant party to this 
litigation—the interests of disfavored minority students.  And precisely because they are 
who they are—disfavored minorities—their interests fail to be represented in our nation's 
highest court.  We need lawyers willing to take on the interests of students like the 
students in the Rios case, lawyers willing to think outside of the confines of Justice 
Powell's dicta in Bakke.  Perhaps they can consider new ways that our Equal Protection 
clause can be construed to actively protect each person equitably, rather than allowing it 




opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas writes that "the Equal Protection Clause renders the 
color of one's skin constitutionally irrelevant" (Grutter 335).  Yet, experience-based 
knowledge shows that, for now at least, race matters greatly to how many people of color 
confront life in the United States, and the voices of these experiences must be allowed to 
help shape educational policymaking. 
 
b. Diversity-Reflection-Readjustment 
Pragmatism has much to say about the role of diversity in shaping a democratic 
society.  The pragmatic thought of John Dewey addresses our social interactions in 
general and our educational interactions in particular.  Most importantly, as Dewey 
asserts, our educational system is inextricable from the sort of society we shape.  Thus, it 
is important we keep in mind that "[t]he conception of education as a social process and 
function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind" 
(Democracy & Education 103).  In his political writings, Dewey established a pragmatist 
notion of democracy.  In The Public and Its Problems (1927), Dewey provides "a 
statement of the nature of the democratic idea in its generic social sense" (Public & 
Problems 147).  He writes of democracy: 
 
From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share 
according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to 
which one belongs and participating according to need in the values which the 
groups sustain.  From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the 
potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and good 




specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and 
fully in connection with other groups. (Public & Problems 147) 
 
Thus, Dewey recognized that democracy consists of the dynamic interaction of 
individuals as individuals and as group-members.  Too often the debate surrounding 
affirmative action is reduced to the fight for "individual rights" on one side and "group 
think" on the other.  Dewey illustrates with this mapping of social democracy that, in 
practice, each member of a democratic society negotiates membership in a number of 
groups all of the time, and yet does so as an individual with certain individual 
responsibilities.  Individual rights and responsibilities and group rights and 
responsibilities are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing. 
Using this concept of negotiating group responsibilities, Dewey identifies two 
components of democratic education.  The first is the cultivation of common interests 
between diverse group members.  He writes: "In order to have a large number of values 
in common, all the members of the group must have an equable opportunity to receive 
and to take from others.  There must be a large variety of shared undertakings and 
experiences" (Democracy & Education 90).  The second is the promotion of interaction 
between different groups, in order to encourage "reorganization and progress through 
wider relationships (Dewey Democracy & Education 91).  These two components—
common interests of individuals and interaction between groups—are closely related and 
dependent on one another for success.  Without recognition of common interests, no 




without interaction, there can be no cultivation of common interests, as this must 
necessarily be done in a communal environment with all parties taking part in the 
creation of those interests and goals.  For if certain groups are left out of the goal-creation 
process, then the goals and interests are not "common." 
Dewey recognizes the radical importance of diversity in education: "Every 
expansive era in the history of mankind has coincided with the operation of factors which 
have tended to eliminate distance between peoples and classes previous hemmed off from 
one another" (Democracy & Education 92).  But it is not enough to bring people of 
different backgrounds into close contact with one another: diverse peoples must also 
learn from these experiences, reflect upon them, and craft behavior accordingly.  Thus, 
diversity in education must include a reflective component.  Students must think about 
the consequences of working together in a cross-cultural environment toward common 
goals.  Dewey writes that although people have begun to come into closer contact with 
one another, "It remains for the most part to secure the intellectual and emotional 
significance of this physical annihilation of space" (Democracy & Education 92).  In 
summary, Dewey's instructions provide an excellent model for democratic, diverse 
education in a race-conscious environment.  He does not suggest that we merely throw 
people of diverse backgrounds together in classrooms.  Rather, educators must create 
environments in which all students actively learn from one another by creating common 
goals that students work toward together.  During this work process, all students must 




Dewey's watchword for the learning process created through diversity is 
"readjustment" (Democracy & Education 92): 
 
The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy.  The first [common 
interests] signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared 
common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a 
factor in social control.  The second [group interactions] means not only freer 
interaction between social groups … but change in social habit—its continuous 
readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse.  
And these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted 
society. (Dewey Democracy & Education 92). 
 
Readjustment is central to the pragmatic learning process.  Similar to Jane Addams's 
notion of "perplexity," Dewey recognizes that social interactions coupled with reflection 
will force us to question previously held beliefs, requiring readjustment of our belief 
systems and attendant habits and behaviors.  Readjustment, in the end, yields new action, 
which for pragmatism is the consequence and the initiation of thought.  This pragmatic 
formula of diversity-reflection-readjustment is the groundwork for what I call meaningful 
diversity. 
In the Grutter decisions, the Court agreed with the University of Michigan's 
arguments that "educational benefits … flow from a diverse student body" (Grutter 328).  
The Court notes that this was the only "justification for their use of race in the admissions 
process" given by the school—not to remedy past discrimination, not to remedy present 
discrimination (Grutter 328).  The University of Michigan took a conservative tactic, 
hoping to preserve affirmative action by pointing toward Justice Powell's diversity dicta 




of how to make diversity meaningful in education.  Justice Antonin Scalia attacks this 
gap in his dissenting opinion.  He writes that some universities will "talk the talk of 
multiculturalism and racial diversity but walk the walk of tribalism and racial segregation 
on their campuses—through minority-only student organizations, separate minority 
housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate minority-only 
graduate ceremonies" (Grutter 349).  I agree with Scalia that universities often admit 
students from disfavored minorities and then turn their backs once the students hit 
campus.  I would go so far as to say that the majority of schools practice this type of 
"diversity." 
Before I tackle the difference between Grutter-diversity and meaningful diversity, 
I must address a serious defect in Scalia's rhetoric.  Scalia writes that even with 
affirmative action, schools are prone to "tribalism" in the form of minority self-
segregation, listing various campus organizations that minority groups often form.  First, 
Scalia's use of the word "tribalism" to refer to minority groups is a woeful error.  For 
centuries black people, Latinos, Native Americans and other people of color have been 
labeled "native," "savage," and "tribal" by whites.  That Scalia has invoked this type of 
racial domination in this context is despicable.  But this kind of defect is typical of 
Scalia's writing—a brilliant jurist, he is nevertheless prone to slips of the pen that, 
intentional or no, reveal a disturbing solipsism.  For example, in his dissenting opinion in 
Romer v. Evans (1996), a decision which overturned a Colorado state constitutional 




"The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite" (Romer 636).  With these 
words, Scalia intended to assert that the Court has no business meddling in affairs of 
culture, even if it is a "culture war."  Scalia's use of the word "Kulturkampf" received 
much attention at the time.  One legal commentator observes: "why would one choose to 
begin an opinion—particularly one dealing with civil rights issues—with a German term, 
especially one that incorporates the word "kampf," with its reverberations of Hitler's 
Mein Kampf and the persecution and extermination of Jews, gay people, and other 
minorities in Nazi Germany?" (Lafferty 185).  "Tribalism" and "Kulturkampf" are 
deliberately insensitive and insulting words, wrong to use in judicial opinions, because 
judicial opinions make law with words.  These words only reinforce the power that a 
white male justice wields over the lives of disfavored minorities. 
Secondly, although Scalia properly observes that colleges and universities often 
do sponsor minority-focused student groups, living groups, and student centers, he fails 
to recognize that the student and housing groups welcome membership of friends who are 
not members of that particular minority (UNC-BLSA).  The stated purposes of these 
groups often includes the promotion of cross-racial understanding.  Other purposes 
include addressing "problems unique to Black students" and "to promote diversity within 
the [school] community" (UNC-BLSA; Duke-BLSA).  Minority-focused student centers 
welcome students who are of other races and ethnicities because they exist to educate and 
cultivate community. These groups and centers do not have the invidious purpose of 




they feel that the interests of these groups do not align with their own interests.  
Furthermore, there would be no need for student organizations to promote diversity or 
address the needs of black students if these tasks were accomplished by the university 
community at large.  The organizations exist because too often black students need 
support and representation in the broader university community, a community that often 
excludes them, socially, intellectually, and politically, because they are viewed as 
different.  Scalia's observations reverse the causation: minority student groups and 
centers are not the cause of segregation on campus; they are formed in response to it.  But 
Scalia is correct when he writes that some schools may "talk the talk" of diversity but fail 
to "walk the walk."  This returns to the primary question facing diversity in education: 
How can teachers make diversity meaningful?   
 
c. Pedagogy for Meaningful Diversity 
John Dewey emphasizes that maintaining diversity "is a matter of deliberate 
effort" (Democracy & Education 93).  Our society "must see to it that intellectual 
opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms" because the health of our 
democracy depends on it (Democracy & Education 93).  This is an affirmative duty, one 
that does not stop at college admissions, but follows each student and teacher into the 
classroom.  The Grutter majority waxed poetic on the benefits of educational diversity 
both in the university setting and for society at large, but they failed to address how such 




his dissent, though shaded by his insulting language, should be heeded.  Universities must 
be held accountable beyond the admissions process.  The "educational benefits of 
diversity" can only be realized through "deliberate effort." 
Law professor Carole Buckner writes about making the "aspirational rhetoric" of 
Grutter into a reality (878). Although Buckner's work deals with law schools in 
particular, her pedagogical ideas easily translate into undergraduate learning 
environments as well.  A critical idea in Buckner's study is "equitable participation" of all 
students in classrooms and other university environments.  Too often, she asserts, 
minority students and women gain admission to universities and graduate/professional 
schools but do not find as many opportunities to participate in the classroom as do their 
white male peers.  The solution to this exclusion from participation lies in the hands of 
educators.  Buckner writes, addressing Justice Scalia's admonitions in Grutter: 
"Implementation of pedagogical strategies conducive to the equitable participation of 
minority law students can transform the 'talk' of multiculturalism into an experiential 
reality of robust participation" (878).  Buckner suggests that to begin to understand the 
problems minority students face, educators must conduct an examination—an 
"investigation" to use Addams's term.  She writes, "'The inequities that exist in the larger 
society are reflected in the classrooms.'  To understand this at the micro level, we must 
'look to the bottom;' that is, we must examine the actual experiences (the reality) of those 




pragmatic fashion, Buckner grounds her knowledge firmly in the experiences of the 
students she seeks to help.   
Buckner's choice of perspective—"looking to the bottom"—echoes that of 
Charles R. Lawrence when he advocates the perspective of the plaintiffs of the Rios 
lawsuit.  Lawrence calls the liberal defense of affirmative action "the view from the top" 
(Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 932).  The Rios suit, in which a class of minority 
plaintiffs sued the University of California for excluding them due to their minority 
status, embodies "the view from the bottom" (Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 942).  
The suit provides a voice to show why race-conscious admissions are both just and 
necessary.  The Rios suit challenges the presumption of liberal theory which "focuses on 
guarding the liberty of an autonomous, disconnected human being. … For the liberal 
legal theorist, racism consists of isolated prejudicial discriminatory practices in an 
otherwise nondiscriminatory world" (Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 950).  The 
liberal model does not reflect the true experiences of those who experience racism today, 
usually as "microaggressions" from many actors and in a structural and institutional 
manner (Davis 1565).  The liberal defense of affirmative action affects how diversity is 
instituted on campus as well.  It "justifies diversity as a way to help privileged whites 
better understand people of color in a nation that may soon have a non-white majority" 
(Lawrence "Two Views of the River" 950).  The way it stands now, "diversity" merely 




Buckner hopes to dispel this twisted vision of diversity's purpose.  Her first 
investigation confirms that minority students do not achieve in law school as well as non-
minority students by the traditional standards of measurement.  They have lower grades, 
higher rates of attrition, and earn fewer judicial clerkships.  These arguments have been 
used by those who seek to eradicate affirmative action, by suggesting that minority 
students are not prepared for law school.  Anti-affirmative action advocates suggest that 
minority students fail because they are not "qualified."  Some criticize the effects of 
diversity on black students.  For example, Justice Thomas writes in his dissenting opinion 
in Grutter, that "heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students" (Grutter 
364).  Thomas argues that black students succeed academically at higher rates if they 
attend historically black colleges (HBCs).  In a way, he is acknowledging what Lawrence 
identified as well: that diversity as it is currently envisioned exists to help white students.  
Rather than blaming minority students for their poor performance as does Thomas, 
Buckner examines the work of educators.  She welcomes the perplexity that is raised 
when otherwise "qualified" minority students fail to achieve in school.  She writes, "law 
school instructors agree that students who participate actively in class more readily 
develop analytical and communication skills. … [C]lass participation affects academic 
achievement independent of gender, ethnicity, and class.  Yet, participation of minority 
students in law school classes is disproportionately low, and many minority students 
choose silence" (886-87).  What she describes is not meaningful diversity, but diversity in 




Buckner advocates, among other strategies, cultivating cooperative learning 
environments which strongly echo the social learning strategies advocated by John 
Dewey.  In Experience and Education, Dewey writes about the importance of allowing 
students to work in groups in order to develop community skills and what he calls "social 
control" (Experience & Education 54).  Social control of individuals operates "without 
violation of freedom" because it is the group as a whole which governs.  Authority comes 
from within, rather than from without.  Dewey contrasts his progressive school model 
with traditional schools in which the "school was not a group or community held together 
by participation in common activities" (Experience & Education 55).  In "the new 
schools," he continues, "the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of 
the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to 
contribute and to which all feel a responsibility" (Experience & Education 56).  However, 
good cooperative work does not come without preparation on the part of the educator.  
He writes: 
 
A genuine community life does not organize itself in an enduring way purely 
spontaneously.  It requires thought and planning ahead.  The educator is 
responsible for a knowledge of individuals and for a knowledge of the subject-
matter that will enable activities to be selected which lend themselves to social 
organization, on organization in which all individuals have an opportunity to 
contribute something… (Experience & Education 56). 
 
Thus, in order to craft a successful cooperative learning environment, the educator must 
use all of the knowledge and experience she has about her students and the subject matter 




Contemporary pragmatist and pedagogical theorist Hephzibah Roskelly, in her 
book Breaking (into) the Circle: Group Work for Change in the English Classroom, notes 
that although group work, a common cooperative learning practice, "is resoundingly 
endorsed" by pedagogy theorists, it is often "unsuccessful in practice" (4).  When 
beginning her work on cooperative learning, Roskelly listened to the voice of perplexity 
that spoke when study after study showed that students of color, even those from wealthy 
families, achieved academically at lower rates than white students (7).  Roskelly 
recognizes the power that group work bears for increasing meaningful diversity.  She 
writes,  
 
[M]any students of color, systematically excluded from the circle of academic 
responsibility and achievement, begin to choose their own circles, outside the 
schoolyards.  The real hope of group work lies in the possibility it can offer for 
nurturing more equitable systems within the classroom and the institution—more 
equal spaces for all the members who are invited to break into the academic 
circle—that is, all students who enter public schools. (7) 
 
Group work can create vital communities that welcome those who have until now been 
exclude by our educational system.   
Like Dewey, Roskelly recognizes that forming effective groups is not easy.  She 
provides four “maxims” for group work.  First, teachers must "make group work organic" 
(130).  If group work is only a sporadic part of the work of the work for a course, then the 
group work will seem forced and unimportant.  Second, Roskelly suggests educators 
"teach people how to work in a group" (130).  Teachers cannot assume that students 




been taught to compete with other students, not to collaborate.  We can encourage 
collaboration by providing thoughtful points of discussion for group-members to work on 
together.  Third, Roskelly suggests that educators "Make membership in a group 
permanent" (130). Making groups permanent throughout a semester or a school year 
allows group-members to develop confidence in each other and create a safe space for 
new types of thinking, thereby developing community.  Finally, Roskelly advises: "Make 
the group’s work real" (130).  Students can tell when the work they do does not matter.  
If the work does not matter, then the groups will not matter either. 
Buckner too advocates group learning in the classroom.  She grounds her model 
of cooperative learning in studies of minority law students and their preferred learning 
styles.  Through her investigations, she learned that Native American students, black 
students, and Hispanic students all typically "prefer a cooperative style of learning" 
(922).  She defines cooperative learning as "a pedagogical approach in which a teacher 
structures learning so that heterogeneous groups of students work together to achieve a 
shared learning goal" (923-24).  She warns, "Simply asking students to work together in 
groups will not create cooperative learning, and such an approach misses the fundamental 
nature and spirit of cooperative learning" (924).  Like Roskelly, Buckner provides 
specific guidelines for cooperative learning that include assigning specific roles to 
students in groups to emphasize group "interdependence" (930).  Yet at the same time, 
the educator must insure that there is "individual accountability" (931).  Buckner allows 




members prepared for class" (932).  "Group processing" is essential; this is the reflective 
component of cooperative learning, when members "discuss the effectiveness of their 
groups" (933).  "Promotive interaction" provides the opportunity for students to provide 
feedback to each other on their work; however, as Buckner notes, this type of interaction 
requires the development of "social skills" (934).  Dewey, Roskelly, Buckner, and other 
pedagogy theorists provide excellent guidance how to implement cooperative learning in 
the classroom and the benefits it provides for democratic learning.  All that is required 
now are educators willing to step out of traditional modes of pedagogy and walk the walk 
of meaningful diversity. 
 
d. Paulo Freire and Contemporary Pragmatic Pedagogy 
One of the most influential thinkers in pedagogy of the twentieth century is 
Brazilian pedagogy theorist and activist Paulo Freire (1921-1997). His work is set in the 
context of illiterate Brazilian peasant laborers seeking freedom and self-actualization 
through literacy and knowledge during the 1960s (Lownd).  Educated in the law and 
philosophy, Freire soon gained a reputation as a progressive educator, helping educate 
poor laborers at a time when the right to vote in Brazil was contingent on literacy.  
Although his writings deal specifically with revolutionary Brazil, his ideas transcend time 
and geography and have been used by many teachers in the United States to theorize their 
work.  "Liberatory pedagogy" is Freire's model of learning which is "grounded in the 




praxis: "the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to 
transform it" (79).  Freire's concept of praxis along with his privileging of students' lived 
experience has led to the embrace of his work by contemporary American pragmatists.  
Pragmatic philosopher Cornel West writes, "Paulo Freire is the exemplary organic 
intellectual of our time," referring to Antonio Gramsci's term, "… It is safe to say that his 
classic work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, was a world-historical event for counter-
hegemonic theorists and activists in search of new ways of linking social theory to 
narratives of human freedom" (West "Preface" xiii).  Freire's work strongly echoes 
pragmatism.  The pedagogy he advocates can help create meaningful diversity in 
classrooms the United States. 
Roskelly and Ronald, contemporary pragmatists and professors of rhetoric and 
composition, assert the pragmatic possibilities of the work of Paulo Freire.  The authors 
concentrate on the ways Freire's work focuses on drawing connections between the 
"world and the word," that is, between social activism and literacy ("Untested Feasibility" 
612).  In their article "Untested Feasibility: Imagining the Pragmatic Possibility of Paulo 
Freire," they show "How teachers might re-create, rather than import, Freire into our own 
North American contexts—and so not lose the power of his ideas" ("Untested Feasibility" 
612).  "At the same time," they note, "exploring the connections between pragmatic 
philosophy and liberatory pedagogy also invites a remaking of pragmatism itself as 
Freirean ideas extend and comment on the earlier approach" ("Untested Feasibility" 613). 




explain.  They caution U.S. teachers who would use Freire’s ideas in their classrooms.  
Rather than importing Freire’s work wholesale into the United States, his work must be 
"re-invented" for our context ("Untested Feasibility" 612).  Re-inventing Freire as a 
pragmatist, as Roskelly and Ronald suggest, would plant his theories firmly in American 
soil.   
Through the course of their article, the authors take three pragmatic tenets in turn 
and re-invent Freire through the lens of each.  First, Roskelly and Ronald explain that 
"Freire and the pragmatists share [a] belief in the centrality of experience" ("Untested 
Feasibility" 621).  Freire believed that both students and teachers needed to engage with 
life experience in order to "see how their words shape their worlds" ("Untested 
Feasibility" 621).  Second, the authors show how pragmatic mediation—the breaking 
down of oppositional binaries and creation of new relationships—is central to Freire's 
literacy methods.  They write, "Pragmatism offers a method of getting beyond dualism, 
recognizing that a third principle, a triadic conception that can put two ideas into 
dialogue, can lead thinkers out of traps of ideological narrowness, meaningless debate, 
and fatalism" ("Untested Feasibility" 626).  Mediation of dualism, in the form of 
dialogue, formed the groundwork of Freire's process.  For Freire, the authors explain, 
"The connections among language, thought, and action are real" ("Untested Feasibility" 
626).  Third and lastly, Roskelly and Ronald approach the work of Freire through the lens 
of pragmatic truth.  They  write, "as Peirce and James outlined it, pragmatic philosophy 




possibility and a worthwhile goal, a belief that is equally important in pragmatic method 
and theory" ("Untested Feasibility" 627).  The authors relate pragmatic truth to Freire's 
unwavering sense of hope: "This hope is a belief in the possibility of truth or, put another 
way, reason to hope for possibility of change" ("Untested Feasibility" 628). 
Freire's hopeful and progressive pedagogy can be called upon to negotiate 
teaching with race-consciousness. Freire's teaching methods, including dialogue, 
privileging experience, and emphasizing action, are all ways toward meaningful 
diversity.  His liberation-minded political writings can be useful guides as well.  Freire 
observes, for instance, the reaction of the wealthy oppressors in Brazil to the gaining of 
independence by peasant laborers.  His description sounds uncannily similar to the 
rhetoric of the affirmative action debate in the United States today.  He begins by 
explaining why a new government established by the working class must not be a simple 
reversal of oppressor positions: "the moment when the new regime hardens into a 
dominating 'bureaucracy' the humanist dimension of the struggle is lost and it is no longer 
possible to speak of liberation.  Hence our insistence that the authentic solution of the 
oppressor-oppressed contradiction does not lie in a mere reversal of position" (57).  
However, even when liberation of laborers is conducted in a democratic fashion, taking 
into account the perspectives of the former oppressors as well as the perspectives of the 
laborers,  
 
the former oppressors do not feel liberated.  On the contrary, they genuinely 
consider themselves to be oppressed.  Conditioned by the experience of 




oppression. … Any restriction on this way of life, in the name of the rights of the 
community, appears to the former oppressors as a profound violation of their 
individual rights … For the oppressors, "human beings" refers only to themselves; 
other people are "things." (Freire 57) 
 
Freire's observations can be useful in understanding the arguments made by those who 
seek to dismantle affirmative action, such as white people who claim to be its "victims" 
and insist on "individual rights" (CIR).  
Freire insists that the lives and experiences of students must be central subjects of 
study (96).  However, he sets up a complex pedagogical framework in which this type of 
study should take place.  First, Freire suggests that the teacher’s role is not to fill 
students’ minds with knowledge from books, what he calls "the banking method" of 
teaching.  Through the banking method, "The teacher talks about reality as if it were 
motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable.  Or else he expounds on a topic 
completely alien to the existential experience of the students.  His task is to 'fill' the 
students with the contents of his narration—contents which are detached from reality" 
(72).  The banking method is the style preferred by oppressors because the oppressed do 
not have a say in what they learn and the oppressed cannot question what they learn or its 
significance.  The banking method simply reifies existing power structures: "Education as 
the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of students, with the ideological intent 
(often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of 




Instead of the banking method, Freire suggests the "problem-posing" method of 
education: "posing the problems of human beings in relations with their world" because 
"liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information" (79).  
In order for problem-posing to work, though, "the vertical pattern characteristic of 
banking education" must first be broken down (80).  In pragmatic fashion, Freire suggests 
breaking down the teacher/student binary, mediating the binary with the creation of 
"teacher-student" and "students-teachers" (80).  The process through which the binary is 
resolved is "dialogue."  Freire writes: "The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-
teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while 
being taught also teach" (80).   
Dialogue is central to Freire's pedagogical theory and praxis.  Freire defines 
dialogue as "the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the 
world" (88).  For Freire, dialogue is a powerful tool: "If it is in speaking their word that 
people, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by which 
they achieve significance as human beings.  Dialogue is thus an existential necessity" 
(88).  Through dialogue, teachers and students bring the life experiences of students into 
the classroom: "It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, 
nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about 
their view and ours.  We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in 
their action, reflects their situation in the world" (96).  However, Freire refines the 




investigation is not persons (as if they were anatomical fragments), but rather the 
thought-language with which men and women refer to reality, the levels at which they 
perceive that reality" (97).  Thus, although the life experiences of students are the object 
of study, it is important that the students themselves provide the perspective from which 
these experiences are viewed and analyzed. 
This Freirean framework of problem-posing, dismantling hierarchies, dialogue, 
and privileging student perspective and experience can be re-invented in pragmatic terms 
to aid in the creation of meaningful diversity in racially and ethnically diverse classrooms 
in the United States.  Law professor Charles R. Lawrence has written on the importance 
of "the Word" in black American pedagogy and scholarship.  Lawrence describes the 
Word as 
 
a tradition of teaching, preaching, and healing; an interdisciplinary tradition 
wherein healers are concerned with the soul and preachers with the pedagogy of 
the oppressed; a tradition that eschews hierarchy in the face of the need for all of 
us who seek liberation to be both teachers and students.  The Word is an 
articulation and validation of our common experience.  It is a vocation of struggle 
against dehumanization, a practice of raising questions about reasons for 
oppression… . ("Word and River" 336) 
 
Lawrence invokes many Freirean themes with his work: raising questions, articulation of 
experience, eschewing hierarchy, and most directly, the pedagogy of the oppressed.  He 
writes about the Freirean notion of praxis: "Within the Word we find two dimensions, 
reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—




("Word and River" 337).  In Lawrence's restatement, the pragmatic possibilities of 
Freirean pedagogy come to the fore. Dewey asserts often in his writings on education that 
reflection and experience are inextricable: "Thought or reflection, as we have already 
seen virtually if not explicitly, is the discernment of the relation between what we try to 
do and what happens in consequence.  No experience having a meaning is possible 
without some element of thought" (Democracy & Education 151).  As Dewey explains, 
students and teachers must reflect on what we do in order for our actions to have 
meaning. 
Lawrence's pedagogy is Freirean and pragmatic, and as such, contains valuable 
projects for achieving meaningful diversity in university classrooms.  Lawrence espouses 
the Freirean notion that the role of the teacher and the role of the scholar must be 
entwined.  "In fact," Lawrence writes, "my teaching (in the broadest sense, my dialogue 
with others) is the chief source of nourishment for my scholarship" ("Word and River" 
337).  One pedagogical-scholarly method that Lawrence advocates is "embracing 
subjectivity."  He explains that most scholars claim "an unbiased and universal 
perspective by distancing themselves from the social reality they seek to describe" 
("Word and River" 338).  However, pragmatism shows us that this scholarly position of 
neutrality and objectivity is impossible—every position has a perspective, and every 
perspective must be heard.  Lawrence advocates claiming one's perspective as a scholar 





The Word, in stark contrast, embraces position perspective.  It recognizes the 
impossibility of distance and impartiality in the observation of a play in which the 
observers must also be actors.  However, championing subjectivity is more than 
an acknowledgement of the existence and validity of many different and 
competing perspectives.  Practitioners of the Word must learn to privilege their 
own perspectives and those of other outsiders, understanding that the dominant 
legal discourse is premised upon the claim to knowledge of objective truths and 
the existence of neutral principles. ("Word and River" 338) 
 
Lawrence recognizes that meaningful diversity cannot be achieved so long as the 
dominant perspective pushes certain people into outsider positions.  He advocates the 
claiming of outsider perspectives, both on the part of students who can use their 
perspective to "tell one's own story" and on the part of teachers who can use perspective 
"as an antidote to the mystifying and oppressive properties of the dominant ideology of 
shared values and neutral principles" ("Word and River" 339-40). 
Race-conscious admissions policies present great opportunities to create 
meaningful diversity in higher education and through education.  Keeping in mind the 
pragmatic strategies embodied in the process of diversity-reflection-readjustment, we can 
remember that simply putting diverse students together is not enough.  Educators must 
encourage continuous reflection by students upon new relationships, and through this 
reflection, continuous readjustment of beliefs.  I have presented here just a few strategies 
provided by contemporary pragmatic educators—Freire, Buckner, Roskelly and Ronald, 
and Lawrence.  One day we will realize the goal of race-conscious admissions: all 







CONCLUSION: ON PRAGMATISM AND RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
As a white woman writing about race and affirmative action, when I discuss my 
project with other white people, I often see questions unasked on their faces: Why are you 
writing about race?  What does it have to do with you? Sometimes they ask the questions 
aloud.  Usually, they are visibly surprised that I defend affirmative action. 
The force behind these questions is the fundamental challenge faced by race-
consciousness and affirmative action in the United States, and why the call for color-
blindness gains so much political traction.  Too many white folks cannot figure out why 
race is an issue that pertains to them and why affirmative action is a fundamental 
necessity.  In U.S. culture, whiteness is a non-race—despite the efforts of academic white 
studies programs.  And since white people get on just fine without a race, then perhaps 
the feeling is that everyone else should, too.  Programs like affirmative action merely 
force everyone to pay attention to something that white people would rather forget. 
Race is the crux of this entire issue, because race is everywhere.  White people try 
to sweep it under the rug in some strange dance of non-race-speak.  White people seem to 
have an agreement among ourselves that we will not mention race when we speak to one 
another in public.  You never know who might be listening.  You never know if someone 
might think you are racist.  The problem is, white people seem to be more worried about 




For example, last month, I was at a doctor's office trying to make an appointment.  
Two white female clerks sat behind the counter.  A year had passed since my last visit 
and it was time for a check up.  The two white women were very polite, but we suffered a 
moment of confusion.  The last doctor I'd seen, Dr. Bayer, had left the practice a few 
months ago.  I needed to switch to a different doctor in the practice.   
I said, "I see Dr. Bayer is no longer with your office.  I need to find a new doctor 
here."   
One woman replied, "You couldn't have seen Dr. Bayer.  He left the practice 
before your last appointment."   
"I'm certain I saw Dr. Bayer.  He was wonderful." 
The other woman said, "Maybe you saw Dr. Connelly." 
"No, I'm certain it was Dr. Bayer." 
The first woman said, "Dr. Connelly is tall, thin…" 
"No," I said, "I saw Dr. Bayer.  The black person." 
Both women stared at me in stunned silence.  One glanced over my shoulder, 
perhaps to see if any of the black people in the waiting room heard me say the b-word.   
Since when has the very mention of a person's blackness become an insult?  
Searching for an explanation for the clerks' behavior, I wondered, did they believe Dr. 
Bayer should be ashamed of being a black person?  Did they hope that Dr. Bayer's 
blackness, an anomaly in this otherwise white doctor's office, would simply disappear if 




Patricia J. Williams identifies this tendency to talk around race.  She writes that 
"it is imperative to think about this phenomenon of closeting race" (Color-Blind Future 
8).  Her words describe my experience at the doctor's office: 
 
[T]he subject [of race] is considered a rude and transgressive one in mixed 
company, a matter whose observation is sometimes inevitable, but about which, 
once seen, little should be heard nonetheless.  Race thus tends to be treated as 
though it were an especially delicate category of social infirmity—so-called—like 
extreme obesity or disfigurement. (Color-Blind Future 8) 
 
My mentioning of Dr. Bayer's blackness horrified and embarrassed the two clerks.  
They'd spoken in circles to avoid mentioning the race of Dr. Bayer and Dr. Connelly.  In 
this excerpt, though, Williams uses "race" to refer to a race of color, like blackness.  
Whiteness would not be a social infirmity, in her terms.  On the other hand, whiteness, 
like "average" body weight, disappears into normalcy.  There is no need for a white 
person to mention a whiteness because, in the language of our society, a person is white 
unless described as something else.  But in the reality of our society, one that is swiftly 
edging toward a majority-of-color, such white solipsism is becoming impractical.  "Most" 
people just are not going to be white any more.  What are we going to do then?  Scenes 
like this one will become more and more prevalent. 
I am reminded of Rhonda V. Magee Andrews's project of "humanity 
consciousness," her attempt mediate the binary of race-consciousness and color-blindness 
(489).  Her stated goal is "post-racial human dignity" (489).  Put into the terms of my 




but it is possible that it could no longer make a difference—at least not a hurtful 
difference.  The clerks were upset that I mentioned Dr. Bayer's blackness because today 
blackness often is indeed a "social infirmity": one that hurts a person's chances of getting 
a job, getting elected to public office, getting a not-guilty verdict, getting out of a 
speeding ticket, and getting a cab.  Blackness currently is a difference that amounts to 
deviance from the norm of whiteness.  By calling Dr. Bayer "black," I invoked this notion 
of difference and deviance.  The clerks wanted to emphasize how much Dr. Bayer is just 
like us, not different and thus not deviant.  I struck back with my words, hoping they 
might see that blackness need not be deviant.  But my words were not enough. 
As a teacher, I recognize that this scene and others like it represent teaching 
moments.  Race-consciousness and meaningful diversity must be begin in classrooms at 
all levels of the educational system in the United States, or there will never be meaningful 
diversity anywhere else.  As Paulo Freire emphasizes over and over in his work, dialogue 
is central to learning.  Moments such as these, when people must speak to one another, 
can be moments of learning, not of fear or aggravation.  Teachers can meet Williams's 
imperative and bring race out of the closet to make it a conscious part of the lives of all 
people, including the lives of white people. 
I am a student and a teacher, not just in the classroom, but everywhere.  This 
notion is central to pragmatic thought.  I am always learning, always teaching, always 







Back in 2005, I presented a paper about rhetoric and the War on Terror at a large 
academic conference.  After the presentation, the discussion turned towards issues of 
teaching politics.  Instructors and professors in the room found this topic especially 
pertinent due to our repressive political regime at the time, in which it appeared that any 
civil liberty could be stripped away in the name of "terror."   Critique of government 
policy was stifled.  A member of the audience asked me how I thought we could provide 
our students with alternatives to the ideas proliferated by mainstream media outlets.  She 
saw this task as a challenge because, as teachers, we cannot bring our own "agendas" into 
the classroom.   
"Why not?" I asked her.   
She answered, with disbelief, "Because we would get fired."   
Setting aside issues of exploitation of non-tenure track instructors and the tough 
university job market these days, I forged ahead.  I replied by arguing that any speech 
challenging an oppressive dominant regime is risky, yet worth the risk.  She laughed.   
Just as troubling as her fear was this educator's endorsement of the popular, non-
academic, Horowitzian consensus that "agendas" should be eradicated from spaces of 





I have spoken with other university teachers about the possibility of political 
change starting in our classrooms.  Some seem hopeful.  Most seem overworked and 
uninterested.  Some seem afraid of even talking about politics in their classrooms. The 
issue of classroom politics has become tied to the word agenda in recent debates over 
teachers and classrooms; the word produces a bad taste in the mouth.   It needs to be 
demystified.  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary provides two definitions: "a list or outline of 
things to be considered or done" and "an underlying often ideological plan or program" 
("Agenda").  
The first definition seems simple enough.  Most teachers have a lesson plans, 
either formal or informal, that they use while teaching.  The second definition seems 
more complicated, but it really is not.  For everyone involved in education has an agenda: 
all teachers, all students, all parents of students, all institutions that facilitate learning, and 
all larger institutions that support these schools.  Sometimes, however, these agendas are 
hidden, or align so closely with the overarching agenda of current mainstream American 
policy that it all but disappears.  If one speaks against current policy, one is being 
political.  If one stands silently, one is also being political by implicitly supporting the 








The overarching question that encompasses my work presents itself simply: What 
is education for?   
There seem to be no shortage of opinions on this matter.  In a recent online 
column for the New York Times, Stanley Fish retackles affirmative action, revealing a 
shift in his opinion.  Although his underlying thought on "principles" has not changed, he 
does not believe schools should use politics to make a better society.  Schools are only 
here to teach certain subjects, and that's it. 
In the column, Fish recognizes that many arguments against affirmative action, 
especially those expounded by members of the U.S. Supreme Court, are founded on a 
conflict over "what works … and what is right" ("Revisiting"): principles versus 
pragmatism.  Justices that vote against affirmative action policies take a principles 
approach.  He outlines the parameters of the debate over race-conscious policies: 
"legislating in response to perceived social needs and legislating with an eye always to 
first principles—have defined the affirmative action debate from its beginning and 
continue to do so" ("Revisiting").  A first principles argument would say that any racial 
prejudice is wrong, even benign prejudice, because prejudice itself has some sort of 
inherent badness.  A pragmatic argument would identify a social need and then work to 
solve it. 
In judging affirmative action, Fish wonders, "Do we ask, will it work?  Or do we 
ask, is it right?" ("Revisiting").  The pragmatic tone of Fish's language is obvious: he 




questions, Fish writes: "so-called principled arguments against affirmative action work by 
evacuating both history and morality—evacuating history by going to a level of 
abstraction so high that the difference between acts motivated by beneficence and acts 
motivated by malice disappear, and evacuating morality on the same reasoning" 
("Revisiting"). 
Although Fish appears to be making an argument in favor of affirmative action, 
similar to the arguments he has made in earlier writings, toward the end of the column he 
takes a new turn.  He presents two arguments against race-conscious admissions policies 
in higher education.  The first has to do with methods of constitutional interpretation.  As 
a professional interpreter of texts, for he is an English professor as well as a professor of 
law, Fish suggests that the Constitution demands that we follow certain "interpretative 
principles" ("Revisiting").  "The pragmatic question of whether it [affirmative action] 
will improve a bad situation" is not the proper question to ask of our Constitution 
("Revisiting").   
The second argument Fish makes against his former pragmatic argument for 
affirmative action has to do with the proper roles of colleges and universities:  
 
institutions of higher education (and their faculty) have only two proper tasks: to 
introduce students to bodies of material and to equip them with analytical skills.  
Anything else, in my very strong view, is the job of some other industry or 
institution, and that includes fashioning character, molding democratic citizens, 
taking moral or political stands, and performing actions designed to make the 
world a better place.  One reason for supporting affirmative action is that it will 
make the world a better place, a more democratic place.  But from the perspective 
of my severe notion of what universities should and should not be doing, that is 





Fish continues: " It follows then that if affirmative action is to be defended, it must be on 
the basis of a pedagogical goal it directly furthers" ("Revisiting").  For a theorist opposed 
to first principles, this is a highly principled argument, and it falls apart for just this 
reason.  Fish should know that universities do not exist in a political vacuum.  Who 
decides what "material" and "skills" students should be taught, and who teaches them?  
These are highly political questions.  African American studies and Women's Studies 
departments came into existence because professors and students recognized the political 
nature of academic disciplines.  Fish yearns for a university devoid of politics, but he will 




Differences among students are not the only sources of power imbalances on 
campus.  Teachers wield extraordinary power over their students, so much that 
sometimes it is hard for teachers to comprehend.  Because of the power and influence that 
inhere in the position of teacher, there are risks to the processes of working toward of 
race-consciousness and meaningful diversity.  Dewey writes that, as students of diverse 
backgrounds come together, they must work to understand the "intellectual and emotional 
significance" of their interactions (Democracy & Education 92).  Dewey's words reveal 




new experiences, but also an emotional processing.  Students are vulnerable, and teachers 
must remember that. 
bell hooks addresses some challenges educators may face when employing 
pragmatic and Freirean pedagogical methods in American classrooms and presents 
possible solutions.  Many of these problems arise from the inherent hierarchies of power 
of U.S. classroom structures combined with the emotions that present themselves while 
using Freirean strategies.  For hooks, one of the greatest challenges is the inherent 
authority that teachers wield over students.  She advocates dialogue as a method to break 
down the power imbalance and allow for free sharing of ideas and perspectives between 
teachers and students (Teaching Community xv).   For hooks, as for Freire, dialogue 
refers to more than simple conversation.  Rather, within hooks's notion of dialogue, ideas 
and authority are shared and altered by the speakers. 
Members of a classroom seeking meaningful diversity must exercise care not to 
force class-members that are members of marginalized groups to speak for their entire 
group.  This is too much of a burden for any one student to bear.  bell hooks terms this 
role of forced spokesperson the "native informant" (Teaching to Transgress 44).  hooks 
suggests discussing with all class-members the native informant issue as a means to 
prevent it.  Students and teachers together bear responsibility to ensure that all students 
feel welcome, valued, and heard, but also free to remain silent.  As Giroux warns, the 
"social relations" that a teacher "legitimates," whether consciously or unconsciously, are 




relations is necessarily part of a teacher's job, no matter that Fish declines to recognize 
this responsibility. 
hooks addresses other risks that arise when teachers make students’ lives a central 
part of study.  She suggests that students should not be forced to write confessional 
narratives about their lives if they do not want to. Students may feel compelled to confess 
about their personal lives by teachers who reward such confessions from a position of 
judgment and power.  hooks asserts that it is unfair for teachers to require students to 
write revealing narratives while the teacher maintains a veil of secrecy about her own 
life.  The solution, according to hooks, is choice.  Students should be given the choice to 
write and talk about their own lives, or not to.  Teachers should not be forced to give 
confessional narrative writing or speaking assignments to their students, as some English 
departments require.  Another solution is for the teacher to share aspects of her own life 
with her students while asking students about their lives, thereby sharing classroom 
power.  hooks writes, "When education is the practice of freedom, students are not the 
only ones who are asked to share, to confess" (Teaching to Transgress 21).  Giroux asks 
teachers to question "the identities we offer up to students" (29).  For a teacher to share 
her life experiences requires great trust in her students—but no more than the trust that 
she asks students to place in her. 
When members of a classroom share their personal experiences on the path 
toward meaningful diversity, teachers can help students negotiate the emotional 




emotionally reflect on what is learned.  Like politics, emotions—of students and 
teachers—are always already present in the classroom.  They should be welcomed, and 




As I come to the end of this project, I think of how the classroom is like a 
courtroom.  The Rios plaintiffs, these students of color in California who sued for being 
excluded from Berkeley after affirmative action was terminated in their state, are legal 
outsiders.  They are non-white, they are immigrants, they are poor, or they are all three of 
these things.  Our judicial system was designed by people who did not have these 
plaintiffs in mind.  The laws were not written with these plaintiffs in mind.  Most 
members of the judicial system—lawyers, judges—do not look like these plaintiffs.  They 
are "outside the circle" as Roskelly puts it.  The Rios plaintiffs are also outside the circle 
in a pedagogical sense.  These students are marginalized because of their differences: 
ethnically, linguistically, economically.  Meaningful diversity can help bring them into 
the circle of learning, community, and democracy.  Being marginalized pedagogically 
and marginalized legally and politically are not unrelated.  As Justice O'Connor rightly 
observes in the Grutter opinion,  
 
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training 
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders.  Individuals with law degrees 




States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of 
Representatives. (Grutter 332) (internal citations omitted) 
 
In other words, there is a direct, causative relationship between attending law school and 
the likelihood of holding political or judicial office.  In this way, the classrooms a student 
is allowed to enter can help determine the roles that student will be permitted to play in a 
courtroom. 
Most affirmative action lawsuits that cast white students as victims reinscribe 
structures of educational and judicial power.  If a legal complaint fails to ask how a white 
student with great grades and scores could be considered the "victim" of anything, the 
circle is kept closed.  If the case only hears the voices of white students and powerful 
university administrators and powerful state officials, the circle is kept closed.  Who 
speaks for the students, the plaintiffs, who have no voice?   
I think of the questions that white people ask or don't ask me when I tell them 
about this project: why write about race and affirmative action?  I should answer with 
more questions:  Who can speak?  Who is asking the important questions?  A Supreme 
Court Justice or a white graduate student in North Carolina?  In some ways, this 
document is a legal complaint, support by evidence, by affidavits, depositions, 
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